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Abstract  
 
This thesis offers two contributions to the literature on Chinese soft power and 
practices of cultural diplomacy. Firstly, it clarifies the relationship between soft power 
and cultural diplomacy, situating 'attraction' and 'persuasion' as important 
mechanisms through which cultural diplomacy builds soft power. To gain analytic 
traction over the topic of cultural diplomacy, a three-dimensional framework is 
introduced that explores manifestations through the spheres of media, education, and 
cultural exchange. Secondly, the thesis develops a comparative review of Chinese 
cultural diplomacy with three significant global and regional powers, namely Japan, 
Russia, and the United States. This comparison explores the correspondence between 
contemporary practices and the 'Chinese Dream' framework that purportedly guides 
foreign policy action. Overall, the thesis argues that the practices of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan, Russia and the United States broadly correspond with Xi 
Jinping’s Chinese Dream. Practice and paradigm both demonstrate a broad 
commitment to more confident leadership and projection of Chinese leadership within 
international politics. However, instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, both 
the narratives of the Chinese Dream and the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy 
vary in different cases depending on the targeted country’s culture, political values, 
and the unique cultural and diplomatic relations with China. This shows the 
importance of disaggregated case study analysis to reveal the nuances of Chinese 
cultural diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
This thesis provides an exploration of soft power theory and China’s cultural diplomacy. 
The thesis develops a framework for analysing important constituent activities that 
exist under the umbrella of ‘cultural diplomacy’, and by exploring China’s practices in 
Japan, Russia, and the United States assesses the extent to which contemporary 
practices reflect the recently-articulated ‘Chinese Dream’. By doing so, the thesis 
extends scholarship on the relationship between ideas (the Chinese Dream), practice 
(contemporary cultural diplomacy activities), and soft power. This introduction 
provides an overview of the thesis and its contribution to existing literature.  
 
 
Soft power and cultural diplomacy in China 
 
Throughout recent decades, the term soft power has become increasingly popular 
amongst Chinese officials and academic circles. Cultural diplomacy represents an 
example of states’ attempts to cultivate soft power, and by focusing on these practices 
we can shed light on soft power promotion in particular countries. 
 
Soft power, or “the ability to get what a country wants through attraction and 
persuasion rather than coercion or payment”, is not a new concept in International 
Relations (Nye, 2004, p.256). It has been widely used since it was first coined by 
American scholar Joseph Nye in 1990. According to Nye, wielding soft power, which 
“involves framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction” would possibly 
contribute to a friendlier cooperative relationship between countries (2011, p.19). 
Nevertheless, while the concepts and mechanisms of soft power remain contested in 
the context of the ongoing transformations within international society, this idea 
continues to “play a crucial role in influencing the outcomes of inter-state 
relationships, as the use of hard power by state actors has been increasingly reduced” 
(Gallarotti, 2011, p.26). 
 
Nye’s initial theoretical framework of soft power was developed in the context of 
America’s foreign diplomacy. However, it is noticeable that soft power has become a 
buzzword amongst Chinese officials and academic circles especially over the past 
decade. Despite having been mentioned by Chinese leaders several times in speeches 
and interviews, soft power was officially launched as a policy aim in 2007 at the 17th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China National Congress. In president 
Hu Jintao’s work-report, he addressed that “China must enhance the country’s cultural 
soft power” (Hu, 2007, p.17). Since that statement in 2007, the term ‘soft power’ has 
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received increased attention within Chinese political and academic spheres (e.g. Men, 
2007; Yu, 2008; Zhao, 2012; Yan, 2014). Chinese academics have repeatedly 
emphasized the important role that soft power could play in promoting a more 
favorable global image of China and thus enhancing the external legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yu Xintian, director emeritus of the Shanghai Institute 
of International Studies, pointed out that “the more fashionable the ideology is, the 
more people will accept it and the greater the possibility to build the country’s soft 
power” (Yu, 2008, p.57). As one of the members of a Chinese think tank, Wang Huning 
also stated that “if a country has an admirable culture and ideological system, other 
countries will tend to follow it… It does not have to use its hard power which is 
expensive and less efficient” (Wang, 1993, p.11).  
 
In contrast to literature aiming to promote or support the promotion of Chinese soft 
power, this thesis aims to explore the relationship between ideas, practice, and soft 
power. A central focus of this thesis is the translation of soft power from theory to 
practice. It seeks to explore whether, and if so how, the idea of soft power has been 
interpreted and manifested in the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy. Since 
the emergence of soft power theory in the 1990s, cultural diplomacy, defined as “the 
application of a state’s cultural policy abroad through the exchange of ideas, 
information, culture and the arts” (Cummings, 2001, p.1), has become widely analysed 
among scholars of International Relations (IR). However, little work has specifically 
analysed China’s cultural diplomacy under the framework of soft power theory. This 
thesis argues that cultural diplomacy represents an example of China’s attempts to 
cultivate soft power, and by focusing on these practices we can shed light on soft 
power promotion in particular countries. The concepts and associated literature allow 
us to have a better grasp of the links between culture and soft power, and how that 
relationship works within the context of Chinese foreign policy. To gain analytic 
traction over the topic of cultural diplomacy, a three-dimensional framework is 
introduced that draws from and builds on existing literature, which explores cultural 
diplomacy in the spheres of media, education, and cultural exchange. This relationship 
between the framework for analysis and existing literature is explored in Chapter One. 
 
 
Introducing Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream 
 
After a brief overview of China’s cultural diplomacy, this section introduces the 
ideational core that is ‘the Chinese Dream’, which indicates the transformation of 
China’s foreign policy within Xi Jinping’s presidency. A central focus of this thesis is the 
extent to which contemporary practices reflect the recently-articulated ‘Chinese 
Dream’, and on points of similarity and difference in operationalization through the 
case study relationships. 
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Cultural diplomacy and cultural policy are highly contentious aspects of Chinese 
politics. As one of the worst incidents in CCP’s history, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution during the Chairman Mao era not only led to strong discontent against 
state-controlled cultural policy inside China but also left China with a blemished 
national and international reputation, “appearing as the various needs and demands 
of propaganda required” (Daubier, 1974, p.3).  After the economic system reform was 
officially launched by the second generation of the Chinese leadership, led by Deng 
Xiaoping, in 1979, China shifted from a centrally planned economy to a market-based 
economy and experienced rapid domestic economic and social development. However, 
after the Tiananmen Square Protest in 1989, the CCP was confronted by a legitimacy 
crisis and widely condemned within international society for the use of force against 
the protesters (Kluver, 2010, p.71).  
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, China officially joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) after a 15-year struggle, turning it into one of the world’s largest 
economies. Meanwhile, with the development of Nye’s soft power theory amongst 
Chinese officials, soft power became valued and adopted in practice, which has led to 
an intangible transformation happening in the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy. A large number of research centers and cultural exchange programs 
emerged due to cultural diplomacy, which is widely viewed by Chinese analysts and 
government officials as the means of improving Chinese soft power. For instance, the 
Chinese Cultural Soft Power Research Centre was first established in Hunan University, 
later on, with 32 universities and government departments including Peking 
University and Renmin University setting up soft power research centres in 
collaboration with it. 1  Over the last decade, a sequence of cultural reforms and 
policies have been made, with increased funding for a number of cultural initiatives 
and activities. Behind the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Shanghai EXPO, a 
large sum of money was spent despite criticism from the public for their wastefulness. 
With the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes in more than 120 countries, there is 
increasing financial support from the Chinese government for educational exchanges.  
 
Noticeably, since the current President, Xi Jinping, first proposed the political appeal 
of the “Chinese Dream” in his speech during a visit to the “Road to Revival” exhibition 
in 2012, debates regarding this notion have been initiated among international 
mainstream news media outlets and Chinese domestic public social media platforms. 
Between 2012 and 2016, Xi addressed the Chinese Dream in more than 15 important 
speeches and documents. Recently, Xi announced again that, “we should increase 
China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s 
messages to the world”.2 This presented the strong confidence and determination of 
China’s new leadership in modernizing China’s soft power strategy. More importantly, 
it demonstrates that after pointing to China’s lack of soft power, Nye’s notion of the 
important transition of power from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ has been much accepted by the 
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fifth generation of the Chinese leadership.  Chinese new policymakers have embraced 
the term ‘soft power’ in the post-Cold War era. Within Hu Jintao’s presidency, “China 
has deployed power resources strategically… the charm offensive was based on a 
sophisticated appreciation for the full range of instruments of national power” (Wilson, 
2008, pp.111-112). The recent proposal of the Chinese Dream could be a good 
example to observe how the fifth generation of the Chinese leadership interprets and 
adopts the concept of soft power into the context of China.  
 
What are the definitions of soft power and cultural diplomacy? What is the 
relationship between ‘soft power’ and cultural diplomacy? What are the key pillars of 
the ‘Chinese Dream’ ideology? How has Xi Jinping pursued soft power through the 
overarching ideological guidance of the Chinese Dream? How has the idea of the 
Chinese Dream been manifested within the practices of cultural diplomacy toward 
distinctive countries? To what extent is there coherence between contemporary 
practices of cultural diplomacy and the Chinese Dream ideology, and; to what extent 
do we see variation in practices of cultural diplomacy across China’s targeted countries? 
A range of broader areas for reflection follow-on from these questions will be explored 
in this thesis.  
 
 
This thesis clarifies the relationship between soft power and cultural diplomacy, 
situating 'attraction' and 'persuasion' as important mechanisms through which 
cultural diplomacy builds soft power. Furthermore, it develops a comparative review 
of Chinese cultural diplomacy with three significant global and regional powers, 
namely Japan, Russia, and the US. This comparison seeks to explore the 
correspondence between contemporary practices, and the 'Chinese Dream' 
framework that purportedly guides foreign policy action. Overall, the thesis argues 
that the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan, Russia, and the United 
States broadly correspond with Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream. However, instead of 
adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, both the narratives of the Chinese Dream and 
the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy vary in different cases depending on the 
targeted country’s culture, political values, and the unique cultural and diplomatic 
relations with China. This finding shows the importance of disaggregated case study 
analysis when studying Chinese cultural diplomacy, in that such study allows for 
nuance and variation to be uncovered.  
 
 
 
 
Structure and overview 
 
This section presents the outline of this thesis that consists of the overview of three 
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parts and six chapters.  
 
This thesis sets out to explore the role of cultural diplomacy as a mechanism of soft 
power in the context of China. Accordingly, it will begin by elucidating the mechanism 
of soft power and the interaction between soft power and cultural diplomacy. It will 
then focus on the evolution of China’s cultural diplomacy, moving from ancient times 
to the previous four generations of the Chinese leadership after the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Furthermore, the ideology of the 
“Chinese Dream”, recently proposed by Xi Jinping, will be explored within its historical 
context as well as the contemporary foreign policy context. Finally, the thesis will 
examine how the idea of the ‘Chinese rejuvenation’ has been manifested in the 
practices of China’s cultural diplomacy in relation to three particular countries, namely 
Japan, Russia, and the United States. In order to do so, this thesis is organized into 
three parts and six chapters as follows.  
 
The first part of this thesis will explore the ideas of soft power and cultural diplomacy. 
Additionally, the link between soft power and cultural diplomacy will be clarified. The 
second part will proceed by exploring the evolution of China’s cultural diplomacy from 
ancient times to the contemporary period. Accordingly, it will focus on exploring the 
historical background of the Chinese Dream and identifying Xi’s Chinese Dream within 
the contemporary foreign policy context. The last part will look at how “China’s 
rejuvenation” is reflected within the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward the three case study countries. The analytic approach and comparison 
between the cases demonstrate the extent to which practices of cultural diplomacy 
echo central pillars of the Chinese Dream, with important differences across cases.  
 
Chapter 1 
 
After broadly summarizing the distinctive understandings of power within the 
discipline of IR, this chapter will explore the emergence and development of soft 
power. In order to do so, the main statements and developments of Nye’s soft power 
theory, as well as alternative perspectives, will be explored. A three-dimensional 
framework for studying cultural diplomacy will be established, and through this 
chapter the relationship between this framework and existing literature will be 
explored. By focusing on the three realms of China’s cultural diplomacy of media, 
education, and cultural exchange, it aims to engage with and extend the increasingly 
large volume of research within the field of IR on China’s soft power. It contributes to 
the overall aim of the thesis of exploring cross-national variation in practices of cultural 
diplomacy by analysing three distinctive global players: Japan, Russia, and the United 
States. 
 
Chapter 2 
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This chapter traces the rise and development of China’s cultural diplomacy from 
ancient times to the beginning of the 21st century. Drawing upon a historical analysis, 
this chapter will first explore the classic Chinese political schools of thought and their 
impacts on distinctive regimes. Furthermore, it will look at how Chinese cultural 
exchanges have developed over the period from ancient times to the twenty-first 
century. In order to do so, it will explore the evolution of China’s cultural diplomacy in 
three distinctive periods. Firstly, it will analyse early cultural exchanges in ancient times 
to trace the original thoughts in shaping the ideas of China’s contemporary cultural 
diplomacy. Secondly, it will provide an overview of the previous four generations of 
Chinese leadership since the establishment of the PRC (1949-2012). Finally, it will look 
at the organizational structure of China’s cultural diplomacy. The purpose of this 
chapter is to contextualize the contemporary practices and to present material that 
allows elements of continuity and change over the long term to be established. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
This chapter will explore the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’ as the conceptual guidance 
presently orienting China’s soft power promotion. In order to do this, three sections 
are included. First, a literature review is provided on the notion of the Chinese Dream. 
Second, the foundations of the Chinese Dream are identified, with insights from 
historical-cultural interpretations and various relevant speeches and statements being 
synthesized to provide a detailed review. Finally, a sketch of China’s cultural diplomacy 
within the context of foreign policy during Xi’s presidency for the further analysis of 
the case studies is specified.  
 
Chapters 4,5, and 6 
 
The last three chapters offer assessments of the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the manifestation of the Chinese Dream in the practices of cultural 
diplomacy toward the three case study countries. The purpose is to understand the 
extent to which practices of cultural diplomacy echo central pillars of the Chinese 
Dream and whether this varies across cases. These chapters highlight the importance 
of disaggregated case study analysis when studying Chinese cultural diplomacy, in that 
such study allows for nuance to be uncovered. 
 
The case studies of this thesis develop a comparative review of Chinese cultural 
diplomacy with three significant global and regional powers, namely Japan, Russia, 
and the U.S. Each chapter begins by analysing the evolution of each country’s cultural 
relations and contemporary diplomatic relationship with China, therefore providing 
the background for understanding the history and development of cultural diplomacy. 
Thereafter, more specific cultural policies, initiatives, and activities will be analysed, 
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with the focus being on three aspects: the media, such as the film industry, internet, 
television, and broadcast journalism; education, such as higher education programs, 
language institutes and other international academic exchanges; and other cultural 
exchange initiatives or activities in arts, sport, tourism and so on. Each case-study 
concludes by identifying the key features and limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy 
and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream within soft power theory.
 Chapter 1: Soft power and cultural diplomacy 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws on existing literature to clarify the relationship between soft power 
and cultural diplomacy. From Nye’s work, it situates ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ as 
important mechanisms through which cultural diplomacy builds soft power. It argues 
that cultural diplomacy represents an example of states’ attempts to cultivate soft 
power. It establishes a three-dimensional analytic framework of cultural diplomacy to 
analyse the mechanism of soft power, which allows for a holistic and structured 
analysis within a field where the focus of much literature is either under-defined or 
somewhat narrow. It discusses that the case study develops a comparative review of 
Chinese cultural diplomacy with three significant global and regional powers, namely 
Japan, Russia, and the United States. This comparison specifically seeks to explore the 
correspondence between contemporary practices by focusing on three pillars of 
China’s cultural diplomacy (education, cultural exchange, and media), and the 'Chinese 
Dream' framework that purportedly guides foreign policy action.  
The first section presents a literature review of soft power theory surrounding its two 
core elements: attraction and persuasion. Through this section, the meaning and use 
of the concepts of ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ are particularly explored. It argues that 
attraction fundamentally relies on certain cultural resources of soft power, which are 
inherently attractive, influential, and alluring in nature. Furthermore, given the 
diversity of the audiences, observing ‘persuasion’ requires us to distinguish different 
targets in specific contexts. The second section aims to provide a broad review of 
cultural diplomacy and a clarification of the relationship between soft power and 
cultural diplomacy. It argues that cultural diplomacy represents an example of states’ 
attempts to cultivate soft power, and by focusing on these practices we can shed light 
on soft power promotion in particular targeted countries. The third section explores 
the existing literature on soft power and cultural diplomacy within the context of 
China. It points out that elements such as traditional Chinese culture and Chinese 
political values have remained largely neglected or under-explored in contemporary 
research. Furthermore, little work has specifically distinguished China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward different targets under the framework of soft power. Therefore, to 
better understand China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power, a clarification of its 
foreign policy based on a comprehensive understanding of Chinese history, traditional 
Chinese culture and political values as well as a systematic analysis in the practice of 
China’s cultural diplomacy toward targeted countries is required. In the last section, it 
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introduces the criteria for case study selection and the methodology based on a three-
dimensional analytic framework. 
1.1 The foundations of soft power 
This section presents a literature review of soft power theory through its two core 
elements: attraction and persuasion. It highlights that ‘attraction’ fundamentally relies 
on certain cultural resources of soft power, which are inherently attractive, influential, 
and alluring in nature. In addition, it argues that observing ‘persuasion’ requires us to 
distinguish different targets in specific contexts, which brings out the significance of 
case study research.  
Attraction 
 
To understand how soft power has been articulated in different contexts, it is 
instructive to scrutinize Joseph Nye’s original explanation of the concept. As Joseph 
Nye argued (2004, p.11), “soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes 
through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payments”. Considerable 
debates have taken place regarding the two elements of soft power, namely attraction 
and persuasion. The debates regarding ‘attraction’ primarily focus on exploring the 
resources of soft power (e.g. Mattern, 2005; Li, 2009; Gallarotti, 2011; Rothman, 2011). 
Such as whether soft power exists in the nature of certain resources or not? What 
kinds of resources could generate attraction? Does attraction rely on certain values or 
is it just a political rhetoric? Are there any universal values that could resonate with 
the audience? 
Nye devotes substantial attention to exploring the central significance of attraction 
within the broader framework of soft power. In his initial account, the main resources 
of soft power are culture, ideology, and institutions (Nye, J. 1990). In 2004, Nye (p. 11) 
demonstrated more explicitly that “a country’s soft power can come from three 
resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are 
seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”. According to Nye, “soft power often 
includes intangible factors like institutions, ideas, norms, values, culture, and 
perceived legitimacy of policies” (2011, p.19). A premise of attraction that could 
mobilize soft power is that these elements are supposed to be seen as legitimate, 
credible, and attractive by the audience.  
Nye (2008, p.14) also believes that some cultural qualities and values, like benevolence, 
benignity, inspiration, morality, and charisma are privileged in producing affections. In 
addition, legitimacy, reputation, self-criticism consistency, and credibility are 
becoming more important in generating attraction. On the other hand, however, some 
qualities like violence, arrogance, and non-humanitarianism generate little attraction 
even with extensive persuasion or other un-coercive approaches. That is to say, if the 
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content of a country's culture, values, and policies are not attractive, persuasion might 
lead to negative outcomes due to the inability to generate soft power (Nye, 2008, p.14). 
In brief, Nye has clearly demonstrated that soft power works on preferences and 
affections. Such a conclusion is evidently based on the assumption that some 
resources of soft power are inherently attractive, influential, and alluring in nature.  
Existing scholarship has extended Nye’s discourse of ‘attraction’, which can help us 
better understand soft power from a synthetic approach (Gallarotti, 2011; Kearn, 
2011). For instance, Giulio Gallarotti (2011, p.28) defines soft power as a form of meta-
power, which “describes situations in which power relations themselves are 
embedded within some greater constellation of social relations that influence those 
relations and thereby influence final outcomes that derive from the interactions 
among actors”. According to Gallarotti, the foundation of soft power comes from 
international sources such as respect for international laws, international treaties and 
commitments, liberal foreign economic policies and willingness to sacrifice short-run 
national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good. Moreover, it also 
comes from domestic sources such as culture and political institutions (2011, p.28).  
Nonetheless, the complexity of attraction seems to be the key deficiency that has led 
to soft power being contested. Even Nye acknowledges that attraction “is more 
complex than it first appears because it can refer to drawing attention — whether 
positive or negative — as well as creating alluring or positive magnetic effects.” (2011, 
pp. 91–92). Li Mingjiang (2009, p.3) argues that “soft power does not exist in the 
nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft 
use of power”. According to Li, “the sources of soft power do not always produce 
attraction, persuasion, appeal, and emulation… Culture, ideology, values, and norms 
also often result in resentment, repulsion, hostility, and even conflict” (Li, 2009, p.16). 
Janice Mattern (2005, p. 583) also offered an alternative framework of thinking about 
attraction in IR by introducing the idea of ‘representational force’. From her point of 
view, representational force is a “nonphysical but nevertheless coercive form of power 
that is exercised through language”, therefore the attraction of soft power is more 
sociolinguistically structured. She rejects Nye’s definition that soft power inherently 
rests on attractions that could be cultivated from some natural qualities. On the 
contrary, she argues that the symptomatic problem with Nye’s account of attraction is 
that he neglects to answer why universal values are the ‘right’ ones or how one 
acquires such values” (Mattern,2005, p.588). That is to say, since attraction is a 
subjective experience, it is difficult to define what makes these values appealing to 
some and not to others. From Mattern’s point of view, attraction is not something 
natural in any culture or values. Drawing on the work of Jurgen Habermas, Mattern 
argues that it is more likely constructed socially through communicative exchanges, 
thus leading to the conclusion that soft power is mainly based upon identity and 
language. Accordingly, she argues that “soft power should not be understood in 
juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of it by different means” 
(Mattern,2005, p. 583).  
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There is, therefore, always a strong, even if sometimes ambiguous, relationship 
between soft and hard power. Put simply, the struggle is between discursive and 
material power resources. For scholars who deny that soft power exists in the nature 
of certain resources, the division between soft and hard resources makes little sense 
in achieving the ideal outcomes empirically (Mattern,2005; Li, 2009). As Li Mingjiang 
puts it, “if culture, ideology, and values can be used for coercion, and military and 
economic strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better approach to soft 
power is how the resources of power are used rather than associating sources of 
power as soft or hard” (2009, p. 16). Therefore, resources can be used either in a soft 
or coercive way as long as it leads to preferred outcomes (Li, 2009). More specifically, 
both hard power and soft power can generate attraction and both tangible and 
intangible resources can be used in a coercive way. As Craig Hayden stated, “we find 
soft power resources being used in decidedly coercive ways (e.g., rhetoric signaling 
the impending War on Terror), and hard power resources embodying intangibles that 
attract and coopt” (2012, p. 135).  
Without a doubt, outcomes are important for assessing the effectiveness of power. 
However, confusing the two approaches of mobilizing soft power would overlook the 
essential part of Nye’s soft power theory: ‘coercive and pay’ means to force while, 
although it might lead to the same result, ‘persuade and attract’ means to follow. As 
Nye (2008, p. 95) insists, “soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to 
move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability 
to entice and attract”. In order to entice and attract, certain qualities are required 
inherently before mobilizing resources for effective outcomes. Soft power 
fundamentally relies on certain cultures, values, and policies, which are inherently 
attractive, influential, and alluring in nature. For example, as Shaun Breslin (2011, p.8) 
states, “in order to unpack soft power into its different constituent elements, the first 
step is to strip out economic bases of power”. Therefore, it is important to understand 
that soft power is not merely anything non-military, such as economic sanctions – 
since sanctions are clearly intended to coerce, and thus a form of hard power (Barr, 
2011, p.16). Gallarotti gives further explanation to soft power through his analysis 
looking at the fundamental distinctions between itself and hard power. As he writes, 
“hard power extracts compliance principally through reliance on tangible power 
resources – more direct and often coercive methods (either their symbolic use through 
threat or actual use), soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, 
and actions that endear nations to other nations – more indirect and non-coercive 
methods” (2011, p. 28). Gallarotti’s explanation distinguishes the different roles 
tangible and intangible resources play in understanding soft power. Actually, both Nye 
and Gallarotti have made clear-cut distinctions between how soft and hard power are 
used in different ways.  
 
Nye himself has enriched his soft power theory by developing the notion of “smart 
power”, which is elaborated as “the combination of the hard power of coercion and 
payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” (2008, p. 4). He states that 
“hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes undercut each other, and 
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good contextual intelligence is important in distinguishing how they interact in 
different situations. Smart power suggests it is best to have both” (Nye, 2008, p. 24). 
Obviously, Nye does not deny the importance of combining soft power and hard power 
in different contexts towards different targets. However, Nye implies the existence of 
certain inherent resources that are able to generate attraction naturally. He has made 
a more explicit explanation: “even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular 
product. Policies that appear as narrowly self-serving or arrogantly presented are likely 
to prohibit rather than produce soft power” (Nye, 2008, p. 103). “People who ignore 
the significance of soft power are like people who do not understand the power of 
seduction…it is a mistake to think of information campaigns in terms that 
misunderstand the essence of soft power” (Nye, 2008, p. 96).  
 
To sum up, although soft power requires linguistic rhetoric, it is essential to highlight 
that attraction fundamentally relies on certain values or qualities, which are inherently 
attractive, influential, and alluring in nature.  
Persuasion 
 
The other important feature of soft power that Nye has consistently emphasized is 
persuasion. The debates surrounding ‘persuasion’ underline the procedure of 
transforming resources into favorable outcomes instead of the attributes of resources 
in soft power. Consequently, the central questions are more concerned with the 
mechanism or implementation of soft power from theory to practice: how soft power 
works in practical scenarios, how to wield soft power to get the desired outcomes, and 
how certain resources are utilized for generating soft power.  
Nye states clearly that soft power not only rests on resources, but also on the specific 
approach to achieving the outcomes. In his words, “there is no exaggeration to say 
that even the best of diplomatic policies may fail if it neglects the task of interpretation 
and persuasion” (Nye, 1990, p. 101). In Nye’s recent article, he further developed the 
concept of soft power by formulating a spectrum of power behaviors as represented 
below (2011, p. 19): 
Hard Power                                                                                                   Soft Power 
  Command > Coerce, Threat, Pay, Sanction, Frame, Persuade, Attract < Co-opt    
 
Nye views the process by which policymakers engage in soft power as one of the 
“conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes” (Nye, 2008, p.8). 
Regarding this, Nye contends that “if one can use ideas and institutions to frame the 
agenda for action in a way that makes others’ preferences seem irrelevant or out of 
bounds, then it may never be necessary to push or shove them…A policy-maker should 
consider preference formation and agenda framing as a means of shaping the 
environment before turning to the first or command face of power” (2008, p. 24). The 
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spectrum shows that the conversion of soft power from resources to outcomes is a 
progressive procedure. In term of ‘persuasion’, how to convert resources to outcomes 
has been put forward as the central question of soft power framework.  
As stated above, soft power rests on the ability of framing and persuading agendas to 
influence the preference of targets. Instead of thinking of persuasion as a single-
tracked information interaction, this thesis suggests that it is essential to consider soft 
power as a two-way process of communication that involves interpreting information 
for different selected targets. As Nye has noted (1990, p. 16), “all power depends on 
context-who relates to whom under what circumstances- but soft power depends 
more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers”. First 
of all, the perception from audiences is a crucial component particularly in assessing 
the outcome of soft power.  As Breslin (2011, p.9) has put it, “soft power emerges from 
how outsiders perceive a country’s values and systems”. By doing so, policymakers 
become better able to adjust particular policies in order to increase their chances of 
achieving the desired outcomes. Furthermore, given the diversity of the audiences, it 
is essential to understand the differences between specific targets before putting 
forward any message or policy when observing soft power. The same cultural resource 
can have different impacts within distinctive contexts and thus be seen by some as a 
propagandistic move and others as a friendly gesture. Therefore, it is necessary to 
distinguish different targets in specific contexts when observing the process of 
‘persuasion’ in practice. 
In brief, soft power rests on the ability of framing and persuasion as a means by which 
to generate particular perceptions within its audiences. Given the diversity of the 
audiences, it is necessary to strategically understand the differences between specific 
targets before putting forward any message or policy. Therefore, observing 
‘persuasion’ requires us to distinguish different targets in specific contexts, which 
brings out the significance of case study research as will be argued later in this chapter.   
1.2 Cultural diplomacy: the means of mobilizing soft power 
This section aims to provide a broad literature review of both soft power and cultural 
diplomacy, with a clarification of the relationship between the two. It argues that 
cultural diplomacy refers to a broad set of practices that overlap substantially with 
working understandings of soft power, which represents an example of states’ 
attempts to cultivate soft power. As such, practices of cultural diplomacy and 
associated scholarship on cultural diplomacy provide a useful focus through which to 
explore soft power.  
Since soft power is such a broad idea to grasp, understanding how soft power works 
in the contemporary political milieu requires us to observe it in a more tangible context. 
Persuasion and framing are both embedded with the practice of agenda-setting and 
thus the implementation of foreign policy. Therefore, a central feature in the 
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translation of soft power from theory to practice is how this idea has been manifested 
into the implementation of foreign policy. Some studies have explored soft power 
through the lens of public diplomacy (e.g. Wang, 2011; Hayden, 2012; D’Hooghe, 
2015). Hayden (2012, pp.12-14) argues that, “soft power’s currency is most readily 
observable in the spread of ‘public diplomacy’ initiatives and similar policies”. However, 
little attention has been paid to the observation of soft power in the context of cultural 
diplomacy or the relationship between the two. As argued in the previous section, 
since soft power fundamentally relies on certain cultures, values, and foreign policies, 
setting out to explore how soft power has been promoted by the states requires a 
more specific context. Accordingly, this thesis argues that cultural diplomacy 
represents a useful example of states’ attempts to cultivate soft power.  
Cultural diplomacy, which refers to a wide range of “governmental initiatives, 
programs, and discourses designed to promote the country’s culture, tradition, 
language, or art” (Otmazgin, 2012, p.37), is not a new concept in IR. The book entitled 
Cultural Approach: Another Way in International Relations (McMurry and Lee, 1948) 
presents an early effort to combine foreign policy and cultural relations by exploring 
the distinctive characteristics of cultural activities performed by major powers, such 
as France, Japan, and the U.S. in the 1940s. So far, although the definitions and 
mechanisms of cultural diplomacy are often ambiguous, with different perspectives 
and overlapping concepts being used by scholars and policymakers, there are three 
main schools of thought.  
Milton Cummings (2003, p.1) defines cultural diplomacy as “the application of a state’s 
cultural policy abroad through the exchange of ideas, values, systems, traditions, arts, 
beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual 
understanding”, which highlights the purpose of cultural diplomacy in fostering mutual 
understanding through the exchange of cultural activities. This school of thought 
suggests that the key function of cultural diplomacy is cultural communication, which 
aims at cultivating mutual understanding. It argues that cultural diplomacy is 
characterized by its focus on two-way exchanges and mutual understanding; culture 
exchanges constitute a key element in cultural diplomacy (Hu, 2007; Schneider, 2009).  
The second school of thought inspects cultural diplomacy from a political state-
centered perspective. Wai-Chung Ho’s explanation highlights the distinction between 
cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy. He points out that the main purpose of 
cultural diplomacy is to promote the nation’s culture, promote public opinions of 
counterparts, and to build integrity and credibility through cultural exchanges (Ho, 
2018, p.58). It argues that international cultural exchange cannot be separated from 
national interests. Similar to propaganda, cultural policy is a politically motivated set 
of initiatives and actions designed to influence mass opinion by appealing to emotions 
rather than rational thinking (Kushner, 2006, p.4). This school of thought considers 
cultural diplomacy to be a “unilateral process of projecting a national image and 
pursuing national interests through cultural activities” (Higham, 2001, p138). In this 
way, the central purpose of cultural diplomacy is for the people of a foreign nation to 
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develop an understanding of the home nation's ideals and institutions in an effort to 
build broad support for economic and political goals (Maack, 2001). 
The third school of thought does not deny cultural diplomacy as a political instrument 
but addresses the importance of distinguishing cultural diplomacy from propaganda 
(Mulcahy, 1999). J. Mitchell defends the term ‘cultural diplomacy’, seeing cultural 
propaganda “at one end of a scale that passes through cultural diplomacy to cultural 
relations at the other” (1986, p. 28). This school of thought views cultural diplomacy 
as politically charged but distinguishes it from the coercive strategies used by 
dominant aggressive states. For this school of thought, cultural diplomacy is often 
viewed as an essential part of public diplomacy, encompassing a series of cultural 
exchange activities relevant to education, language, sports music, and art. Ben 
O’Loughlin’ underlines the audience of cultural diplomacy and its connection between 
public diplomacy, as he said, “cultural diplomacy is a more specific term insofar as 
diplomacy is usually associated with states. States’ public diplomacy is states liaising 
with publics in other states, so cultural diplomacy being states liaising with other states 
or their peoples through the medium of culture” (O’Loughlin, personal communication, 
cited in Rivera 2015, p.10). 
Cultural diplomacy has been closely linked with public diplomacy. To a great extent, 
cultural and public diplomacy are the same, due to the number of similarities they 
share. As first noted by former U.S. diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965, public 
diplomacy was developed partly to distance overseas governmental information 
activities from the term propaganda, which had acquired pejorative connotations 
(USCCPD, 2006: paragraph 3). Different from traditional diplomacy, which is mainly 
deployed between governments at the highest level, both cultural and public 
diplomacy focus on the ways in which a country communicates with citizens. In such 
an era where information technology has been rapidly developing, the engagement of 
the public in soft power means diplomacy is no longer exclusive to political elites 
(Melissen,2005; D’Hooghe,2015). However, considering the content as the main 
difference between cultural and public diplomacy seems to make more sense in the 
observation of soft power. Cultural diplomacy, “the process by which direct relations 
with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values 
of those being represented”(Sharp, 2012, p.23) tends to focus specifically on the 
cultural dimension which manifests through a series of cultural exchanges, media 
communication, and educational exchanges, rather than the dimension of hard power 
such as economic or military elements.  
However, it is worth noting that some issues are still missing within the literature 
review. First of all, as argued before, little attention has been paid to the observation 
of soft power in the context of cultural diplomacy or the relationship between the two. 
Obviously, Nye’s soft power theory is tightly linked with cultural diplomacy as culture, 
political values, and foreign policy are formed from the main resources of soft power 
Nonetheless, there is often a distinct lack of clarification in existing literature when it 
comes to the definition of cultural diplomacy and how it relates to the concept of soft 
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power. Since culture and foreign policy are the main resources of soft power, setting 
out to explore how soft power has been manifested in cultural diplomacy contributes 
to a better understanding of soft power within specific contexts. By clarifying the 
existing debates of soft power and cultural diplomacy, this thesis argues that the 
bottom line for understanding the relationship between the two is that cultural 
diplomacy can be deployed as a means of mobilizing soft power by the governments. 
Here ‘mobilizing’ means both generating and wielding soft power. More specifically, 
generating soft power involves the integration of soft power resources that a country 
possesses and the strategy of framing an agenda to maximize the possibility of 
wielding soft power. Whereas wielding soft power includes the process of persuading 
and influencing either other states or the citizens of those states in order to achieve 
one’s foreign policy goals.  
On the one hand, cultural diplomacy can be more explicitly related to issues of security 
and foreign policy. The United States Department of State, for example, notes a 
commitment to “enhancing national security by informing and influencing foreign 
publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and 
the government and citizens of the rest of the world”. 3  On the other, cultural 
diplomacy also strives to build commonalities by interpreting the resources of culture, 
values, and institutions inside the home. Leonard, Stead, and Smewing (2002, pp.10-
11). identify three alternative purposes, or sphere of public diplomacy: 
political/military, economic and societal/cultural. The latter particularly demonstrated 
that cultural diplomacy plays an important role in acting as the means by which a 
country can promote its soft power (Wastnidge, 2015). Therefore, it is crucial to 
consider cultural diplomacy as an example of states’ attempts to cultivate soft power, 
and by focusing on these practices we can shed light on soft power promotion in 
particular targeted countries.  
In sum, cultural diplomacy refers to a broad set of practices that overlap substantially 
with working understandings of soft power. Cultural diplomacy represents an example 
of states’ attempts to cultivate soft power, and by focusing on these practices we can 
shed light on soft power promotion in particular targeted countries  
1.3 Soft power and cultural diplomacy in the context of China 
The following paragraphs explore the literature on soft power and cultural diplomacy 
within the context of China. Firstly, it argues elements such as traditional Chinese 
culture, Chinese history, and Chinese political values have been largely neglected or 
unclarified in the existing literature. Secondly, little work has specifically distinguished 
China’s cultural diplomacy as a means for mobilizing soft power toward different 
targets. Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by providing 
a holistic analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy in cross-culture and cross-country 
studies within soft power theory, based on a deep understanding of Chinese history 
and Chinese culture.  
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It is difficult to overstate the speed with which soft power has diffused from academia 
to practical and political discussions. Early practical research mainly concentrated on 
the United States’ foreign policy, where the theory is primarily developed in practice 
(e.g. Nye, 1990; Nye, 2002; Nye, 2003; Nye, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2005). With the 
increasing attention and development of soft power theory over the past decade, a 
large number of international political scholars embarked to move beyond the context 
of the U.S. to astutely explore soft power theory in a broader setting. Scholars and 
officials have discussed soft power in a diverse range of countries, including Russia 
(Yulia, 2015), the United Kingdom (Nisbett, 2015), Germany (William, 2008), Saudi 
Arabia (Gallarotti, 2015), Australia (Broinowski, 2012), Iran (Edward, 2015) and Greece 
(Zartaloudis, 2013). The focus of analysis in studies of soft power also varies from social 
media to public policy (Rawnsley, 2015; Creemers, 2015), employment policy to higher 
education (Artaloudis, 2013; Lee, 2015; Metzgar, 2015), and energy security to cultural 
relations (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015; Meissner, 2002).  
Nowadays, the usage of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy has developed 
considerably with most countries displaying their culture abroad as part of their 
international conduct. In the field of practical research, studies of cultural diplomacy 
in developed countries have drawn the most attention. Those case studies mainly 
focus on the US, the UK, France, Russia, Japan, and other developed countries (e.g. 
Krenn, 2017; Pamment, 2016; Lane, 2013; Simons, 2018; Akagawa, 2014). For example, 
Topic and Rodin (2012) analyse cultural diplomacy imperialism from a European 
perspective.  At the same time, they clarify certain definitions as there is some 
overlapping confusion between cultural and public diplomacy. Their book draws a 
well-organized outline of the application of cultural diplomacy in European countries 
(2012). In addition, the book Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy also provides valuable 
insights for analysing the evolution of cultural diplomacy in the global context 
(Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010).   
Strategy begins the analysis of China’s soft power foreign policy in security or 
economic affairs and has been offered mostly within a realist framework, however, 
often fail in providing a comprehensive explanation of China’s behaviors towards 
cultural diplomatic policy (e.g. Passin, 1963; Ratliff, 1968, Murray, 1976). Some 
scholars researched China’s cultural diplomacy during the period from the 1950s to 
the 1990s. In the book China’s Cultural Diplomacy, Hebert Passin (1963) analyses 
China’s cultural diplomacy toward selected countries in Asia, Australia, and Western 
Europe from 1949 to 1960, emphasizing each country’s slightly different range of 
practices. William Ratliff (1968) on the other hand examines the process of China’s 
cultural diplomacy in Latin America, focusing on cultural exchange activities between 
the government and non-government entities/individuals/corporations/persons. 
However, as Murray (1976, p.28) states, China’s cultural diplomacy during that time 
(between the 1950s and the 1980s) is “difficult to be removed entirely from politics”. 
Passin (1963, p.1 ) also found it is difficult to keep up with the fast flow of events during 
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the periods of rapid political upheaval, such as the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s. 
Overall, research in both the implementation and the policy-making process of China’s 
cultural diplomacy was deeply constrained by China’s political relations and the 
associated ideological tension, which fairly limited the depth of academic exploration 
towards this topic. 
It is noteworthy that the international structure has been greatly transformed since 
the end of the Cold War. Impacted by the information revolution and globalization, 
cultural diplomacy has become a rapidly evolving field of research. Since soft power 
theory was first introduced to China in the 1990s, much more work has been done on 
the development of China’s soft power and cultural diplomacy in political science 
journals and the academic sphere in the 21st century (e.g. Callahan, 2005; Yan, 2007; 
Kurlantzick, 2007, Ding, 2008; Wilson; 2008, Barr, 2011; Breslin, 2013; Hartig, 2015; 
Edney, 2015; Rawnsley, 2015, Wang, 2015; D’Hooghe, 2015). Some work has discussed 
China’s soft power and cultural diplomacy from a relatively “cheerleading” perspective; 
often assuming that interventions have effectively expanded China’s soft power and 
providing details of contemporary activities. It argues that the implementation of 
China’s foreign policy has contributed to the enhancement of China’s soft power and 
allowed for the efficient wielding of its soft power in constructing a desired 
international order. As Ernest Wilson (2008, p.18) argued, “China’s soft power 
strategy was based on a sophisticated appreciation for the full range of instruments 
of national power”.  Sheng Ding (2008) examined China’s recent success of mobilizing 
soft power in Africa and Latin America, with the examination aiming to provide a more 
complete understanding of China's national power and the modernization process. 
Joshua Kurlantzick (2007) stated that China's diplomacy has become increasingly 
sophisticated, and its growing trade and aid promote a benign view of China that 
allows it to push its hard goals. Drawing on years of experience tracking China’s policies 
in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, Kurlantzick reveals how China has wooed 
the world with a "charm offensive" that has largely escaped the attention of American 
policy makers. In a provocative conclusion, he considered a future in which China may 
be the first nation since the Soviet Union to rival the United States in international 
influence. (Kurlantzick, 2007).  
In contrast, other literature is from a more “critical” perspective, seeking to identify 
tensions, contradictions, and hypocrisy in current practices. Nye himself argued that 
China “needs to match words and deeds in its policies, be self-critical, and unleash the 
full talents of the civil societies”.4 Kingsley Edney alluded to the practice of hard power 
through “the use of propaganda has deliberately restricted the development of such 
transnational civil society coalitions” (2015, p.188). William Callahan stated that “soft 
power works in a different way in China which is negative rather than positive” (2005, 
p. 217). He also pointed out that some problems, such as China’s censorship and the 
overseas development of Confucius Institutes, have been seen as a setback rather than 
the positive strategy of spreading Chinese civilization as “it is employed as a tool in 
domestic policy more than in foreign affairs” (Callahan, 2005, p. 226). Similarly, Falk 
Hartig (2015) argued that Confucius Institutes, as one of the instruments of China’s 
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cultural diplomacy, have failed in increasing China’s soft power due to practical issues 
and credibility problems. Rogier Creemers also pointed out that, “China’s top-down, 
state-driven approach to communication that pays little attention to market demand 
or audience concern, enjoys little credibility and conflicts with other sources of 
information to which audiences have access” (2015, p.317). As Gary Rawnsley noted, 
“more communication does not necessarily mean better or more readily accepted 
communication… China is still struggling with converting its soft power resources into 
tangible changes in international opinion” (2015, p.284). 
Since the popularization and adoption of soft power by the Chinese government, a 
large number of articles and books discussing this topic and cultural diplomacy have 
emerged amongst Chinese academics, particularly over the past decade. Yiwei Wang 
(2015) explores the Chinese approach to soft power and pointed out that China’s 
public diplomacy carries the burden of a huge language and cultural gap in 
communicating with the world (p.266). Zhi Li, who studied cultural diplomacy from a 
communication studies approach, stated that “it has been a common phenomenon 
that nations seek for political purposes through cultural diplomacy. Nonetheless, how 
to take advantage of this approach, for what kind of political purpose, mainly depends 
on a country’s political ideology, social development level, and foreign policies” (2005, 
p.1). Some Chinese analysts moved beyond Joseph Nye’s original theoretical 
framework for soft power to develop the core value of China’s soft power in Chinese 
academic circles and scholarship. The majority of Chinese research points out that 
culture or cultural values are at the core of soft power (Yu, 2011; Wang, 1993). These 
works argue that the concept of appropriately defining China’s cultural soft power has 
the potential to serve as a vital integrative factor for creating a positive global image 
of China. Those analysts have paid considerable attention to seeking what is China’s 
soft power, what kind of resources are available for wielding its soft power and the 
interpretation of China’s soft power. Some scholars have also argued that enhancing 
China’s soft power needs to be enriched with more Chinese characteristics (Men, 
2007). Xuetong Yan (2007, pp 4-5) stated that China should pay more attention to 
improving its political power since starting with politics is not the same thing as 
starting with culture. 
Recent literature on China’s soft power and cultural diplomacy has placed a greater 
focus on comparing China’s soft power with other countries (Rawnsley, 2015; Wilson, 
2015; Hayden, 2012). For instance, Rawnsley (2015) compared how China and Russia 
have increased their international broadcasting capacity as a particular vehicle for 
public diplomacy in quite distinctive ways. He argues that China tends to use it as a 
means of rectifying ‘perceived distortions in the global flow of news about China’, 
whereas Russia focused on reporting events that negatively affect the image of the US 
(Rawnsley, 2015, p.273). Furthermore, case studies mainly focus on the regions of Asia 
and Africa (Meissner, 2002; Kurlantzick, 2007; Li, 2009; King, 2013; Zhang, Wasserman 
and Mano, 2016). It is noteworthy that in D’hooghe’s book China’s Public Diplomacy, 
she provided a systematic analysis of the concept of public diplomacy in the context 
of China. She examined how the development and conduct of China’s public diplomacy 
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over the last two decades should be understood in relation to recent developments, 
particularly in Asia and Africa (D’hooghe, 2015, p.353). Some studies also explored 
China’s soft power by paying particular attention to certain initiatives, such as the 
development of the Confucius Institutes and the recent Belt & Road initiatives (e.g. 
Wang, 2011; Hughes, 2014; Hartig, 2015; Lahtinen, 2015; Gil, 2017). 
 
However, existing literature does not go far enough in what comes to capturing the 
dynamics of China’s cultural diplomacy, in particular against the background of soft 
power theory. First of all, because culture, political values and foreign policy are 
formed from the key resources of soft power, it is essential to consider the three 
factors when observing soft power. Barr’s work (2011) sheds light on the mutual 
perception and understanding regarding the rise of China from the perspective of a 
western observer. It reveals how traditional Chinese values and historical events such 
as Tianxia and the ZhengHe Voyages were adopted as the resources for promoting 
China’s soft power, as well as observing how it is intertwined with hard power (Barr, 
2011). Nevertheless, elements such as traditional Chinese culture, Chinese history, and 
Chinese political values have still been largely neglected or unclarified in the existing 
literature surrounding China’s soft power and cultural diplomacy. In order to 
understand how ideology works in the Chinese social context and how it is reflected 
in practice, a more systematic clarification of the Chinese mentality based on a deep 
understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture is necessary.  
 
Furthermore, few authors have specifically distinguished China’s cultural diplomacy as 
a means for mobilizing soft power toward different targets (Ding, 2008; D’Hooghe, 
2015; Hartig, 2016). As argued in the first section, soft power rests on the ability of 
framing and persuasion as a means by which to generate particular perceptions within 
its target audiences. It is important to consider it as a two-way process of 
communication involving significant amounts of interpreted information for different 
selected targets rather than a single-tracked information interaction. As Breslin (2013, 
p.628) states, “it is notable that China has a number of different relationships with 
neighbors rather than a single overarching and all-encompassing regional agenda”. 
“Categorical judgments about Chinese soft power worldwide should be made with due 
caution and take into account every imaginable angle of policy” (Creemers, 2015, 
p.317). For those works that simply highlight the importance of Chinese culture as the 
resource of China’s soft power or draw a focus on “promoting ancient cultural icons 
whom it thinks might have global appeal”5, it would be inadequate without paying 
attention to the diversity of the receiving audiences. Because perceptions differ across 
distinctive policies among different audiences, analysing how soft power has been 
manifested into cultural diplomacy requires distinguishing its targets in the specific 
processes and the contextual factors that generate particular outcomes.  
 
In sum, to better understand China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power, a clarification 
of its foreign policy based on a comprehensive understanding of Chinese history, 
traditional Chinese culture and political values is required. Drawing from a historical 
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and cultural perspective, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by 
providing a holistic analysis of Chinese foreign policies in cross-culture and cross-
country studies, looking both at Chinese and English-language literature. Furthermore, 
a greater focus on the processes by which policies are adapted to specific contexts 
toward selected targets would also allow us to tackle some of the current limitations 
of China’s soft power research. 
1.4 Case study selection and methodology 
This section introduces the criteria for case study selection and the methodology based 
on a three-dimensional analytic framework.  
 
The case studies of this thesis develop a comparative review of Chinese cultural 
diplomacy toward three significant global and regional powers, namely Japan, Russia, 
and the United States. There are two key criteria for determining the case study 
selection. First of all, selected countries are great powers in the international arena 
who play crucial roles in China’s foreign policy-making process. They represent some 
of the strongest international players whose significance within Chinese politics has 
become increasingly salient in recent years. The practice of cultural diplomacy toward 
those great powers reflects the Chinese government’s soft power ambition and 
indicates China’s strategy in the international theatre. Furthermore, the case studies 
have been chosen because of their unique cultural characteristics and cultural 
relationships with China. By discovering distinctive cultural relationships between 
China and the case study countries, the thesis explores how the Chinese Dream is 
reflected in each empirical practice of China’s cultural diplomacy and what the 
potential constraints in promoting its soft power within the case study countries may 
be. Accordingly, the development of cultural exchange between China and these three 
countries is understood to have a key role in future developments within the global 
order, both economically and culturally.  
 
China’s neighboring country Japan, the world’s third-largest economy, shares a 
number of cultural similarities when it comes to traditional culture and philosophical 
values. The cultural relationship between China and Japan has lasted for nearly 2,000 
years, and the influences of that connection are still evident. As the older of the two 
civilizations, Chinese culture, especially traditional culture popularized in the Ming 
dynasty, had a massive influence on Japan, which can be found in areas such as 
language, philosophy, religion, and art. Interestingly, this historical-cultural affinity 
seems to be challenged regularly by historical disputes and territorial conflicts, which 
has given rise to a great deal of public concern. Japan is often depicted as a regional 
contender whose historical relationship with China has been troubled. Both countries 
tend to forge their historical narratives in ways that frame them as their historical 
‘Other’. Therefore, exploring how China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan has been 
deployed in this specific cultural and political context can bring more significance in 
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understanding how soft power works in a specific context. 
 
The case of Russia is particularly relevant in that both China and Russia have 
historically represented the dominant powers within their respective regional spheres. 
What is more, both see themselves as representing alternative development models 
to that promoted by the West, and thus both end up contesting the Western narratives 
of globalization (Lavrov, 2008; Rawnsley, 2015). And like China, the Russian Federation 
has also devoted a significant amount of resources towards the development of non-
military instruments of foreign policy in recent years. Nonetheless, recent studies have 
suggested that these countries tend to use different strategies when it comes to the 
role of culture in their broader strategies of soft power (Rawnsley, 2015; Wilson, 2015; 
Simons, 2015). Moreover, Russia and China have also been seen as emerging powers 
whose shared interests and growing international importance has led to the 
constitution of multilateral institutions. The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflect how their 
shared interests go well beyond the economy and include broader concerns related to 
border and energy security. Indeed, it can be argued that these topics have 
represented the bulk of the literature concerned with the relationship between China 
and the Russian Federation. Both countries also tend to be more pragmatic than 
strategic in regard to their acceptance of other cultures in their territory and, indeed, 
their overall foreign policy. In other words, both Russia and China are often depicted 
as being resistant to the incorporation of alternative cultural values within their society. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore how China has been deploying cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia as a means of enhancing its soft power within the Chinese 
Dream era. 
 
The comparative study of soft power and cultural diplomacy between China and the 
United States has been the central topic in international relations literature (Nye, 2012, 
2015; Kurlantzick, 2007; Dynon, 2013; Zhang, 2010). The Sino-American relationship 
is becoming increasingly renowned as the world’s most influential bilateral 
relationship. However, at the same time it has been regularly challenged by major 
conflicts and crises. “Strip away the ostensibly benign surface of public diplomacy, 
cultural exchanges, and language instruction, and it becomes clear that the U.S. and 
China are engaged in a soft power conflagration – a protracted cultural cold war” 
(Dynon, 2013, para.2). On the one hand, soft power theory originated in the context 
of the United States. On the other hand, it has been popularized in an emerging 
developing power, both among Chinese academic circles and officials over the last 
decade. Given the distinctive differences in their political values, cultural background 
and their foreign policy goals as great powers within international society, it is worth 
exploring China’s cultural diplomacy and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream 
in the case of the United States. 
 
This thesis specifically seeks to explore the correspondence between the ideas 
embedded in the 'Chinese Dream' that purportedly guide Xi’s foreign policy and 
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practices of cultural diplomacy in these three cases. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, analysis of 
the evolution of cultural relations provides the background for understanding the 
history and development of cultural diplomacy toward the three countries. On the 
basis of this historical study, the analysis of current practices of cultural diplomacy is 
based on a three-dimensional framework, structured along three realms: the media 
(e.g. film, book and publishing, internet, television, and broadcast), education (e.g. 
education exchange programmes, language institutes), and cultural exchange (e.g. 
culture, music, art, sport exchange initiatives and activities).   
 
Media plays a key role in shaping people’s perception and thereby the implementation 
of cultural diplomacy. As Barr (2011, p.45) noted, “in order to expand the reach and 
impact of its state-run media and improve the effectiveness of mass communication 
as a means of state soft power, China has committed U.S. $6.5 billion for the overseas 
expansion of its main media organizations”. While traditional media, such as television 
and newspapers, has historically played a central role in the implementation of cultural 
diplomacy, it has been gradually replaced by the internet as a key tool for mobilizing 
soft power (Li, 2003). In the new digital era, the emergence of new media has 
considerably influenced the approach that cultural diplomacy takes. The introduction 
of the Internet to China in 1994 paved the way for two decades of rapid media 
transformation up until 2014. In 2011 the number of mobile Internet users in China 
had reached 356 million, and by 2017 this number had more than doubled to 724 
million. 6 Given the importance of new media and China’s dramatic media investment, 
it is necessary to consider the media as a research point in observing the formulation 
of China’s cultural diplomacy.  
 
Educational exchange is another approach to consider when looking at the dynamic of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. Over the last decade, large numbers of educational 
institutes such as Confucius Institutes, cultural studies centres, and hubs have 
emerged towards international audiences both inside and outside of China. Since the 
first Confucius Institute opened in Korea in 2004, there have been more than 500 
Confucius Institutes and Classes set up around the world. Furthermore, according to 
data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), more than 700,000 Chinese students were studying abroad in 2015 
(UNESCO 2016), while fewer than 400,000 foreign students were enrolled in Chinese 
universities in 2014 (Institute of International Education 2014) (Bislev, 2017, P.82). 
Between 2016 and 2017 there was an 11.74% increase in the number of Chinese 
students studying overseas; this was the first time the number had exceeded 600,000, 
reaching 608,400. In the policy instruction on how to strengthen patriotic education 
in the Chinese educational system, it suggests the creation of a network that integrates 
domestic and foreign students and experts to promote the Chinese Dream, thus 
encouraging all Chinese overseas students to play the role of potential ambassador 
among the people.7  This clearly illustrates the government’s increasing interest in 
using educational exchanges in its cultural diplomacy to project a favorable image of 
China that eradicates any potential misunderstandings.  
 31 
 
Cultural exchanges such as culture, music, art, sport exchange initiatives and activities 
has been a central research topic in traditional cultural diplomacy and cultural 
relations (Passin, 1968; Ratliff, 1969; Taylor, 1978). Exchanges of official delegates, 
non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, artists, musicians, actors and athletes 
between countries promote diversity by helping participants and the individuals in 
their host countries learn about other cultures. In this case, cultural exchanges 
comprise a variety of events and initiatives, such as cultural festivals, heritage 
protection cooperation, governmental and international organization-led delegation 
visits, and other various cultural exchange in sports, music, dance, handicrafts, tourism, 
and so on.  
 
While all the documents, speeches, and videos made by states leaders and 
policymakers are usually available online, the task for each chapter is to systematically 
investigate the evolving pattern in official discourses and how they frame the 
relationship between China and each particular country. The sources are mainly taken 
from policy documents within the Ministry of Foreign affairs of PRC and the Ministry 
of Culture of PRC, the Chinese leadership’s speeches and reports on important 
international events and party congresses, and the conversations or interviews 
between spokesmen of the Ministry of Foreign affairs and world mainstream media. 
The timeline mainly focuses on the period from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 
to now, especially on the fifth generation of Chinese leadership. Broad reviews of 
earlier events and dynamics are incorporated to provide a sense of continuity and 
change, and to allow for reflection on whether the articulation of the Chinese Dream 
has been followed by a significant change in practices of cultural diplomacy. 
Furthermore, it also includes comprehensive readings of relative literature on soft 
power analysis, Chinese culture studies and Chinese foreign policy studies, including 
scholarly articles and books, media reports, and various texts both in Chinese and 
English. In addition, school textbooks, feature documentaries, films and television 
programs will also be analysed. As will be argued in Chapter 2, the administrative 
structure of China’s cultural diplomacy is a top-down administration with various 
branches and offices undertaking relevant responsibilities. Although non-
governmental organizations play an essential role in cultural exchanges, both the scale 
and the number of those Chinese non-governmental organizations seem insufficient 
and less developed in terms of quality and experience. Therefore, the case study in 
this thesis would mainly focus on the government-led or states-organized events and 
initiatives.  
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Conclusion  
This thesis aims to answer the central research question of: what are the key pillars of 
the ‘Chinese Dream’ ideology; to what extent is there coherence between 
contemporary practices of cultural diplomacy and the Chinese Dream ideology, and; 
to what extent do we see variation in practices of cultural diplomacy across China’s 
targeted countries? Guided by these research questions, it will offer a reflection of the 
ways in which soft power has been mobilized through the overarching ideological 
guidance of the Chinese Dream and the practice of cultural diplomacy toward the case 
study countries of Japan, Russia, and the United States. In addition, a few sub-research 
questions that are closely linked to the central question will also be answered: What 
is the relationship between soft power and cultural diplomacy? How do we identify 
the Chinese Dream within Xi’s presidency? How has the idea of the Chinese Dream 
been reflected in the practice of cultural diplomacy and in the promotion of soft power 
in relation with three specific countries? What cultural resources have been adopted 
to project a particular image of China toward each country? What image does the 
Chinese government intend to cultivate through cultural diplomacy?  
 
In short, this thesis represents an effort to fill the gap in the dynamics between China’s 
soft power and cultural diplomacy, particularly in the era of the Chinese Dream. It 
provides a critical examination of how soft power is mobilized in the formulation of 
China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan, Russia and the United States. Each case 
represents a distinctive aspect of how soft power has been mobilized through the 
overarching ideological guidance of the Chinese Dream and the implementation of 
China’s increasingly sophisticated cultural diplomacy during Xi’s presidency. Overall, 
the analytic approach and comparison demonstrates that the extent to which 
practices of cultural diplomacy echo central pillars of the Chinese Dream varies across 
cases.
 Chapter 2: The evolution of China’s cultural diplomacy 
Introduction  
This chapter traces the inception of China’s cultural diplomacy in ancient times and 
follows its development through to 2012. It highlights the importance of traditional 
Chinese schools of thought, particularly Confucianism, in understanding a broader 
pattern of continuity within the CCP’s ideology. It provides an overview of China’s 
cultural diplomacy within the previous four generations of Chinese leadership and 
argues that cultural diplomacy has been playing an increasingly salient part in the 
CCP’s foreign policy practice. It also explores the dynamics of the key actors in China’s 
cultural diplomacy, particularly within the three case study countries. It argues that 
China’s cultural diplomacy is predominately performed by governmental departments 
and organizations, featuring a top-down administrative structure. Overall, traditional 
Chinese schools of thought, particularly Confucianism, play an essential role in 
understanding a broader pattern of continuity within the CCP’s ideology. Chinese 
cultural diplomacy, featuring a top-down administrative structure, has been a key tool 
in China’s continuous foreign policy within the CCP regime.  
 
The first section explores the three main classic schools of Chinese political thought 
and China’s early cultural exchange activities. It argues that traditional Chinese political 
values, particularly Confucianism, provide a significant philosophical backdrop against 
which to understand a broader pattern of continuity within the CCP’s political narrative. 
Early explorations as historical anchorages provide the background for understanding 
how the Chinese envisage the position of China in international society and the 
political priority with a sense of continuity in the CCP’s broader political narrative. The 
second section focuses on contemporary China’s cultural diplomacy within the periods 
of the previous four generations of Chinese leadership. It argues that cultural 
diplomacy has been playing an increasingly salient part in the CCP’s foreign policy. It 
provides an overview of China’s cultural diplomacy within the previous four 
generations of the CCP’s leadership, thereby setting the stage for the investigation of 
the dynamic between cultural diplomacy and soft power under the fifth generation of 
Chinese leadership. The last section clarifies the key organizations of China’s cultural 
diplomacy, examining how they function within its own field in the implementation of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. It argues that China’s cultural diplomacy is predominately 
conducted by governmental departments and organizations, featuring a top-down 
administrative structure. Both the scale and number of Chinese non-governmental 
organizations seem insufficient and less developed in terms of quality and experience.  
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2.1 The seeds of China’s cultural diplomacy 
 
This first section seeks to shed light on the seeds of China’s cultural diplomacy through 
the examination of the three mainstream traditional Chinese schools of thought and 
early cultural exchanges. The purpose is to highlight their significance in providing 
valuable insights into China’s contemporary practices of cultural diplomacy. It argues 
that traditional Chinese political values, particularly Confucianism, provide a 
significant philosophical backdrop against which to understand a broader pattern of 
continuity within the CCP’s political narrative. Furthermore, early explorations as 
historical anchorages also provide the background for understanding how the Chinese 
envisage the position of China in international society and the political priority with a 
sense of continuity in the CCP’s broader political narrative. 
 
2.1.1 Traditional Chinese political schools of thought   
 
The following paragraphs introduce the three mainstream traditional Chinese political 
schools of thought as a way of providing a foundation of the Chinese ideology for 
understanding the contemporary context of Chinese cultural diplomacy. It argues that 
it provides China with a vast range of cultural and historical resources that can be 
mobilized to promote cultural diplomacy in accordance with its soft power strategy. In 
particular, Confucianism provides the philosophical backdrop against which to 
understand a broader pattern of continuity within the CCP’s political narrative. 
 
Chinese political philosophy has guided each regime over the past thousand years, 
providing a certain guidance in the process of decision making, and designing national 
strategy as a state governing guidance for distinctive dynasties. Before exploring how 
soft power theory has been interpreted and adopted into China’s foreign policy, it is 
essential to look at the role of Chinese political original schools of thought within the 
government of distinct regimes. Certain questions arise, such as what is the cultural 
foundation of Chinese political authority? What is the relationship between laws and 
morals? How do the ruling class and common people understand the goal of human 
society? Known as the “Hundred Schools of Thought”, Chinese philosophy dates back 
to the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States (771 to 476 BCE) (Ebrey, 1996, 
p.42). Broadly, this label refers to any of the several schools of philosophical thought 
in Chinese tradition and is divided into five streams: Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, 
Buddhism, and Mohism and so on. The three major schools of thought that emerged 
were Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism, with each of these philosophies had a 
major influence on Chinese culture and politics (Hue, 2007; Chen and Lee, 2008; Zhao, 
2015). 
 
Legalism is one of the oldest schools of thought and was first coined by Han Feizi (BCE 
280–BCE 233), which emphasizes the importance of strong laws and penalties in state 
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governance. It contends that moral concerns should always give way to pragmatic 
considerations when it comes to national interest. Radical political changes started 
after Shang Yang (BCE 390–BCE 338) came to power as an adviser of the Qin emperor 
(BCE 259–BCE 210). Often noted as his most relevant contribution, Shang Yang put 
forward a series of governmental and political reforms and advised Qin to increase his 
military power while becoming more assertive towards other states (Zhang, 1983, p.23; 
Zhang, 1988, p.1). This in turn led to the implementation of a strict set of rules and the 
definition of a clear political philosophy. “Such ideas tended to have special sway in 
times of war and chaos… The ruthless king of Qin drew on Han Fei’s advice to conquer 
and rule all of China under the title of First Emperor of the Qin dynasty” (Bell, 2015, 
p.34). After more than one hundred years of wars fought between the ‘Spring and 
Autumn’ and the ‘Warring States’ periods, China eventually emerged as a highly 
authoritarian nation. In order to unify the different fragmented states, the Chinese 
leaders imposed a series of draconian punishments and laws, setting up a legal 
framework clearly articulated upon the Legalist tradition. 
 
The contribution of Legalism to the Chinese political schools of thought was noted in 
two particular ways. Firstly, one of the most important ideas advanced through 
Legalism was the standardization of the institutional system, thus laying institutional 
foundations for later empires. According to Legalism, subservience to the ruling court 
was the foremost law. Meanwhile, the idea of Legalism provided equal treatment for 
everyone under a fixed set of laws; everyone must receive equal punishment for 
breaking the laws (Ma and Tsui, 2014. p.18). To some extent, equality can be seen as 
a key component of this traditional thought since it envisioned a legal system that 
defended the equal treatment of every person regardless of class. Secondly, the 
centralization of power has also been a key component of Legalism. The Legalism 
philosophy of Qin with strict rules intended to enhance the emperors’ capacity to 
govern the state and its overall authority over its people. Under the Legalist tradition, 
political opposition was not to be tolerated and the role of morals in state governance 
should always give way to the pragmatic interests of the state. “Top leaders alone must 
hold the power, especially of reward and punishment” (Ma and Tsui, 2014, p.18). 
 
However, despite possessing a strong military, the Qin dynasty was to be remembered 
as the shortest in China’s history, collapsing after only 15 years in BCE 206. Through a 
series of military battles and the subsequent territorial expansions, as well as the 
guidance of Legalist-inspired state policies, the Qin emperor established the largest 
territory of China until that date. Yet, the persecution of dissidents and the strong 
centralization of power through the imposition of a strong legal framework also led to 
growing dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Dissidents faced serious 
punishments such as torture, enslavement, or even execution. Meanwhile, inside the 
ruling court, the desire for absolute power and the increasingly authoritarian system 
led to an increase in corruption and conflicts of interests within the elites, ultimately 
leading to a series of violent rebellions and eventual fall of the Qin dynasty (Fields, 
1989. p.1). Noticeably, once Legalism was adopted by the leading class as the official 
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philosophy, other schools of thought came to be dramatically destroyed. The event 
known as ‘the burning of books and burying of scholars’ (Fen Shu Keng Ru) is widely 
regarded as one of the greatest losses of Chinese cultural and philosophical heritage. 
It led to the disappearance of various treatises from other traditions that are part of 
the Hundred Schools of Thought (Shi, 1973; Sun, 1980; Zhang, 1991). In particular, 
during this period the philosophies of Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism came 
under substantive attack by the ruling class, leading to the persecution of some of their 
most important scholars and philosophers.  
 
Replaced by the Han Empire, one of the longest-lasting empires in Chinese history, the 
new ruling class abandoned legalism as the state’s official philosophy. In its place, 
Daoism emerged as the philosophical anchorage of a new era in Chinese civilization. 
Daoism was created by Laozi, who supported the preservation of life and advocated 
the avoidance of injury and non-interventionism, or what is also called “Wuwei” and 
can be translated as doing nothing other than facilitating people (Kohn, 1996; 
Csikszentmihalyi and Ivanhoe, 1999; Michael, 2015). In direct opposition to Legalism, 
Daoism rule is literally separated small anarchies. Differing from contemporary 
political constructivists, the Daoist rule aimed to achieve non-governance by allowing 
natural order to take over and have people to flow naturally within this order, rather 
than trying to structure and control the world to people’s own needs and desires. 
Without the desire of winning and/or dominating others, as well as the fear of being 
beaten or harmed by others, Daoism can be said to achieve a status of anarchism.  
 
The main contribution of Daoism in that context was that it alleviated the control over 
the people by the ruling court in a period still shaped by the recent loss of a significant 
portion of the population. Under the guidance of Daoism, the legal system was to be 
radically altered: taxation was lowered, and extremely torturous punishments came to 
be abolished by the Emperor. Unlike the Qin emperor, early Western Han emperors 
granted a greater degree of freedom to the population and decreased the highly 
centralized and authoritative nature of the state seen in previous eras. During the 
period that lasts from the Emperors Han Wen to Han Wu (BCE180-BCE141), China was 
considered to be at a particularly prosperous economic level and a culturally advanced 
civilization. This particular period is also known as Wen Jing Zhi Zhi, or the rule of the 
emperors Wen and Jing. However, since emperor Han Wu (BCE141-BCE87) took power, 
Confucianism started to become increasingly accepted by the ruling class as the official 
state doctrine. Yet, the Daoist tradition continued to be highly influential as a folk 
religion among lower classes.  
 
First proposed by Confucius (BCE551- BCE479), Confucianism has been considered 
China’s dominant ideology at both the religious and political level. It was developed 
continuously by later dynasties after Han Wu first launched the initiative BaChu BaiJia, 
expelling the hundred (non-Confucian) schools of philosophy. (Shi, 1980; Li, 1988; 
Wang, 1990). Distinct from the previous schools of thought, Confucianism upholds a 
hierarchical “top-down” dynamic of state governance, based on principles, morals and 
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interpersonal relationships. On the one hand, Confucianism emphasizes the 
importance of conventional discipline, principles and social rules in state governance. 
On the other hand, it also addresses the important role that benevolence and morals 
played between the ruling class and common people. As Yiwei Wang (2015, p.8) 
pointed out that, “traditional Chinese thinking about power is that power comes from 
morality and morality comes from nature.” Confucianism believes that “human nature 
is essentially good, the moral life is the full realization of our moral nature” (Tang Chun, 
1959, p.28). Therefore, “morality and law could form the basis for relations among 
states; and peaceful and cooperative relations among states were possible” (Ding, 
2008, p.196). Overall, similar to Nye’s point of view, Confucianism doesn't dismiss the 
rule of law so long as the law is established upon a particular moral code. Benevolence, 
benignity, and other moral values are to be privileged in state governance. 
 
Mencius (372-289 BCE), a student of Confucius who first developed the idea of just 
and unjust war from a Confucian perspective, advocates that rulers have an obligation 
to promote the peaceful unification of the world. As he stated, “there is a way to gain 
the world, it is to gain the people, and having gained them one gains the whole world. 
There is a way to gain the people, gain their hearts and minds and then you gain them” 
(Barr, 2011, pp.25-26). This is closely related to the core statement of Nye’s soft power, 
by gaining one’s heart through inherent attraction rather than coercive power. As seen 
here, “the idea of soft power is not new to China, or at least to Chinese philosophy. 
Human nature was not considered to be inherently evil, and thus states could operate 
as a community rather than merely as autonomous self-interested agents” (Barr, 2011, 
p.26). “Confucianism veers towards the other extreme of utopian cosmopolitanism. 
Confucians defended the ideal of Tian Xia (the world under the heaven), a harmonious 
political order without state boundaries and governed by a sage by means of virtue, 
without any coercive power at all” (Bell, 2015). Although Nye does not clearly describe 
an ideal status of human society, such principles are somewhat similar to the features 
of soft power, emphasizing co-operative power rather than coercive power and 
political persuasion.  
 
In short, classic Chinese political schools of thought represent important cultural 
resources that could potentially be mobilized into the official narrative of the state, 
both in the context of domestic and foreign cultural policy. There is also a strong 
connection between the dominant guiding ideology of Confucianism and Nye’s soft 
power theory. More importantly though, Confucianism provides the philosophical 
backdrop against which to understand a broader pattern of continuity within the CCP’s 
political narrative. On the other hand, this may also help us to explain why the notion 
of soft power has gained so much approval among the CCP and its leading intellectuals. 
 
2.2.2 Early cultural exchange in Chinese history 
 
The proceeding paragraphs aim to reveal the origins of China’s cultural diplomacy 
through presenting the cases of renowned cultural exchange activities carried out by 
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distinctive regimes in Chinese history. Consequently, it argues that these earlier 
activities represent cultural resources that could potentially be adopted and 
interrelated as a means of achieving the goal of cultural diplomacy. At the same time, 
these early explorations as historical anchorages also provide the background to 
understanding political priority with a sense of continuity in the CCP’s broader political 
narrative.  
 
Cultural diplomacy is relatively new as a concept introduced to international politics. 
However, practices of cultural exchange between different civilizations can be traced 
back to more than two thousand years ago. Within the Chinese context, interactions 
with foreign cultures date from the Han dynasty (BCE 202- AD 9), with numerous 
activities of cultural exchange having been recorded since then. Well-known stories of 
early cultural exchanges such as the Expedition of ZhangQian, the Voyages of ZhengHe, 
and Matteo Ricci Missionary Work continue to have an essential impact on 
contemporary Chinese culture and identity.  
 
The Western Han Empire (BCE 202- AD 9) was the first large and long-surviving empire 
in the region. Communication between the central government and the outside of 
China had not started until emperor Han Wu adopted Confucianism instead of Daoism, 
as the previous emperors had. It should be noted that underlying earlier cultural 
exchanges was a clear concern with the development and prosperity of the Western 
Han dynasty, as well as with the security of its territory. Accordingly, the Expedition of 
ZhangQian to central Asia set out to open one of the most important and well-known 
exchange routes in human history. The ancient Silk Road worked both as a major hub 
for trade and commerce, and, more broadly, as a bridge between Chinese civilization 
and foreign societies (Wang, 1977; Zhang, 1986; Wang, 1988). Today, the Silk Road 
continues to play a central role in Chinese foreign policy, as well as the narrative of 
ZhangQian in projecting the role of China in the governance and development of the 
Eurasian space. 
 
The story of ZhanQian is complex, but clearly shows the diversity of cultures reached 
by the Chinese explorer. To resist the invasion of northern nomadic enemies called 
Xiongnu, ZhangQian was dispatched by the Han emperor Wudi twice as the 
representative of the Han Empire, seeking political collaboration against the threat 
posed by Xiongnu. However, ZhanQian’s first expedition was immobilized by the 
Dayuezhi, an Indo-European tribal group residing in Central Asia. After being detained 
for 10 years, ZhanQian finally reached Dayuezhi and returned to central China. But the 
quest of ZhanQian and the Han Empire into the steppes of Central Asia had only just 
begun. During his second exploration, ZhanQian reached the Wusun, another Indo-
European tribe living near the Ili River, north of the Tarim Basin. In this second attempt, 
ZhanQian and his team reached Fergana (now part of Uzbekistan), Bactria (now part 
of Afghanistan), and Sogdiana (now part of Uzbekistan) (Wang, 1988, pp.117-118).  
 
Although both explorations failed to achieve their intended political purposes, 
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ZhangQian’s explorations played an important part in the establishment of cultural 
relations between China and the outside world. These explorations not only 
broadened the existing knowledge about geography within China, but also brought a 
large amount of reliable information about Western regions and their cultures. 
Accordingly, ZhangQian’s mission not only brought the Chinese into contact with the 
Hellenism and the empire of Alexander the Great, but also opened the way for the 
exchange of envoys between these Central Asian states and the Han (Wang, 1988). 
More importantly though, this early exploration into Central Asia opened up the 
ancient Silk Road and significantly boosted cultural exchanges between China and the 
West. Throughout the Silk Road, Chinese silk, metallurgy and water conservancy 
technology spread to Central Asia, Korea, Japan and Europe. Ivory, spices, stones, and 
a variety of plants were introduced into China. Meanwhile, the Silk Road also allowed 
for a dissemination of Chinese culture, from Central Asia to Europe. Moreover, this 
early attempt also signaled the pivotal role that this region would continue to have for 
future Chinese leaders. To be more specific, it promoted Chinese economic prosperity 
via trade and commerce and, equally important, in protecting the mainland from 
foreign invasion. 
 
In the Tang (AD 681- AD 907), Song (AD 960- AD 1279) and Yuan (AD 1271-AD 1368) 
dynasties, cultural exchanges and communication between China and foreign 
countries became more frequent. Examples can be seen in the diffusion of Chinese 
techniques of papermaking, textile technology, poetry, Chinese characters, printing, 
the compass, and the well-known spread of gunpowder to regions such as Korea, 
Japan, India, North Africa and Europe. At the same time, knowledge about astronomy, 
medicine, music, dance, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism were introduced into Chinese 
civilization. As Chang (1988, p. 374) neatly puts it, “the expanding Sino-Arab trade 
during the 14th century had gradually expanded Chinese knowledge of the world: 
‘universal’ maps that previously only displayed China and its surrounding seas began 
to expand further and further into the southwest with much more accurate depictions 
of the extent of Arabia and Africa”. 
 
From 1405 to 1433, the Ming government sponsored seven voyages to explore further 
regions outside of China. These also played a remarkable role in the evolution of 
China’s cultural relations. Often known as the ‘Treasure Voyages’ (ZhengHe XiaXiYang), 
these expeditions were led by Zheng He and reached the Southeast of Asia, Arabia, 
India and East Africa (Zheng, 1983; Tian, 1983; Fan, 1984; Fang, 2019). As a Muslim, 
Zheng He developed China’s cultural relations with Islam Southeast Asia, and his 
journeys constituted a crucial part in the history of cultural exchange between China 
and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, envoys from more than 30 countries were brought 
by Zheng He into mainland China. This placed foreign countries in direct contact with 
China’s tributary system, something particularly essential in the establishment of 
official relations between Chinese civilization and the outside world. During the late 
Ming and early Qing Dynasties, with the dissemination of European science and 
technological knowledge, cultural exchange continued to play a salient role in 
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developing the relations between China and the West. A seminal example is the Italian 
Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci who dedicated nearly 30 years of his life to the cultural 
exchange between China and Europe (1582-1610) (Wang, 1981; Lin, 1983). He was a 
pioneer of Catholicism in China and the first western scholar to read Chinese literature 
and study Chinese classics. His work introduced the findings of European explorations 
to East Asia for the first time. These early explorations, cultural exchanges and 
activities continued to shape Chinese understandings of both self-evaluation and 
perceptions of the relationship between China and other countries.   
 
The dissemination of Chinese culture through cultural exchanges and activities is 
noteworthy due to it being different from the contemporary systems of the time in 
other parts of the world. As Bell pointed out, “one feature of imperial China was that 
it did not expand in ways comparable to Western imperial powers, even when it may 
have had the technical ability to do so.” (2015, p.36) Through early business trades and 
cultural exchanges, a “top-down” tributary system was established. Interestingly, this 
cultural diplomatic relationship is premised on the consensus that China is considered 
as the cultural center of the world while other civilizations are less important. “In this 
system, the tributary ruler or his representative had to go to China to pay homage in 
ritual acknowledgment of his vassal status.” On the other hand, the cultural consensus 
is based on generous economic supports. “China guaranteed security and provided 
economic benefits, while using moral power to spread Confucian norms and allowing 
traditional ways of life to flourish” (Bell, 2015, p.36). The tributary system has 
remained the primary instrument of diplomatic exchange since the Han dynasty. 
Although it facilitated economic and cultural exchanges in ancient times, the 
hierarchical dynamic of the imperial Chinese tributary system was based on an 
unbalanced economic and cultural relationship that eventually caused a substantial 
financial deficit to the regime. Consequently, the ‘Closed Door policy’ (Bi Guan Suo 
Guo) came to be adopted during the period of Chinese contemporary history (Guo, 
1982; Huang, 1986). Since the ‘Sea ban policy’ (Hai Jin), which aimed at restricting 
private maritime trading and coastal settlement was adopted by the Ming dynasty, 
China was both economically and culturally isolated within the international system. 
From the beginning of the First Opium War in 1840 to the end of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1945, China had experienced one hundred years of foreign invasions, extreme 
poverty and a dramatic decline in both economics and culture. This period is called by 
the Chinese the Hundred Year Humiliation of the Chinese Nation (Bai Nian Guo Chi). 
 
Arguably, understanding these earlier interactions is of particular salience as they 
represent the cultural resources that could potentially be mobilized into the state’s 
official narrative toward both domestic and foreign cultural policy. More importantly, 
they play a pivotal role in the shaping and reshaping of China’s self-understanding as 
a distinctive civilization, as well as how China portrays itself to the world and how this 
idea has been manifested into the implementation of cultural diplomacy. However, 
how specifically Chinese traditional philosophy and early cultural exchanges had a 
influence on guiding contemporary policy-making processes in Chinese cultural 
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diplomacy? Is it in some ways being deliberately used by President Xi to justify the 
present? Or is there something about what was done in the past that has some 
connection to what is done today?  
 
Marked by significant cultural and intellectual developments, these historical thoughts 
and early cultural exchanges have a substantial influence on the contemporary 
Chinese articulations of soft power as well as China’s cultural diplomacy. “Recognizing 
culture as an effective instrument of soft power and modern statecraft is an example 
of the pragmatism characterizing contemporary Chinese foreign policies.” 8  Such 
cultural resources were deliberately selected and used for creating a positive national 
image of China in order to gain attraction from other countries in the international 
society. For instance, the Zheng He Voyages is often seen a peaceful symbol of China’s 
peaceful rise in the Chinese official narratives. Some historians argued that Zheng He 
missions suggests that coercion must have been an important element of the voyage 
in order to obtain political and economic control. As Geoff Wade (2005, p.51) noted: 
“the maritime forces sent abroad in the first third of the fifteenth century were 
intended to achieve the recognition of Ming dominance of (or perhaps suzerainty over) 
all the polities of the known maritime world. To achieve this, they used force, or the 
threat thereof”.  
 
However, within the official narratives of the CCP, those examples are often introduced 
as foundational moments in the development of China’s cultural diplomacy.  “In sharp 
contrast to the Western navigators’ exploration, conquest and colonialist plunder, 
Zheng He Voyage reveals China’s traditional good-neighbour foreign policy and ideas” 
(Xiao, 2005, p.17). Similarly, such rhetoric narratives are also manifested in China’s 
cultural diplomacy within Xi’s Chinese Dream era. For example, the transition from the 
ancient Silk Road to the contemporary Belt and Road grand design, and the adoption 
of various Chinese old proverbs and traditional Chinese philosophy in the official 
speeches, documents and reports. Such cultural resources represent the long history 
of inter-civilizational contact between China and foreign cultures, more importantly, 
they fit in China’s pursuit of soft power as well as the mutually beneficial types of 
relationships that China seeks to develop with its international partners. 
 
2.2 The PRC and cultural diplomacy: from 1949 to 2012 
This section provides an overview of China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy within 
the previous four generations of leadership. Accordingly, it argues that cultural 
diplomacy has played an increasingly salient part in the CCP’s foreign policy. Tracing 
the evolution of Chinese cultural diplomacy and its interactions with Nye’s soft power 
theory within the previous four generations of Chinese leadership builds up the 
foundation for the investigation of the dynamic between cultural diplomacy and soft 
power under the fifth generation of Chinese leadership. 
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2.2.1. Mao Zedong and the first generation of Chinese leadership: from the 
establishment of PRC to the Cultural Revolution (1949-1976)   
 
After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP became increasingly engaged in 
the practice of cultural diplomacy. Traditional areas of cultural diplomacy often 
involved sectors such as education, science and technology, arts, and sports. As Passin 
noted, in this earlier period, “more than 400 groups of Chinese delegates have 
participated in international sports meetings, drama and film festivals, musical 
contests, exhibitions, and activities commemorating famous people in the cultural 
world” (Passin, 1963, p. 1). As a new regime took power, the overall purpose of cultural 
diplomacy came to be that of promoting China’s international position and the 
legitimacy of the CCP abroad. This was especially vital at this stage if we take into 
consideration the adverse international environment at that time, and the widespread 
practice of non-recognition by several of its most important players.  
 
Despite the increasing number of cultural exchanges between China and the outside 
world, every interaction was carefully planned and controlled, as well as designed to 
achieve a specific purpose. For example, taking part in cultural exchanges in the post-
revolutionary period was restricted to certain groups, such as students, government 
officials and the Party’s delegations. Moreover, activities were prepared in great detail 
and had the overarching purpose of altering any unfavorable impressions about China 
and the CCP abroad. As Passin wrote, “he (the delegate) will have been guided, albeit 
with great skill, in accordance with his susceptibilities and dispositions, over a 
carefully-prepared stage” (1963, p.10). Clearly, these earlier practices of cultural 
exchange were also constrained by the international environment in this period. In the 
first ten-years of the CCP (1949-1959), the patterns of cultural exchange were strictly 
limited to improving the relations between Communist countries. This reflected 
China’s lean on one side 9 foreign policy as a means of fortifying its alliance with the 
Soviet Union and counterbalancing the growing weight of the U.S. in the international 
sphere.  
 
In Mao’s second decade of leadership, diplomatic relations between China and other 
countries gradually came to be more and more reliant on cultural diplomacy. In the 
1950s, the Chinese government established official relations with Asian countries such 
as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, and Nepal. This number increased 
from 10 countries to more than 40 in 1965. In Africa, China established diplomatic ties 
with more than 20 countries, including Egypt, Syria, and Yemen (Masannat, 1966, 
p.216). In 1964, France and the PRC had re-established diplomatic relations and 
momentously opened up cultural exchanges between China and the West: a French 
classical ballet group, a French pianist, and a basketball delegation visited China after 
a group of Chinese artists, acrobats, basketball and table tennis players went to France. 
In the same year, 36 delegations (including representatives and experts) were sent to 
France in order to study science and technology and take part in international 
academic conferences (Wang, 1998, p.379). 
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However, in the following period, cultural diplomacy between China and communist 
countries experienced a substantive decline due to the Sino-Soviet conflicts in the 
1960s. Accordingly, the deterioration of diplomatic relations between China and 
socialist countries led the number of cultural exchange programs and projects to 
decrease substantially. As an example, a large group of Soviet experts who had made 
significant contributions to the development of China’s nuclear research was 
commanded to return to the Soviet Union due to the deterioration of the relations 
between the two nations (Yang, 1989). Meanwhile, cultural diplomacy was facing 
other challenges that reflected older problems, such as the highly state-controlled 
environment within China’s cultural institutions. Unsurprisingly, these programs had a 
limited impact in achieving their goal, as the carefully planned visits often appeared 
unattractive to foreign audiences.  
 
During Mao’s third decade in power, the political and social chaos generated by the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976) led to a stall in China’s cultural diplomacy 
(MacFarquhar, 1974; Jin, 1996). In 1966, Mao Zedong launched the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ as a way of reinforcing his power and legitimacy within the country and 
CCP. Outside of China, political tension came with millions of Soviet troops deployed 
on the north Sino-soviet border. Down to the south, the United States started 
deploying military personal in Vietnam, thereby threatening the stability of China's 
southwest regions. Furthermore, the instability in diplomatic relationships seriously 
impeded the implementation of any kind of cultural diplomacy. As one of the most 
well-known incidents in the CCP’s history, the ‘Cultural Revolution’ not only led to 
strong discontent among the population towards state-controlled cultural policy 
within China, it also left China with a fragile reputation within international society. 
(Lu, 2004; Dikötter, 2016). A series of diplomatic disputes seriously damaged China’s 
international image and impeded cultural diplomacy to a substantive extent.  
 
During the "Cultural Revolution", both Western and Chinese traditional culture were 
seriously damaged. Cultural diplomacy during this period was considered an 
"international struggle in the field of ideology” and cultural exchange was viewed as 
the “dangerous risk of poisoning people spirits" (Zheng and Zhang, 2003, p.329). As a 
result, those in charge of foreign affairs departments came to be increasingly criticized, 
the cultural diplomatic agenda was disrupted, and foreign institutions were 
dismantled. As a ten-year tragedy in Chinese contemporary history, the Cultural 
Revolution led China’s cultural diplomacy into an extreme crisis. Despite the 
achievements made during the Cultural Revolution, such as China’s seat in the Security 
Council and the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the US, 
China’s cultural diplomacy continued to be relegated to a lower position in China’s 
international agenda during this period. 
 
In short, China’s cultural diplomacy in the period of first-generation Mao suffered a 
huge impact from the combination of domestic and international factors, such as the 
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internal unrest during the Cultural Revolution and the growing tension between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some foundations of current Chinese cultural 
diplomacy were formed during this period. In the decades following Mao’s leadership, 
cultural diplomacy came to play an increasingly salient part in China’s international 
strategy and foreign policy.  
 
2.2.2. Deng Xiaoping and the second generation of Chinese leadership: From the 
Reform and Opening-up to the Tiananmen Protest (1978- 1992) 
 
When the second generation of the Chinese leadership came to power in 1978, China 
adopted a remarkably different model of economic development. Known as the 
Reform and Opening-up (GaiGeKaiFang), this strategy represented a radical change 
from the previous period and led to several modifications in the structure and political 
priorities of the CCP. Advanced by the leader of the CCP Deng Xiaoping, the Reform 
and Opening-up policy sought to improve the level of economic development across 
the country while at the same time reinforcing the domestic legitimacy of the party 
(Deng, 1986). In sharp contrast with the previous generation, this strategy sought to 
achieve these goals by focusing on economic growth rather than the ideological 
control of the population. This strategy also had an enormous impact on the foreign 
policy of the CCP in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It was 
originally conceived by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and China’s first 
premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1954. The principles rose to fame at the Bandung Conference 
in 1955, which set the stage for the Non-Aligned Movement. as stated by the 
Panchsheel Treaty, signed on April 29, 1954, are: Mutual respect for each other’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Mutual non-aggression. Mutual non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. Peaceful 
co-existence. 10  Following these principles, China started to establish diplomatic 
relations with countries beyond the socialist spectrum, with substantive effort on 
strengthening the diplomatic ties with developed countries. 
 
Remarkably, cultural diplomacy came to assume a crucial role in China’s broader 
international strategy during this period. Deng not only acknowledged the potential of 
Chinese traditional culture in the implementation of cultural diplomacy, but also 
appealed to a greater integration between traditional Chinese culture and western 
culture at the domestic level. As a result, cultural diplomacy has kept pace with China’s 
significant economic growth since the second generation of Chinese leadership came 
to power. An increasing amount of cultural politics, initiatives, and activities have been 
carried out since 1979. For example, China Daily, one of the most effective tools of 
Chinese contemporary cultural diplomacy and the largest English-language newspaper 
in China, was established in 1981. 11 In 1985, People’s Daily, the biggest newspaper 
group owned by the CCP, also announced its overseas edition both in Chinese and the 
English language.12 Furthermore, a great variety of cultural activities, initiatives, and 
agreements to improve the communication between the public inside and outside 
China were launched during this period. The range of initiatives varied from local art 
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to academic exchange, from sports to traditional culture. By the end of 1989, there 
were 172 international multilateral treaties that China had been engaged (Xie, 1997, 
p.451). The CCP placed a substantive emphasis on China’s organization and 
participation in multilateral cultural diplomacy activities which not only benefited 
from, but also accelerated, the broader process of economic development. 
 
However, China’s cultural diplomacy faced more challenges after the ‘Tiananmen 
Square Protest’ in 1989 whereby the Party was widely condemned by the international 
community for its use of force against the protesters (Hersiikovit, 1993; Wasserstrom, 
2018).  In the early 1990s, the Chinese leadership was being confronted by an adverse 
international environment and an unstable domestic situation. At the domestic level, 
the challenge to the CCP’s legitimacy came from the broader public and led to 
increasing tensions among the different factions with the CCP. More crucially, the 
substantive change in the domestic order resulting from the end of the Cold War as 
well as the widespread criticism of the CCP’s actions regarding Tiananmen left the 
party in a delicate position, especially concerning its diplomatic relations with 
democratic countries such as the United States. The breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the radical change of Eastern Europe also placed considerable pressure on the CCP.  
 
Speaking about the predicaments faced by China at that time, Deng (1989, p.96) 
pointed out that, "in terms of current the international situation, it can be summarized 
up to three phrases: first of all, observe it calmly; Secondly, stay calm; Last but not 
least, deal with it calmly. Just keep calm and working hard, focusing on one thing at a 
time". Following on from that, the policy of TaoGuang YangHui translated as "hide the 
brightness, cultivate the mind" was adopted by the CCP. As laid out by Deng in the 
early 1990s, the ideas underlying this strategy were deeply rooted in ancient Chinese 
political culture. The words Taoguang and Yanghui were attributed to an old Chinese 
saying that was first used by Zheng Guanying in the late Qin dynasty. As Shen pointed 
out, “when Deng outlined his foreign policy principles based on the above ideas, the 
most intriguing addition to the recipe was Daoism” (2007, p.1). Similar to what Daoism 
advocates, Deng’s strategy mainly focused on “cultivating the mind” by first improving 
the living standard pragmatically for the people and then “hiding the brightness" 
which meant being humble by keeping a low profile in world affairs.  
 
In sum, Deng’s strategy can be said to represent a pivotal change in Chinese politics 
and, to a certain extent, have paved the way to one of the most successful periods in 
China’s history, becoming one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Deng’s 
policy demonstrated how China’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic through 
the gradual removal of the previous ideological barriers. As a result, cultural exchanges 
with other countries entered a new stage where communication became less 
constrained and a renewed emphasis was placed on cultural diplomacy during this 
period. 
 
2.2.3. Jiang Zemin and the third generation of the Chinese leadership (1993-2003) 
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Despite the rapid growth at the economic level under the direction of Jiang Zemin, 
China’s soft power in the international sphere remained limited due to the long-lasting 
effects of the Tiananmen Protests. In response, Jiang Zemin, the leader of the third 
generation of leadership, started to place an increasing amount of effort into cultural 
diplomacy to reshape the image of China abroad following the negative consequences 
of the Tiananmen Protest. First, a more sophisticated network of institutions focusing 
on cultural diplomacy was established. Inside the government, a top-level 
coordinating body, the Central Foreign Propaganda Group (ZhongYang DuiWai 
XuanChuan Zu), first established in 1980, was reestablished as the Leading Group for 
Propaganda and Ideology Work (ZhongYang XuanChuan SiXiang GongZuo LingDao 
XiaoZu).13 In 1991, “under the guidance of the Leading Group for Propaganda and 
Ideology Work, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) (GuoWuYuan XinWen 
BanGongShi) was established” (Shaw, 2004, pp.16–17). More specifically, “it actually 
acts as ‘one body with two plaques’ because it is also the CCP Central Foreign 
Propaganda Office (ZhongGong ZhongYang DuiWai XuanChuan BanGongShi), which is 
under the charge of the Central Propaganda Department (ZhongYang XuanChuan Bu)” 
(Creemer R, 2015, p.308).  
Furthermore, beyond the broader reform of the cultural administrative system, the 
Chinese leadership came to realize the crucial role that the media could have in 
communicating with international audiences and influencing public opinion both 
inside and outside China. Therefore, the strategies pursued by the traditional media 
(such as state-owned newspaper and television) had the underlying purpose of 
creating a favorable international environment for the CCP and, in doing so, countering 
the negative discourse hindering the development of China’s soft power abroad. As a 
consequence, news outlets such as China Radio International (CRI), China Central 
Television (CCTV), China News Service (CNS) and Xinhua News receive increasing 
support from the CCP during this period and assumed a greater salience in the CCP’s 
domestic and international strategies.  
In addition, a series of cultural exchanges, events, and activities were implemented to 
support the dissemination of traditional Chinese culture abroad. By the end of the 
20th century, the Ministry of Culture of the PRC had held three culturally themed years: 
"Chinese International Year of the Symphony" in 1996, "Chinese International Year of 
Opera and Drama" in 1997, and the "Chinese International Art Year" in 1998 
(Guangming, 1998). These events substantially improved Chinese people’s knowledge 
of world culture and enhanced the communication between China and broader 
international audiences. In addition to the numerous cultural festivals promoted by 
the CCP abroad, several international cultural activities were launched. From 1990 to 
2000, the number of cultural exchange activities between China and other countries 
nearly doubled, increasing from 733 to 1433 (Chinese Cultural Relics Statistics 2005, 
p.63).  
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In sum, following the essential core values of Deng’s Reform and Opening-up policy, 
the third generation of the Chinese leadership demonstrated a greater willingness to 
reintegrate China into international society through a series of cultural diplomacy 
activities and events. Despite the drawbacks generated by the Tiananmen Protest, 
China rapidly reestablished itself as a major power through its economic rise in the 
international sphere.  
 
2.2.4. Hu Jintao and the fourth generation of the Chinese leadership (2003-2012): 
harmonious world and peaceful rise 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, after a negotiation period that took fifteen years, 
China officially joined the WTO. At the same time, the idea known as “Culture Going 
Out” (Wenhua Zouchuqu) was being proposed as a response to the Western idea of 
soft power (Ye, 2010). Introduced within Chinese academic circles in 1993 by Wang 
Huning, this notion adapted Nye’s soft power theory into the Chinese context and 
gradually achieved great prominence within China’s intellectual circles and the CCP. By 
the mid-2000s, the CCP had largely adopted soft power as a key component of the 
country’s broader international strategy, with cultural diplomacy seen as the privileged 
mechanism for its promotion (Barr, 2011). Following from that, the term “China’s soft 
power” has been used frequently in official speeches, interviews, policies, reports, and 
academic works.  
Based on both ancient Chinese political thoughts and contemporary soft power theory, 
the fourth generation of the Chinese leadership adjusted its diplomatic strategy to 
achieve the goal of creating a more cooperative international environment. “At the 
heart of China’s foreign policy lies the ‘democratization of international relations’, an 
aim that turns on dialogue and multilateralism, not coercion” (Wijk, 2015, p.155). The 
ideological guidance Harmonious World was first proposed in 2005 by Hujin Tao at the 
United Nations Summit, becoming one of the most symbolic narratives for explaining 
China’s behavior during the nation’s rise in the global economic order. The idea of 
“harmony” derives from Confucius philosophy discussed in the Analects. Confucians 
define the ideal of Tian Xia (the world under heaven) as a harmonious political order 
without state boundaries and governed by a sage by means of virtue, without any 
coercive power at all (Bell, 2015). In the same year, the white paper on “China’s 
Peaceful Development” was also issued. China’s commitment to a peaceful 
international environment was seen as being essential to the development of cultural 
diplomacy. Hu pointed out in the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese 
People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries Conference that: “we 
should not only present different cultures from other countries to Chinese people, but 
also introduce Chinese culture to people from all over the world, therefore to promote 
the Chinese people and the people of all countries to learn from each other through 
cultural exchange, to promote Chinese culture and other cultures to learn from each 
other.” 14 
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During this period, the number of foreign policies intending to enhance China’s soft 
power increased, and many research centers and programs focusing on cultural 
diplomacy were established as a result. By the end of 2005, China had signed contracts 
for cultural exchanges and initiatives with more than 145 countries, with more than 
750 cultural exchange proposals being advanced. China also established official 
relations with more than one thousand international culture organizations (Meng, 
2005). These policies and proposals demonstrated that the fourth generation of the 
Chinese leadership has gained a deeper understanding regarding the essential role of 
cultural diplomacy in promoting the national image and enhancing the country’s soft 
power. Accordingly, a series of international cultural activities and events were held to 
promote foreign audiences’ perceptions of China. For example, “A Close Look at China” 
(Zou Jin Zhong Guo), which was the largest series of cultural events ever, was first held 
in the United States by the Ministry of Culture of the PRC and the State Council of 
Information in 2001 (Guangming, 2002). In October 2005, the month-long “Festival of 
Chinese Culture” (Zhong Guo Wen Hua Jie) was jointly presented in Washington DC by 
the Chinese Ministry of Culture and the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing 
Arts. The festival included more than 30 cultural performances and exhibitions, 
attracting more than 400,000 people. 15  Furthermore, cultural exchange activities, 
such as the Culture Year, were held in countries such as Russia, Australia, New Zealand, 
Brazil, Italy and India. These efforts were made to ensure that the cultural diversity 
and vitality of China was highlighted side by side with China's ancient history and 
customs, which contributed to a broader cultural exchange and better understanding 
between China and foreign audiences. 
In addition to the above, greater attention was paid by the CCP to the role of education 
and academic exchanges in their broader strategy of soft power promotion. Given the 
importance of engagement with international conferences, China showed a greater 
willingness to engage with academic audiences and initiated a number of initiatives in 
that direction. In 2004, the 7th Conference of the International Network on Cultural 
Policy (INCP) was held in Shanghai, which aimed to strengthen the awareness of 
protecting traditional culture. 16  This informal international event sees national 
ministers responsible for culture explore and exchange views on new and emerging 
cultural policy issues, allowing them to develop strategies to promote cultural diversity. 
17 Additionally, language education has become a salient tool in the promotion of 
China’s soft power. Since the establishment of the first Confucius Institute in Seoul in 
2004, the number of CIs had increased to 200 by the end of 2007. CIs have become a 
place where foreign audiences can learn the Chinese language and Chinese traditional 
culture. “CIs are increasingly successful in introducing knowledge about Chinese 
language and culture to the world, as the ever-growing number of institutes and 
students indicates” (Hartig, 2015, p.255).  
In brief, the diplomatic strategy of China was adjusted in order to create a friendly and 
cooperative international environment within the fourth generation of the Chinese 
leadership. China’s cultural diplomacy entered a new stage where cultural exchanges 
were carried out through multiple approaches and at different levels within Hu’s 
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presidency.  
 
2.3 The organizations of China’s cultural diplomacy  
This section clarifies the key administrative organizations responsible for China’s 
cultural diplomacy, examining how they function within their own field to implement 
China’s cultural diplomacy, particularly within the three case study countries. It argues 
that there is a top-down administrative structure to China’s cultural diplomacy, with 
various branches and offices undertaking different responsibilities in the three case 
study countries. Although the non-governmental organizations play an essential role 
in cultural exchanges, both the scale and the number of those Chinese non-
governmental organizations seem insufficient and less developed in terms of quality 
and experience.    
 
2.3.1 Official Governmental organizations and government-led organizations 
 
The State Council Information Office of China (SCIO) can be seen as the central official 
organ of China’s cultural diplomacy. Established in 1991, the major function of the SCIO 
is to propel domestic media further along the path of introducing China’s history, 
technology, education, culture, domestic and foreign policies, and the Chinese 
economy and society to the international community. The SCIO also holds press 
conferences regarding major national policies and provides books, magazines, films, 
television programs and other means of communication to introduce China to the 
world. Further to these, the SCIO also carries out exchanges with governments and 
media outlets from across the globe.18 The SCIO has played a strategic role in China’s 
use of cultural diplomacy to promote a favourable image of China to countries around 
the world. The Bureau for External Cultural Relations Ministry of China is another 
governmental organ of China’s cultural diplomacy. On the one hand, as the 
subordinate of China’s Ministry of Culture19, its main function is to guide and manage 
foreign cultural exchanges and draft relevant laws and regulations. On the other hand, 
as one of the executive bodies of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Chinese embassies 
take responsibility for conducting and organizing those cultural exchange activities and 
events in different countries. In addition, the Cultural Office and the Educational Office 
are also set up in individual embassy to facilitate relevant cultural, educational 
exchange work, particularly in those countries that have frequent cultural and 
educational exchange with China. In the three case study countries, both the Cultural 
Office and the Educational Office have been set up within the embassies. The 
responsibilities of the Cultural Office of Embassy of China include assisting the 
domestic organizers of cultural exchange activities and events, engaging directly with 
the signing up of cultural cooperation agreements, making the agreement of annual 
project plans and so on. Furthermore, it also communicates relevant information and 
materials to the government in order to promote the implementation of the cultural 
cooperation and exchange programs. In addition, another responsibility of the Cultural 
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Office is to assist in the arrangements of culture and art exchanges, i.e. supporting 
visits of the tourists, artists, scholars, professionals, and giving guidance and help to 
people from both countries. 20 The responsibilities of the Educational Office mainly 
include regulating and supporting overseas students from both countries, providing 
study guidance, scholarship guidance and so on. It also assists the Confucius Institutes 
Headquarter (Han ban) in conducting Chinese teaching activities and other Chinese 
promotional events in the case study countries. 
 
Another governmental organ is the Department of International Cooperation and 
Exchanges (DICE). As a subordinate of China’s Ministry of Education, DICE is 
responsible for the overall regulation of educational exchange, student exchange, 
education support, and culture aid. DICE also plans and guides the work of teaching 
Chinese as a foreign language and other relevant business. 21 In addition, there are 
two more governmental organizations that are generally involved in the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy. The first being the International 
Cooperation Office of National Radio and Television Administration of China (ICONRTA), 
which is responsible for the overall international exchanges and cooperation in 
publishing, radio, film and television and copyright.22Furthermore, ICONTRA makes 
international cultural agreements and undertakes relevant projects. The second 
organization is the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), also known as the 
China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, which is the largest foreign-
language publishing organization in China. 23  It has developed into a global media 
corporation that provides up-to-date information about China to readers worldwide. 
The CIPG has produced books and magazines since its establishment in 1949, later 
utilising the internet after its introduction to China. 
 
Government-led organizations include organizations and institutes that are directly 
affiliated to the governmental organizations, such as the State Council, China’s 
Ministry of Education, and China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Affiliated to China’s 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the China and Foreign Countries Cultural Exchange 
Centre’s responsibilities include organizing international conferences, international 
academic exchanges, performances of arts groups and exhibitions in China and 
abroad.24  It holds various official and folk culture and art exchange activities and 
undertakes media advertising and public promotion of large-scale cultural activities 
abroad. Hanban /Confucius Institute Headquarters is another public institution 
affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education. It is committed to providing Chinese 
language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide. 25 As a non-profit 
public educational organization used for promoting cultural diplomacy, Confucius 
Institutes engage in activities aimed at contributing to local societies and promoting 
international exchange and mutual understanding between China and the rest of the 
world. They organize a variety of programmes and activities in the fields of Chinese 
language education and Chinese traditional culture. The first Confucius Institute was 
established in November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. In addition to training teachers 
and teaching the Chinese language, Hanban also holds cultural exchange projects that 
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are concerned with promoting Chinese culture. These projects include such things as 
Festival-themed activities, the “Chinese bridge summer camp in China”, “Chinese 
bridge competition”, and “Confucius Institute Day”. 
 
In terms of broadcasting and television, the biggest and most influential publisher is 
the Xinhua agency. It is a central publicity agency that has been conducting work under 
the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee and State Council since it was 
established by the CCP in 1931. It covers a number of themes, such as politics, 
economics, society, culture, diplomatic relationships, education, and other areas of 
everyday life.  The Xinhua North American headquarters was established in October 
2008. The year after, the Eurasian headquarters was set up in Moscow.26 More recently, 
Yasuo Fukuda, the former Japanese prime minister, addressed the launching ceremony 
of the Xinhua News Agency's Japanese News Service in Tokyo in Jan 2018. This marks 
the fact that China's Xinhua News Agency is now able to provide news services in the 
Japanese language, as well as English, Spanish, Russian, German, French, Portuguese, 
Arabic, and Korean.27  
 
In addition, China News Service, CCTV, China Radio International, and People’s Daily, 
are the main media organizations working towards the implementation of China’s 
cultural diplomacy. Launched in 1941, the purpose of China Radio International is “to 
show the world to China, to introduce China to the world, to report the world to the 
world, to enhance the understanding and friendship between Chinese people and 
people from all over the world.” 28 Co-organized by China Central Television and the 
Japanese Daifu Firm in Japan in 1998, CCTV Daifu is one of the earliest channels built 
on cooperation between China and Japan. 29 It began bilingual broadcasting in both 
Chinese and Japanese in 2012. In the same year, CGTN America, the Washington News 
Bureau CCTV, started to offer multi-language news channels internationally, including 
a 24-hour English-language news channel that is broadcast to over 100 English-
speaking countries, including the United States.30 The Russian-language channel was 
launched earlier in 2009, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between Beijing and Moscow.31  
  
Overall, from the SCIO to the Cultural Office, from the Confucius Institutes to the 
Xinhua News Agency, it can be seen that there is a top-down administrative structure 
to China’s cultural diplomacy, with various overlapping branches and offices 
undertaking relevant responsibilities.  
 
2.3.2 Non-governmental associations and societies 
 
There are various societies and associations engaging in China’s cultural diplomacy. 
Among them, the four most renowned organizations are the Chinese People’s 
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) (established in 1954), the 
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) (established in 1949), the China 
International Culture Association (CICA) (established in 1986), and the International 
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Culture Exchange Centre CICEC (established in 1984). These groups carry out cultural 
and educational exchanges with scholars, politicians, artists, students and local people. 
They aim to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese 
people and the people of other countries, promoting the establishment and 
development of friendly relations and cooperation while contributing to peace and 
development in the world.  
 
For example, CPIFA is engaged in compiling and publishing documents on foreign 
affairs and international studies, holding seminars and lectures on international and 
regional issues in the political, economic, cultural, security and other fields. 32 It has 
contributed to China’s cultural diplomacy through establishing bilateral ties and 
academic exchanges with countries and regions such as the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. 33 Take Japan as an example, CPAFFC’s Department of Japanese Affairs 
is one of the most important non-governmental associations between China and Japan. 
This department is responsible for receiving the visiting delegations, organizing and 
sending delegations to Japan, and coordinating and promoting the establishment of 
friendship cities with the local Japanese authorities. 34  Besides, there are also a 
number of small-sized associations and societies which are dedicated to China’s 
cultural exchanges. For example, the China-Japan Student Conference was first 
established in 1986. It organizes annual conferences for top university students from 
both countries to conduct academic and cultural exchanges. In recent years, more 
subjects regarding the rise of China as a major power in Asia have been discussed 
through bilateral forums. Moreover, societies have been set up in universities by 
students, such as the Association of China-Japanese Communication (ACJC) at the 
Beijing University and the YingLong Society from Xiamen University.  
 
Non-governmental organizations play an essential role in carrying out the exchange of 
personnel and promoting the long-term, steady cultural relations between China and 
other countries. They make positive contributions in promoting the communication of 
ideas about economy, politics, culture, sports, science and technology, developing 
good relations between countries. Compared to governmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations were confronted with less opposition and doubts when 
implementing cultural diplomacy, which makes its role irreplaceable in the 
implementation of cultural diplomacy. However, it is worth pointing out that most of 
China’s non-governmental organizations are small, informally constituted, 
marginalized, and much less developed in terms of quality and experience when 
compared to other developed countries such as Japan and the U.S. (Yang & Alpermann, 
2014, p.311). Therefore, the case study in this thesis would mainly focus on the 
government-led or states-organized events and initiatives.  
 
To conclude, there is a top-down official administrative structure to China’s cultural 
diplomacy, with various overlapping branches and offices undertaking relevant 
responsibilities. Although non-governmental organizations play an essential role in 
cultural exchanges, both the scale and the number in China seem insufficient and less 
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developed in terms of quality and experience.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter traced the inception of China’s cultural diplomacy in ancient times and 
follows its development through to 2012. It argued that early explorations as historical 
anchorages provided the background for understanding how the Chinese envisage the 
position of China in international society and the political priority with a sense of 
continuity in the CCP’s broader political narrative. This chapter also explored the 
dynamic of the key actors in China’s cultural diplomacy, particularly within the three 
case study countries. It argued that China’s cultural diplomacy is predominately 
performed by governmental departments and organizations, featuring a top-down 
administrative structure. Both the scale and number of Chinese non-governmental 
organizations seem insufficient and less developed in terms of quality and experience. 
Overall, traditional Chinese schools of thought, particularly Confucianism, has been 
playing an essential role in understanding a broader pattern of continuity within the 
CCP’s ideology. Chinese cultural diplomacy, featuring a top-down administrative 
structure, has been a key tool in China’s continuous foreign policy within the CCP 
regime.  
 
 Chapter 3: Identifying the Chinese Dream  
Introduction  
The concept of the Chinese Dream has become a central principle around which 
China’s foreign policy in general and cultural diplomacy specifically is, in theory, 
oriented. To assess the correspondence between the ideological framework and the 
contemporary operationalization of soft power and cultural diplomacy in later 
chapters, it is essential to clarify the meaning of the Chinese Dream. Drawing upon 
historical analysis and discourse analysis, this chapter aims to provide a 
comprehensive clarification of the Chinese Dream through exploring the content and 
the mechanism of the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural diplomacy within the 
context of Xi’s foreign policy. To conclude, Xi’s Chinese Dream patriotically emphasizes 
the bond between the development of every individual and the prosperity of the 
nation, which is based on a traditional collective top-down relationship between the 
state and the individual. More importantly, by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, it 
demonstrates that there is a process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening 
based on the understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture in Xi’s Chinese 
Dream. Therefore, ancient cultural exchanges and historical narratives are embraced 
as the resources of soft power used for the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy within Xi’s presidency. 
 
In order to do this, three sections are included in this chapter. First, a literature review 
regarding the research of the Chinese Dream is provided. Second, the foundations of 
the Chinese Dream are identified, with insights from historical-cultural interpretations 
and various relevant speeches and statements that are synthesized to provide a 
detailed review. Finally, a sketch of China’s cultural diplomacy within the context of 
foreign policy during Xi’s presidency is specified, which suggests that the goal of 
cultural diplomacy is to provide a stable case study chapters build out from this initial 
point of entry.  
 
The first section provides a review of existing literature on discourse about the Chinese 
Dream. It argues that a historical approach based on a comprehensive understanding 
of traditional Chinese values is often under-appreciated in existing literature, 
particularly when it comes to looking at how the Chinese Dream ideology corresponds 
with the practice of cultural diplomacy within different countries. To assess in later 
chapters the correspondence between the ideological framework and the 
contemporary operationalization of soft power and cultural diplomacy, it is essential 
to clarify the meaning of the Chinese Dream with a solid understanding of its cultural 
foundation and historical context. 
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The second section explores the foundations of the Chinese Dream, with insights from 
historic cultural interpretations and various relevant speeches and statements being 
synthesized. It points out that the ancient interpretation of the ‘Chinese Dream’ is 
usually considered an ideal status of Chinese society. Top-down paternalistic 
governance and unity consensus play important roles in understanding this concept. 
In contemporary contexts, the Chinese Dream discourse fundamentally focuses on 
improving the lives of common people and the nation’s prosperity through the state’s 
modernization and industrialization. Xi’s Chinese Dream patriotically emphasizes the 
bond between the development of every individual and the prosperity of the nation, 
which is based on a traditional collective top-down relationship between the state and 
the individual. More importantly, by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, it demonstrates 
that there is a process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening based on the 
understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture in Xi’s Chinese Dream.  
 
The last section will delve into the developing practice of China’s cultural diplomacy, 
which corresponds with Xi’s foreign policy to provide a stepping-stone for further case 
studies. It argues that instead of keeping a low profile, China’s foreign policy within Xi’s 
presidency started to take the initiative by seeking leadership opportunities and 
influencing ongoing international dynamics. The broader foreign policy context of 
cultural diplomacy highlights the continuity of China’s peaceful development approach, 
as well as its ambition to rebuild a new international order on behalf of China’s voice. 
Furthermore, ancient cultural exchanges and traditional Chinese culture are embraced 
as the key resources of soft power implemented into China’s cultural diplomacy within 
Xi’s presidency. The Chinese Dream provides a broad ideological guidance in orienting 
China’s cultural diplomacy to enhance its soft power, whilst the main purpose of 
cultural diplomacy is to create a stable, peaceful, and favorable international 
environment to propel the achievement of the Chinese Dream.                        
3.1 The Chinese Dream: states of the art of existing literature 
This section provides a review of existing literature on the Chinese Dream discourse. It 
argues that a historical approach based on a comprehensive understanding of 
traditional Chinese values is often under-appreciated in existing literature, particularly 
when it comes to looking at how the Chinese Dream ideology corresponds with the 
practice of cultural diplomacy within different countries. To assess, in later chapters, 
the correspondence between the ideological framework and the contemporary 
operationalization of soft power and cultural diplomacy, it is essential to clarify the 
meaning of the Chinese Dream with a solid understanding of its cultural foundation 
and historical context. 
 
The concept of soft power was officially launched in October 2007 by Hu Jintao, stating 
in his work-report that “China must enhance the country’s cultural soft power” (Hu, 
2007, p.17). Likewise, Xi emphasized again that “enhancing China’s soft power matters 
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through the achievement of the Two 100 Years goals and the Chinese Dream”35 in a 
speech at an internal CCP conference in 2013 (Two 100 Years: the goal of becoming a 
“moderately well-off society” by 2020, the Party’s centennial, and the goal of China 
becoming a fully developed nation by 2049, the PRC’s centennial). As stated in the 
introduction, the term ‘soft power’ has become more prevalent within Chinese 
political and academic spheres since it was first introduced to China in the 1990s. In 
other words, Nye’s appeal of the important transition of power from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ 
has been welcomed by Chinese officials. Having realized the importance of soft power 
in international society and China’s weakness in its use, the CCP demonstrated its 
ambition in enhancing China’s soft power by first putting it into the national agenda.   
 
The Chinese Dream was first proposed in Xi’s visit to the National History Museum in 
November of 2012. Since then, considerable efforts have been made to publicize 
China’s new thoughts about world affairs and how they are centered on the idea of 
the Chinese Dream. The phrase “Chinese Dream” has been frequently emphasized in 
the speeches and documents of policymakers and leadership. Between 2012 and 2016, 
Xi has stated the Chinese Dream discourse in more than 15 important speeches and 
documents, both inside of the party and abroad. A great deal of attention has been 
drawn to the Chinese Dream, particularly within IR academia (Mohanty, 2013; Link, 
2015; Liu, 2015; Zhao and Gan, 2015; Kerr, 2015; Barr, 2015; Callahan, 2017; Ho, 2018). 
It has also captured much attention among Chinese academics. According to the CNKI, 
a Chinese mainstream academic research database, within the four years between 
2012 and 2016, more than 66,000 articles with the keywords “the Chinese Dream” 
(Zhong Guo Meng) in their titles had been published within Chinese academics. 36  
 
Zhao and Gao examine how the system of Chinese diplomacy has changed within Xi’s 
Chinese Dream era since the 18th CCP’s National Congress by looking into Xi’s key 
statements and strategic ideas. They argue that there have been three major changes 
to China’s diplomatic system since the 18th CCP’s National Congress: top-level design, 
strategic coordination, and multi-dimensional diplomacy (Zhao and Gao, 2015, p.43). 
Kent Deng explores China’s economic rejuvenation and its consequences by focusing 
on China’s long path towards modern growth and development (Deng, 2015, p.43). 
Kerr explores China’s development of a modern civil society in terms of internal and 
international dynamics and its consequences. He argues that the Chinese state’s 
unwillingness to share political and legal authority with a civil society is the largest 
single barrier to achieving the goal of good governance on which the goal of national 
rejuvenation will depend (Kerr, 2015, p.5). Shiping Zheng compares China with three 
neighbouring countries: Japan, Russia and India. He looked at the systems of 
performance assessment which cover the areas of government effectiveness, 
economic confidence, foreign direct investment confidence, intentional homicide, 
gender gap, international tourism, and global competitiveness, therefore exploring the 
dynamic of the Chinese Dream and national identity (2013). William Callahan (2017) 
compares the Chinese Dream with the American Dream from a poststructuralist 
approach. He points out that such “national dream is national perfection rather than 
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the universal emancipation of humanity”, therefore “it shows the normative politics 
of national belonging differs from cosmopolitan evocations of solidarity that prescribe 
universal belonging” (p.253). Furthermore, assessment is another focus of relevant 
Chinese Dream study: some researchers argue that slogans like the Chinese Dream can 
be problematic as they don’t resonate with the broader public (Servaes, 2016; 
Callahan, 2017). Barr argues that there is little prospect of bringing back traditional 
Chinse values to everyday life due to China’s people becoming part of the modern 
world, and therefore the promotion of Chinese traditional values is more to do with 
managing the manifold problems and dislocations of Chinese modernity (2015, p.7).  
 
However, little work has been done to systematically examine the comparison of how 
the Chinese Dream ideology corresponds with the practice of cultural diplomacy, 
particularly within different countries. Ho examines how music and songs can be 
instruments of power and dreams in their own rights, stating how the Chinese Dream 
has been reflected in music education in mainland China (Ho, 2018). However, “soft 
power is not limited to international image building, its deployment is as critical at 
home within the country as it is abroad” (Barr, 2011, p.28). Rather than simply 
observing it within a domestic scope, the analysis of the Chinese Dream in 
correspondence with cultural diplomacy toward distinctive countries would shed light 
on existing research regarding this notion. Furthermore, a historical approach based 
on a comprehensive understanding of traditional Chinese values is often under-
appreciated in the existing literature. The idea of the Chinese Dream is not something 
new, as Wang pointed out; it is like old wine in a new bottle.37 However, existing 
literature provides a low level of analysis of a historical exploration regarding the 
Chinese Dream discourse. Various interpretations surrounding this notion were made 
by early schools of thought within different periods and circumstances throughout 
Chinese history. The Chinese Dream is perceived as being a manifestation of Chinese 
soft power across the globe and is the key guideline of China’s foreign policy within 
Xi’s presidency.  
 
In short, to assess in later chapters the correspondence between the ideological 
framework and the contemporary operationalization of soft power and cultural 
diplomacy, it is essential to clarify the meaning of the Chinese Dream, especially with 
a solid understanding of its cultural foundation and historical context. Drawing upon 
historical analysis and discourse analysis, this chapter aims to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the Chinese Dream by exploring the content and the 
mechanism of the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural diplomacy within Xi’s foreign 
policy context.   
3.2 Identifying the Chinese Dream 
Drawing upon historical and discourse analysis, this section explores the foundations 
of the Chinese Dream from ancient to contemporary interpretations. It points out that 
the ancient interpretation of the ‘Chinese dream’ is usually considered as an ideal 
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status of the Chinese society. Paternalistic governance and unity consensus play 
important roles in understanding this concept. In the contemporary context, the 
Chinese Dream discourse fundamentally focuses on improving the lives of common 
people and the nation’s prosperity through the state’s modernization and 
industrialization. The key characteristic of Xi’s Chinese Dream is that it emphasizes the 
bonds between developing every individual and the prosperity of the nation, which is 
based on a traditional collective Chinese political relationship between the state and 
individuals. More importantly, it indicates that the word ‘rejuvenation’ demonstrates 
the ambitious goal of bringing China back to the top of many aspects within 
international society, similar to how it used to be in ancient times. 
 
 
3.2.1 The seeds of the Chinese Dream: the content and the mechanism 
 
The following section sheds light on the content and the mechanism of the Chinese 
Dream by exploring ancient interpretations and the mechanism between the Chinese 
government and Chinese society. It argues that the Chinese Dream is generally 
interpreted as an ideal status of the society and the relationship between the ruling 
class and the common people in China is understood as a paternalistic relationship, in 
which unity consensus often enjoys priority.  
 
The content of the Chinese Dream: Commonwealth of Great Unity  
 
After the establishment of the Qin dynasty in 221BCE, China became one of the most 
economically and culturally prosperous feudal countries in the world. The views of 
Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism had a dominating influence on the feudal system 
of a decentralized social structure. For example, Taoism is known for the intriguing 
prose depiction of a place called Peach Blossom Spring, hidden from the outside world 
(Taoyuanming, 421). In the description of this utopian society, people lead an ideal 
existence in harmony with nature on a peaceful land, an ideal society without 
exploitation, oppression or wars. As noted in Chapter 2, both Confucianism and Nye’s 
soft power theory suggest that culture and values could potentially generate a state’s 
influence and power in a co-optive way. As the most influential traditional Chinese 
political schools of thought, Confucians envisage the ideal status of Chinese society as 
Great Harmony of the World or Commonwealth of Great Unity (Tianxia Datong); this 
is an economically strong, culturally attractive, and harmonious society worthy of 
neighboring states emulating its culture and values. This ideal society was clearly 
explained in the book Liji-Liyun at the end of the Warring and States period. 
 
大道之行也，天下为公。选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子，使老有所终，
壮有所用，幼有所长，矜寡孤独废疾者，皆有所养。男有分，女有归。货恶其弃于地也，不必
藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己。是故谋闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作。故外户而不闭，
是谓大同。 
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While the perfect order called the Great Dao prevails, the world belongs to the public. 
Virtuous and worthy people should be elected to public office while capable people 
hold posts and contribute to employment in the society. Integrity and trust should be 
highly valued by the society, which contribute to social peace and harmony. Therefore, 
everyone loves and respects his or her own parents and children, as well as the parents 
and children of others. There is caring and protection for the old until their last days; 
there is appropriate employment for the able-bodied; and there is nourishment and 
education for the children and youth. There is kindness and sympathy for the widows 
and widowers, for the orphans, for the childless and for all who find themselves alone 
in the world, as well as for the disabled and sick. Every man/woman has an appropriate 
role to play in the family and society. Although nobody likes to see natural resources 
and wealth wasted on the land (people don’t like wealth to be wasted), no one 
necessarily needs to keep them for oneself. Although nobody likes wealth, which is not 
the creation of one's own labour (all people want to contribute), no one does things 
just to benefit oneself. A devotion to public service leaves no room for idleness; 
intrigues, and connivances for ill gain are unknown. Villains such as thieves, robbers, 
rogues and rebels no more exist. The door of every house needs not to be locked and 
bolted during day and night. 38  
 
This narrative of an ideal society may be interpreted as a form of utopianism. However, 
the idea of Datong that represents the spiritual aspiration of Chinese people has 
brought historical significance to the development of how China conceives the ideal 
status of itself. More broadly, classical Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism, 
has set a solid foundation for the further development of political values and thoughts 
(Fang, 2011). This can be seen from the subsequent social mainstream ideologies from 
throughout the history of Chinese civilization. In brief, the ancient interpretation 
regarding the Chinese Dream can be seen as an ideal status of Chinese society. 
 
The mechanism of the Chinese Dream: the relationship between the state and the 
society  
 
Since the Chinese Dream is such a cultural discourse, which has been deeply rooted in 
Chinese history and Chinese identity, observers who know little about this cultural 
background or do not necessarily link the historical paths with current affairs might be 
confronted by misunderstandings. How do we understand the Chinese Dream 
discourse in a cultural context? How have China’s self-perception as a great power and 
its changing role within the international system, at a broad level, interacted with 
domestic and foreign audiences? In order to reveal these questions, we first need to 
understand the dynamics between the state and the society in China. From the 
perspective of the Chinese ruling class, as discussed in Chapter 2, most of the regimes 
derived strong influence from Confucian doctrine, which offers a type of moral guide 
and prescription, including hierarchy, group orientation, and respect for age and 
tradition. Confucians’ principles regarding morality and ethics, with ‘goodness’ as the 
core and ‘rites’ as the norm, served as the dominant traditional Chinese political 
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school of thought. As Sin argued in his book, “early Confucians not only stressed the 
importance of strong families for strong government but also advocated a patriarchal 
theory of government” (Sin, 2011, p.109). In fact, with the influence of Confucianism, 
the relationship between the ruling class and the common people in China is 
understood as a paternalistic relationship. 
Therefore, as it is in a family, both the rulers and the common people should follow a 
paternalistic hierarchical model, with the government as the authority on one side and 
the people as the acquiescence on the other. This could be seen from the term Xi Dada 
(Uncle Xi), which refers to the fifth generation of Chinese leadership Xi Jinping.39 This 
term is used in Xi’s hometown to show respect and admiration for a male, especially a 
father on an uncle, who plays a supportive and important role in a family.40 In this case, 
the president is not just a leader of the country or a party, but more like an important 
family member who is obligated to support and take care of the whole family. Simply 
put, the Chinese leadership must adopt the role of protector or guardian as a spiritual 
symbol of the civilization due to thousands of years of feudal heritage. “A ruler had 
absolute authority over his subjects but was morally bound to treat them properly. If 
he did not, they could flee or rebel, and the ruler might lose his ‘heavenly mandate’ to 
rule” (Link, 2015, p.25). 
Another factor that we need to understand is that unity has been the most important 
political priority in Chinese history, both for the state and the society (Jacques, 2009, 
p.95; Bislev and Li, 2014, p.24). There has been a strong demand from the society for 
a powerful government that can unite the people together and bring prosperity to the 
society. “China’s frequent experience of disunity and its baleful consequences have 
served to reinforce its commitment to unity, a tradition that began with Confucius” 
(Martin Jacques, 2009, p.95). A powerful regime wins people’s hearts through 
demonstrating their ability to solve fundamental problems that are of the biggest 
concern to society, such as food, health and education. More importantly, the suffering 
of the A Hundred Year Humiliation of the Chinese Nation has made Chinese society 
desire a peaceful environment to live in more than anything else. This history is not 
just told by the media or the government, but also through the experiences and stories 
told by the older generations who are the most respected in a family. People are 
convinced that wars and infighting within the country would only lead to a poor and 
backward Chinese nation. Furthermore, “there is often a genuine concern, based upon 
recent historical memory with colonialism and imperialism, that opening up China to 
interference by foreigners will open a Pandora’s box, with China plunging into civil war, 
poverty and chaos” (Bell, 2009, p.21). In this case, national stability is the highest 
priority in terms of policymaking. This means that people would give way or sacrifice 
other interests if it contradicts with the wider picture, such as factors deemed 
potentially hazardous against the unity of the country and society. 
In brief, the ancient interpretation regarding the Chinese Dream can be seen as an 
ideal status of the society. With the influence of Confucianism, the relationship 
between the ruling class and the common people in China is understood as a 
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paternalistic relationship. Unity is a consensus between the government and the 
society, which functions as a cornerstone for understanding the Chinese Dream 
discourse. 
3.2.2 Modern interpretations of the Chinese Dream  
 
This part will explore contemporary narratives of the Chinese Dream discourse 
interpreted by early modernizers Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen and the previous four 
generations of Chinese leadership. It argues that the Chinese Dream discourse focuses 
on improving the lives of common people and the nation’s prosperity through the 
state’s modernization and industrialization in the contemporary context. 
 
With the beginning of the First Opium war in 1840, the Chinese social system gradually 
became a combination of colonial and feudal social structure, which led to dramatic 
social and ideological transformations. As noted in the previous section, the Chinese 
dream symbolizes the goal of achieving an ideal status within Chinese society. Over 
the past one hundred years of contemporary Chinese history, there have been a few 
outstanding modernizers, such as Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen, who proposed their 
own interpretations regarding the Chinese Dream.  
 
Kang insisted that Confucianism is the soul of the nation and believed that 
Confucianism as the national religion could unite the Chinese people as one nation 
and instill morality and national spirit in them (Tay, 2010, p.105). In Kang’s best-known 
book, The Book of Great Harmony (Datongshu, 1919), Confucianism’s Datong society 
has been adopted as a prototype for the state, as well as modified for contemporary 
China. Kang described an ideal Chinese nation, Datong as a utopian future world, 
economically based on a public ownership system and democratically ruled by a 
central government (Kang and Jiang and Zhang; 2007). Although adopting an 
unaggressive internal reforming approach has proved his Chinese Dream to be a 
fantasy, Kang’s political view of a Chinese dream Datong played an important role in 
promoting Chinese traditional political heritage and influencing the perception of the 
Chinese dream from the society (Li, 1955; Zhu, 1999; Tang, 2000).  
Similarly, As the continuation of Confucianism, Sun combined both Western and 
traditional Chinese political values into his blueprint for the future of the Chinese 
nation (Lin, 1974; Bedeski, 1977, Gregor, 1981). Sun’s idea of a Chinese dream can be 
reflected in the proposal of Three Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi) of Nationalism, Democracy, 
and Livelihood. He stated that the foremost goal of the Chinese nation at that time 
was to oppose imperialist aggression against China in order to gain state independence 
and sovereignty. The slogan Revitalization of China (ZhenXing ZhongHua) was first 
proposed when Sun Yat-sen formed a small bourgeois revolutionary organization in 
Honolulu, called the Xingzhonghui (Society for China's Regeneration) in 1884.  
Meanwhile, Sun put traditional Chinese moral concepts to the service of China's 
nationalism. “When Sun appealed to the Chinese to ‘regain their national spirit’ he 
advocated not only some of the substance of Confucianism but also a reawakening of 
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‘the moral ideals’ which Confucian China once possessed” (Gregor, 1981, p.58). 
Interestingly, “for Sun, the natural communities of family and the nation had a moral 
priority over the individual” (Gregor, 1981, p.65). This is consistent with the 
mechanism of the Chinese Dream as discussed in the previous section: the relationship 
between the ruling class and the common people in China is understood as a 
paternalistic relationship. 
However, with the failure of their bourgeois revolutions, neither Kang nor Sun’s 
‘Chinese Dream’ led China to the ideal destination depicted in their conceptions. 
During the New Democratic Revolution Period (1919-1949), when the CCP gradually 
became a dominant party in China, the realization of socialism and communism had 
become the focus of political agenda. Under Mao’s leadership, Chinese national 
history, especially the national humiliation narrative, was not particularly addressed 
as a major ideological tool or source of legitimacy. Instead, Mao used the class struggle 
theory to explain the Chinese revolution, the foreign imperialism, and the civil wars 
(Wang, 2013). Influenced by Marxism and Leninism, Mao announced that the goal for 
the Chinese nation in this period was to be independent from internal feudalism, as 
well as external imperialism and capitalism through political revolutions. Economically, 
Four Modernisation (Sige Xiandaihua) was also set forth to strengthen China’s 
economic power in the areas of agriculture, industry, national defense and finally 
science and technology. Mao also put forward ten Five-year Plan (Wunianjihua), which 
aimed to boost a backward China to a highly industrialized modern socialist country at 
the beginning of the 21st century (Zeng, 2002; Sha, 2007). The outcome of the Chinese 
dream under the first generation of Chinese leadership has clearly pointed out the 
direction of China’s future.  
By setting Invigoration of China (ZhenXing ZhongHua) as the slogan orienting the 
development of China, the second generation of Chinese leadership switched the 
priority of development from political to economic. Noticeably, socialism with Chinese 
characteristics has become a popular term, which targeting the legitimacy of the CCP 
to modify and develop Marxism according to the domestic and international situation. 
As a result, Four Modernisation was formally enacted during the Reform and Opening 
policy, which dramatically boosted China’s economy.  In contrast with the first 
generation, the second generation has paid much attention to absorbing ideas from 
classic Chinese political values. Inheriting the legacy of traditional Confucianism and 
contemporary modernizers, Deng stated that the goal for the Chinese nation was to 
achieve a XiaoKang Society (XiaoKang SheHui, a moderately prosperous society) at the 
end of 20th century and become a moderately developed country (Deng, 1994). 
Originally from the Confucianist book named Liji, XiaoKang refers to a lower 
developing stage of the ideal Datong status, as mentioned in previous paragraphs. It 
can be loosely understood as a “well-off society” in which most people are able to live 
a comfortable life (Zhang and Zhang, 1998; Lu, 2000; Lu, 2002; Li, 2003). Different from 
the first generation of Chinese leadership, Deng went back to traditional Chinese 
political classics to design and legitimize the vision for the future of China. 
Consequently, it has influenced the development of ideological guidance within the 
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later generations of leadership to a great extent. 
 
The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation was first proposed by the third 
generation of Chinese leadership as a continuation of the Invigoration of China 
narrative proposed in one of Jiang Zemin’s speeches in 1998. Jiang stated that: “our 
goal is to achieve modernization and make China into a powerful, democratic, and 
civilized socialist country. By that time, China will enter the range of moderately 
developed countries in the world, the Chinese people will achieve modernization on 
the basis of common prosperity, China will realize the Great Rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation”.  On the one hand, Jiang’s Chinese Dream still focuses on improving 
the lives of Chinese people and the nation’s prosperity through the state’s 
modernization and industrialization. On the other hand, As Wang (2013, p.6) pointed 
out, “the mission of the Party was no longer the realization of communism, having 
deviated to a more nationalistic objective”. Noticeably, this laid the foundation for the 
interpretation of Xi’s Chinese Dream, which will be analysed in the following section. 
 
The legacy of the fourth generation of the Chinese leadership is Harmonious Society 
(Hexie Shehui), which also dates back to Confucius classics. The concept of harmony 
came from Confucians’ understanding of music, which is powerful in creating balance 
within nature, individuals and society as a whole (Li, 2006; Ji, 2008). Given the 
increasing uncertainty, this proposal is also viewed as a response to balancing social 
problems such as the wealth gap, social injustice and environmental pollution after 
the dramatic increase in China’s economy. “Hu would be inclined towards a more 
humanistic centralism and would help alleviate some of the tensions that had risen 
during Jiang’s tenure… It would be the role of the populist Hu to salve the wounds, to 
rebuild China’s welfare system and where possible, promote social justice” (Mahoney, 
2013, pp.22-24). 
 
In sum, it can be concluded that early political schools of thought and the historical 
path of contemporary China have left a rich legacy that has influenced the design 
processes of the Chinese Dream for the contemporary generations of Chinese 
leadership. In the contemporary context, the Chinese Dream discourse focuses on 
improving the lives of common people and the nation’s prosperity through the state’s 
modernization and industrialization in the contemporary context. 
 
3.2.3 Clarifying Xi’s Chinese Dream  
 
The following paragraphs explore the content and features of Xi’s Chinese Dream. It 
argues that Xi’s Chinese Dream has a patriotic emphasis on the bonds between the 
development of every individual and the prosperity of the nation, which is based on 
traditional a collective top-down relationship between the state and the individual. 
More importantly, by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, it demonstrates that there is a 
process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening based on the understanding of 
Chinese history and Chinese culture in Xi’s Chinese Dream.  
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In Xi’s 8 minute speech at the National History Museum, he clearly stated that: “the 
greatest Chinese Dream of Chinese people in the modern-day is to achieve the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which has been a long-cherished dream for many 
Chinese generations”.41 In the long run, the core of the Chinese Dream is to achieve 
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In order to achieve the Chinese Dream, 
the CCP made two milestone goals for the Chinese dream – a “double anniversary” 
(Two 100 years). According to statements from Chinese officials, the key idea of the 
Chinese Dream is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 
accomplishing the ‘Double Anniversary’ goals. More specifically, the short-term goal 
of the Chinese Dream is to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 
2021, while in the long run, it is to build a strong, civilized and harmonious modern 
socialist country by 2049. To understand in simple terms, the main content of the 
Chinese Dream is to build a moderately prosperous society and eventually accomplish 
national rejuvenation. 
 
Since the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was first noted by Deng Xiaoping, 
the term has been adopted and frequently addressed in the CCP’s political guiding 
principle. However, its complex content didn’t make it a popular and well-known 
phrase.42 Unlike the complex political concepts and terms, which highlight the party 
doctrines or theoretical principles, Xi’s Chinese Dream has chosen a pragmatic 
approach. In his speech at the 2015 Global Poverty Reduction and Development Forum, 
Xi stated, “to build a moderately prosperous society, to achieve the Chinese Dream, is 
to improve people’s wellbeing.” 43 By being associated with factors contributing to 
wellbeing, such as better jobs, better education, better life and so on, Xi’s Chinese 
Dream carries more positivity and simplicity, making it relatable and easier to 
understand for most Chinese people. Another example is the release of "The Chinese 
Dream-365 Stories" into the global market. "The Chinese Dream-365 Stories" is a 100-
episode documentary series created in Beijing. It captures how common people of 
different professions are chasing their dreams in their own modest ways.44 There are 
also a number of events and stories relating to the Chinese Dream that focus on similar 
themes, which is the lives and wellbeing of ordinary people. As Mohanty (2013, p.38) 
pointed out, “from the very start, Xi emphasized on paying attention to people’s 
concrete day-to-day problems, such as jobs, housing, education and healthcare”. 
Consistent with Xi’s pragmatic diplomatic style, the Chinese Dream focuses on 
concepts like better lives and better futures, which make it more positive and much 
easier for the whole society to understand and relate to. 
 
As argued in the previous section, since Jiang first mentioned the great rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation in his speech, the mission of the CCP has diverged to a more 
nationalistic objective. Consistent with the third generation of Chinese leadership, 
another core feature of Xi’s Chinese Dream is that it has a patriotic emphasis on the 
bonds between the development of every individual and the prosperity of the nation. 
At Xi’s Chinese Dream speech, he highlighted the core feature of this notion by stating 
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that, “History tells us, the destiny of every individual is closely connected to the destiny 
of the country and of the nation. Only when the country is doing well, and the nation 
is doing well, can every individual do well…it requires every generation of people to 
strive hard to achieve this great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi, 2013). In one 
of Xi’s letters to the students from Beijing University in 2013, he replied that “the 
Chinese Dream is a dream of a country, a dream of a nation, as well as a dream for 
every Chinese including the young people. Only when a person integrates his/her own 
dream into the whole dream of the nation, can he/she accomplish great things 
eventually”.45 It can be seen that Xi’s Chinese Dream ties together the government and 
society by highlighting the important connection between the prosperity of the nation 
and wellbeing for the people. 
 
In addition, the mechanism of Xi’s Chinese Dream is based on a traditional collective 
top-down relationship between the state and individuals. As argued before, with the 
influence of Confucianism, the relationship between the ruling class and the common 
people in China is understood as a paternalistic relationship. Besides the title of Dada 
give to Xi, another example shows the continuity of a paternalistic governing style 
within the Chinese Dream era. In 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education released a 
policy for the implementation of patriotism in education. At the end of this policy, it 
states that in order to enhance the promotion of the Chinese Dream abroad, a three-
dimensional network of "the motherland, the embassies and consulates- international 
students societies – the individual students studying abroad" should be built at home 
and abroad”. 46  This again demonstrates that Xi’s Chinese Dream is derived from 
Confucian’s paternalistic top-down relationship between the government and the 
society.  
 
“Xi’s Chinese Dream narrative is like an old wine in a new bottle with the dream’s name 
replacing Jiang and Hu’s national rejuvenation, Deng’s invigoration of China, and Mao’s 
realization of socialism and communism… it continues the CCP’s tradition of providing 
the people a rose-tinted picture of the future” (Wang, 2013, p.7). However, there is a 
slight modification that distinguishes the Chinese Dream from the previous political 
slogans. The concept of the Chinese dream repositions China’s identity in international 
society by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, which is deeply rooted in Chinese history and 
Chinese culture. As Wang pointed out, “the use of that word underscores an important 
point: the Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness and not a rise from 
nothing.”47 As examined in Chapter 2, early cultural exchanges show that China was a 
prosperous country during the Han, Tang and Early Qing dynasties, both culturally and 
economically. However, from the beginning of the First Opium War in 1840 to the end 
of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, China had experienced one hundred years of foreign 
invasions, extreme poverty and a dramatic decline in both economics and culture. All 
of these ups and downs became the key elements in shaping the Chinese peoples’ 
national identity.  
 
This memory has been passed down through the generations as part of Chinese history. 
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“There are textbooks, novels, museums, songs, and parks devoted to commemorating 
national humiliation” (Callahan, 2004, p.199). More importantly, the young generation 
not only learnt it through history classes, museums or other forms of patriotic 
education, but also from their older family members’ personal experiences, pictures, 
and their childhood memories. “For the Chinese themselves, the historical memory of 
past humiliation is not just a psychological issue, or something only related to 
perception and attitude. It is a key element of constructing the Chinese national 
identity… After suffering a humiliating decline in national strength and status, the 
Chinese people are unwavering in their commitment to return China to its natural 
state of glory, thereby achieving the Chinese Dream” (Wang, 2013. p.4).  
  
Therefore, ‘rejuvenation’ does not simply mean becoming a rising power in the 
international system, but a process of self-acknowledgement and a self-awakening of 
its past achievements and failures, based on the understanding of Chinese history and 
Chinese culture; this is also not purely global, but individualistic with people’s 
aspirations and expectations for the future of China taken into consideration. 
Rejuvenation reminds Chinese people that the final goal of the Chinese dream is to 
revive the country in every aspect, bringing back the prosperous state that China used 
to be in ancient times. As Ding and Saunders stated, “for much of its history, China was 
the strongest country in the world--not only in economic and military terms, but also 
in the cultural sphere” (Ding; Saunders, 2006, p.13). “the Chinese Dream is an attempt 
to restore China’s ideational greatness while not losing the material gains of the past 
35 years (Barr, 2015, p.191). The purpose of Xi’s Chinese Dream is not to make it better 
from nothing, but to be as strong as it used to be in the past, both economically and 
culturally. As Sørensen noted, “the ‘Chinese Dream’ is thus not only the narrow, 
aggressive and anti-foreign version that hinges on the ‘century of humiliation’ 
discourse. Rather than on foreign invasion and exploitation, the focus is on the positive 
elements and strengths in Chinese history and in Chinese ancient civilization with 
strong calls to revive and be proud of Chinese cultural values, strengths and 
achievements” (Sørensen, 2015, p.64). It encourages Chinese people to have faith in 
the CCP and their approach, to have confidence in Chinese traditional culture and 
values, and to have determination in the Chinese nation on its way to rejuvenation.   
 
In brief, consistent with Xi’s pragmatic diplomatic style, the Chinese Dream 
patriotically emphasizes the bonds between the development of every individual and 
the prosperity of the nation, which is based on a traditional collective top-down 
relationship between the state and the individual. More importantly, by using the 
word ‘rejuvenation’, it demonstrates that there is a process of self-acknowledgement 
and self-awakening based on the understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture 
within Xi’s Chinese Dream.  
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3.3 The Chinese Dream and cultural diplomacy: Xi Jinping and the fifth 
generation of the Chinese leadership (2012-present)  
 
The proceeding paragraphs provide a broad review of China’s foreign policy and 
cultural diplomacy within Xi’s presidency. Accordingly, it argues that instead of keeping 
a low profile, the broader foreign policy context within Xi’s presidency indicates that 
China has become more proactive and pragmatic in seeking leadership opportunities 
in international society. In correspondence with the Chinese Dream, traditional Chinese 
culture and historical narratives are embraced as the resources of soft power that are 
implemented by China’s cultural diplomacy within Xi’s presidency. and historical 
narratives are embraced as the resources of soft power that are implemented into 
China’s cultural diplomacy within Xi’s presidency.  
 
3.3.1 An overview of Xi’s foreign policy context  
 
In order to understand how Xi has been mapping the future for China with the key idea 
of the Chinese Dream, it is necessary to examine China’s foreign policy in a broader 
context. Through several speeches given over in the past 4 years, the CCP has 
articulated a new foreign policy known as FenFa YouWei (striving for achievement). 
The transition of China’s foreign policy strategy from Taoguang Yanghui (hide the 
brightness and keep a low profile) to FenFa YouWei (striving to achievement) has been 
a gradual process within the fifth generation of Chinese leadership. As noted in 
Chapter 2, Taoguang Yanghui foreign policy was first proposed by the second 
generation of Chinese leadership, Deng Xiaoping. The original meaning of the phrase 
in Chinese is to “hide one’s advantages and to improve one’s disadvantages”. To be 
more specific, it focuses on Taoguang (cultivated the mind) as the first step and 
followed by Yanghui (hide the brightness). Taoguang is achieved by improving people’s 
living standards and Yanghui refers to being humble and keeping a low profile in world 
affairs.  
 
However, this has been replaced by a more active foreign policy with the guideline of 
Fenfa youwei (striving to achievement) under the fifth generation of Chinese 
leadership. Xi’s foreign policy is indeed beginning to show signs of departure from that 
of his predecessors (Pho and Li, 2017. P.84). After Xi took power in 2012, the Chinese 
Dream became the most featured ideological slogan, revealing the determination of 
the CCP in leading China toward the great rejuvenation. In Xi’s speech at the National 
History Museum, he stated that: “the greatest Chinese Dream for Chinese people in 
modern days is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which has 
been a long-cherished dream for many Chinese generations.” 48 As Zhao Kejin pointed 
out, “previous leadership addressed the importance of how China integrates itself into 
the mainstream international society, however, Xi’s Chinese dream emphasizes that 
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the primary goal for China is to revive its nation, and more importantly, this implies 
that Xi wants Chinese people to have faith in Chinese approach, Chinese values and 
Chinese nation…We used to pay much attention to how the changing world has been 
influencing China, now we reckon China itself as an important factor of changing the 
world, therefore we shall take the initiative to plan and design.”49 
 
Another key concept of Xi’s grand foreign strategy is the Community of Common 
Destiny (Mingyun Gongtongti). This is often linked with the New Type of International 
Relations (Xinxing Guoji Guanxi) which is based on win-win cooperation and the 
peaceful resolution of international and regional disputes (Sørensen, 2015, p.59). In 
Xi’s speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2013, he called 
for a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation at the core. Xi 
argued that, “the international community has increasingly become a more complex 
community of common destiny. The Chinese people and people from different 
countries are positively correlated, therefore the dream of the Chinese people and the 
dreams of the people from all over the world are tightly connected.”50 In 2015, at the 
annual United Nations’ General Assembly high-level debate, Xi addressed again, “we 
should renew our commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
(UN) Charter, build a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation, 
and create a community of common destiny for mankind.”51 
 
In 2014, Xi put forward a new phrase called Global Network of Partnerships (Quanqiu 
huoban guanxi wangluo) in Central Meeting on Foreign Affairs within the CCP. 
Adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, it highlights that China would 
remain engaged in a larger global society by seeking partnership with more countries 
under the non-aligned principle and without interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries. More importantly, the fifth generation of leadership is also aware of 
the complicated relations between different countries. For example, in Xi’s 2013 visit 
to the United States, Xi stated that China will be searching for a New Type of Power 
Relationship (XinXing DaGuoGuanXi), which is based on equality, mutual trust and win-
win cooperation.52 In terms of China’s relationships with neighbouring countries, the 
CCP announced the Qin Cheng Hui Rong Policy, which specifically focuses on improving 
and maintaining good relations among periphery countries.  
 
By looking at these new concepts, it can be seen that Xi’s foreign policy is seeking for 
a more pragmatic approach to pursuing common economic benefits. (Poh;Li, 
2017,p.86). As Xi recently emphasized at the 19th National Congress, “the dreams of 
the Chinese people and those of other peoples around the world are closely linked. 
The realization of the Chinese dream will not be possible without a 
peaceful international environment and a stable international order.” 53  With the 
guideline of striving for achievement, the priority of China’s foreign policy work is to 
maintain a peaceful developing environment for achieving the Chinese Dream. More 
importantly, it also demonstrates China’s ambition to build a new international order 
on behalf of China’s voice. It indicates that instead of keeping a low profile, China’s 
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foreign policy within the fifth generation has started to take the initiative and seek 
leadership opportunities to shape the international order. In other words, the new 
leadership aims to enhance China’s soft power by making more contributions to 
international affairs as a great power and gaining a better reputation among 
international society. 
 
In short, the broader foreign policy context within the fifth generation indicates that 
China has started to take the initiative and seek its leadership in shaping the 
international order. Distinguished policies towards different countries demonstrate 
that China’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic as well. Creating a peaceful 
international environment for making achievements has been put as the priority of 
the diplomatic policies within the fifth generation of Chinese leadership.  
 
3.3.2 An overview of China’s cultural diplomacy within the Chinese Dream era 
 
As a tool of mobilizing soft power, China’s cultural diplomacy has received growing 
attention since power was transferred to the fifth generation of Chinese leadership in 
2012. Echoing with the Chinese Dream and the ‘Fenfa youwei’ policy, it can be found 
that traditional Chinese culture and historical narratives have been warmly embraced 
in the context of cultural diplomacy in the promotion of China’s soft power in Xi’s era. 
As Nye pointed out, culture is one of the three pillars in generating soft power (Nye, 
1990). Obviously, the CCP started to show greater awareness of the importance of 
communicating with domestic and foreign publics through the implementation of 
cultural diplomacy, which draws inspiration from Chinese historical narratives and 
traditional cultural resources.  
This feature can be first observed from Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, who has stood out since 
2013 because of her breakthrough in public diplomacy during presidential visits 
abroad. Peng has caught the attention of other nations through her elegant dress style 
with ‘Chinese characteristics’ and her sophisticated diplomatic manners during visits. 
“Eschewing international luxury labels, logos and Western bling, Peng has curated a 
specific style that is feminine yet conservative, confident and chic and often nods to 
her Chinese heritage with qipao, mandarin collars and traditional details on otherwise 
quite modern outfits.”54 In November of 2014, Peng accompanied the wives of leaders 
and representatives from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and 
introduced Chinese cultural heritage such as cloisonné, filaments Mosaic, and carved 
lacquerware during their visit to the Summer Palace in Beijing. Later in the same 
month, during Peng’s visit to the University of New South Wales, she talked about 
Mandarin, Chinese calligraphy, traditional Chinese art, paper-cutting, and embroidery 
in Confucius classroom. In addition, Peng has prepared a variety of cultural gifts that 
symbolize Chinese character and carry Chinese values, such as the Chinese traditional 
instrument Guzheng, Chinese folk music, Chinese brand cosmetics, Chinese calligraphy 
work and so on.55 Meanwhile, she has also been frequently engaged in a number of 
charity projects and serious tasks since 2006, such as raising awareness of childcare, 
female education, and critical public health issues, including the prevention and 
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treatments of tuberculosis, and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). As one 
of the most popular Chinese folk singers, her domestic popularity as a singer also 
boosts her influence in advocacy and publicity among Chinese society. “Since Xi’s 
elevation to the most powerful position in China, Peng has increasingly been travelling 
abroad, prompting some Chinese media to tout the first lady as an example of China’s 
expanding soft power.”56  
In brief, Peng’s role as the first lady has seen her become a Chinese cultural 
ambassador which has set a precedent for the CCP’s cultural diplomacy. “For many 
Chinese, Peng’s sense of glamour and natural elegance is even more significant in a 
historical context – as she is the first Communist Party first lady to embrace a polished, 
modern style that doesn’t look amiss on the international stage.”57 Traditional Chinese 
culture became a key element of China’s cultural diplomacy in the promotion of soft 
power under the fifth generation of Chinese leadership. 
 
Another case to explore in the fifth generation’s cultural diplomacy is a recently 
proposed strategy called ‘One belt, One road’ (Yidai Yilu or Belt and Road Initiative BRI), 
which is focused on connectivity and cooperation between China and Eurasian 
countries. The ‘belt’ refers to the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ which bonds China with 
land-based countries in Central Asia, and Eastern and Western Europe. The ‘road’ 
refers to the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ which bonds China with sea-based 
countries in South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia. As noted in Chapter 2, the Silk 
Road dates back to ancient times and it used to be both a major hub for trade and 
commerce, and more broadly, as a cultural bridge between Chinese civilization and 
foreign societies.  
 
BRI is not only a story of prosperous trade between China and a variety of Eurasian 
countries, but also a magnificent history of harmonious cultural exchanges and 
activities. In Xi’s speech at Connectivity Spearheads Development and Partnership 
Enables Cooperation in 2014, he suggested to “draw peoples closer to one another for 
exchanges of ideas and intercultural dialogue through connectivity development in 
Asia, so that they will meet and learn about each other, trust and respect each other, 
create a harmonious and peaceful life for their common enjoyment and jointly pursue 
an Asian dream of peace, prosperity and progress.” 58  In 2015, Xi also indicated in his 
speech to the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference that the Belt and Road Initiative 
will “promote inter-civilization exchanges to build bridges of friendship for our people, 
drive human development and safeguard the peace of the world.”59  BRI  is based on 
a deep understanding of this concept of history and cultural exchanges between China 
and countries across Eurasia. “Histories of silk, porcelain, and other material pasts, 
together with competing ideas about civilizations and world history, will play a distinct 
role in shaping trade, infrastructure, and security within and across countries in the 
coming years… Culture forms part of the international diplomatic arena now, and with 
routes, hubs, and corridors serving as the mantra of the Belt and Road, countries will 
continue to find points of cultural connection through the language of shared heritage 
in order to gain regional influence and loyalty.” 60 
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More significantly, ancient cultural exchanges and historical narratives are embraced 
as the resources of soft power that implemented into China’s cultural diplomacy. This 
initiative echoed Xi’s Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: 
it aims to not only continually build on this cultural legacy, but to remind the rest of 
the world of China’s prosperity in ancient times and its ambition to achieve the great 
rejuvenation. A rich Chinese cultural resource conveying Chinese values, norms and 
beliefs have been implemented into Xi’s cultural diplomacy as a tool for enhancing 
China’s soft power. The Chinese Dream provides broad ideological guidance that 
orients China’s cultural diplomacy to enhance its soft power. On the one hand, China’s 
soft power is also actively applied to its domestic situation in order to aid ethnic 
relations and promote conditions for sustained growth (Barr, 2011, p.7). On the other 
hand, cultural diplomacy aims to create a stable, peaceful, and favourable 
international environment to propel the achievement of the Chinese Dream.  
 
In sum, the Chinese Dream provides broad ideological guidance in orienting China’s 
cultural diplomacy to enhancing its soft power. It is the key ideational strategy 
orienting China’s soft power promotion. Traditional Chinese culture and historical 
narratives are embraced as the resources of soft power implemented by China’s 
cultural diplomacy within Xi’s presidency. 
 
Conclusion 
The Chinese Dream relies on cooperation between the state and every individual of 
the Chinese nation. It is also about the ambitious goal of bringing China back to the 
top of international society, as in ancient times. It is a national agenda that seeks to 
incorporate the personal dreams of individual Chinese people. It is a dream that is to 
be accomplished by both the government and the Chinese people in order to maintain 
security, stability and eventually the revival of a prosperous country. In pursuit of the 
goal of a more vigorous foreign policy, cultural resources, which Nye suggested as one 
of the three pillars of attraction, have been mobilized by China as a way to build up 
soft power. Nevertheless, Nye also argued that it is essential to observe soft power 
towards different audiences because context matters. How, then, has China’s cultural 
diplomacy been implemented towards different audiences? This will be clarified 
through case studies in the proceeding chapters.  
 
 
Chapter 4: China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan 
Introduction  
Japan represents the strongest of China’s neighbours with whom significant political, 
economic, and cultural ties have existed throughout a long history. Existing literature 
lacks a strong connection between the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural diplomacy 
when analysing China’s soft power toward Japan in the contemporary context. This 
chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing a holistic analysis of China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward Japan and the correspondence with the Chinese Dream 
under the three-dimensional analytic framework. 
 
The chapter develops through six structured sections. The first section presents a 
literature review of research on Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and Sino-Japanese 
soft power and cultural diplomacy. The second section provides a clarification of the 
historical context of the Sino-Japanese cultural ties, and of the contemporary 
development of PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan, in particular within Xi’s 
presidency. The next three sections clarify the manifestations of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream based on the 
three-dimensional framework: media exchange, educational exchange, and cultural 
exchange. The last section provides an analysis of the key features and limitations of 
China’s cultural diplomacy in promoting China’s soft power toward Japan. 
 
Overall, this chapter argues that there is a high level of correspondence between 
China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy in Japan and the foundational ideas of the 
Chinese Dream paradigm. Practice and paradigm both demonstrate a broad 
commitment to more confident leadership and projection of Chinese leadership within 
international politics. This analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy practices in Japan 
suggests that in the realm of media there have been significant attempts of rebranding 
China as an economically strong and culturally attractive country.  This has been done 
by projecting visions of Chinese citizens’ and corporations’ successes, albeit in a 
manner that commonly acknowledges the presence of social and political tension. In 
the realm of education, attempts at convincing Japanese students to accept Chinese 
narrative regarding the historical disputes became the focus in China’s pursuit of soft 
power; strong political interference has been the main obstacle in promoting its soft 
power toward Japan. In the realm of cultural exchange, there have been various 
activities aiming to cultivate a favorable, friendly, and strong image of China toward 
Japan, despite the negative uncertainties of political dissent at a governmental level. 
To conclude, this chapter points out that historical disputes remain the fundamental 
impediment for China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan in the pursuit of soft power.  
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4.1 Sino-Japanese Cultural Diplomacy: State of the art of existing 
literature  
The cultural relations of China and Japan can be traced back to two millennia. 
Nowadays, as the second and third-largest economies in the world, whether and how 
China and Japan cooperate with each other will certainly affect the welfare of nations 
both in the region and around the world. Substantial attention has been paid to the 
analysis of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations within IR academics, particularly given 
China’s troubled historical relationship with Japan (Iriye, 1990; Rose, 2000; Yahuda, 
2006; Hagström,2008; Sun, 2012; Mori, 2013; Beeson and Li, 2014; Yang, 2015; Men, 
2016, Zhao, 2016). For example, Caroline Rose (2000) analysed the role of nationalism 
in affecting Sino-Japanese relations and the implications for Sino-Japanese relations. 
Takeshi Uemura (2013) offers a cultural constructivist framework to capture how 
China’s perceived identity of Japan constitutes and evolves through social interactions, 
and how such identity in turn gives meaning to the PRC’s interactions with another 
state. Kazuko Mori (2013) explores how Sino-Japanese relations transformed over 40 
years, the unresolved issues after the 1972 negotiations, and attempts on the 
institutionalization of cooperative frameworks.  
 
Some existing literature focuses on the analysis of Japanese soft power and cultural 
diplomacy toward China (Lam, 2007; Mochizuki, 2007; Vyas, 2011, Otmazgin, 2012). 
Mike Mochizuki argues that Japan has “shifted away from the ‘friendship diplomacy’ 
paradigm to a mixed strategy that involves both positive engagement and realistic 
balancing to hedge against the potential threats that China may pose in the future” 
(2007, p.739). Peng Lam’s (2007) examination of Japan’s soft power approach to China 
argues that despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more 
traditional forms of public diplomacy, Japan’s soft power is undermined by its failure 
to overcome its burden of history. In the book Soft Power in Japan-China Relations, 
Utpal Vyas (2011) systematically examines how Japanese state agents, governmental 
organizations, and non-governmental actors enable soft power to be transformed, 
based on a three-level agent comparison framework.  
 
Furthermore, there is also some work focusing on comparative studies of soft power 
between China and Japan (Heng, 2010; Sun, 2012). Noticeably, Yee-Kuang Heng (2010) 
compares China and Japan’s culture, history, norms, values, and private sectors to 
examine the two countries’ soft power strategies. He argues that Japan has developed 
a well-rounded foundation for soft power from its popular and traditional culture, 
together with values and norms embodied in its policies, while China is still behind 
with its shortcomings. In addition, Jing Sun (2012) explores the competition of soft 
power between China and Japan toward South Korea, Taiwan, and other states in the 
region. He also evaluates the effectiveness of individual campaigns from the 
perspective of the target state, looking at public opinion polls, media coverage, and 
 74 
the response from state leaders (Sun, 2012). 
 
However, little attention has been paid to cultural diplomacy from China’s side to Japan 
(Passin, 1967; Liu, 2013; d’Hooghe 2015). Ingrid d’Hooghe (2015) provides an 
overview of China’s public diplomacy toward Japan with a particular focus on Hu’s 
presidency at the beginning of the 21st century. It summarizes the key features and 
organizations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan (D’Hooghe,2015). Liu Bei 
(2013) identifies the key factors affecting China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan 
from a cross-cultural communication perspective. He argues that the underestimated 
cultural difference, unfavourable media environment and Chinese anti-Japanese 
nationalism are the key factors affecting the development of Sino-Japanese relations 
(Liu, 2013, p.237). Some studies focus on the specific aspects that are closely engaged 
with the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan. For example, Chunlian 
Chao (2016) provides an overview of Sino-Japanese film and television cooperation 
from the 1980s to the beginning of the 21st century. Fan Qiang and Zhang Yun (2017) 
take Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan University as a case and analyse China’s public 
diplomacy in promoting diplomatic relations with Japan.   
 
To conclude, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing a 
systematical analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan and the 
correspondence with the Chinese Dream under the three-dimensional analytic 
framework. It addresses the existing insufficiencies of proving a systematical analysis 
of the manifestation of the Chinese Dream in contemporary practices of cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan.  
4.2 The background of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan 
 
The following section provides a foundation from which the connection between 
historical ties between the two countries and China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy 
can be explored. The broad evolution of Sino-Japanese cultural relations and practices 
of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan from ancient times to Xi’s first five years of 
the presidency is covered. It argues that despite both countries being under the East-
Asian cultural sphere and having strong cultural affinity, historical disputes remained 
the central obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations, along with distinctive perceptions and 
narratives from both sides. Overcoming historical disputes has become a significant 
focus of the CCP’s cultural diplomacy towards Japan. More recently, the renewed 
political stability in both countries has shown great potential for creating a better 
environment for the development of cultural diplomacy. 
 
 
4.2.1 Sino-Japanese cultural relations  
 
The cultural relations between China and Japan have lasted since the Han dynasty (57 
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AD), nearly 2,000 years. Over the centuries, geographic proximity had brought the two 
countries into constant contact through maritime trade, cultural contacts, periodic 
military battles, regional rivalries, and economic exchanges 61 As the older civilization, 
the Chinese strongly impacted various aspects of Japanese society such as language, 
political thoughts, religion, and art, particularly during the Tang, Ming and Qing 
dynasties (Wang, 2010; Huntington, 1912).  
 
Noticeably, the most significant influences are scholarship, religion, and art. It is 
generally believed that there had been no writing system in Japan until Japanese 
Buddhist monks had returned from China with texts written in the Chinese language 
(Beermann, 2006). The Chinese writing was used as a bridge between the languages 
of different tribes and communities. After, by absorbing and modifying the logographic 
components of Chinese characters, Kanji (Han characters) was formed and from there 
widely used in the Japanese writing system (Tyler, 1995). Furthermore, Japanese Ruism 
(Confucianism) was also imported from China and played an extremely important role 
in the history of the Japanese language and culture. According to Japanese historic 
records, the book The Analects of Confucius was first introduced to Japan by Wang Ren 
in AD 285 (Chang, 2013, p.409). It was warmly embraced and studied by the Japanese 
elites and became an integral part of the Japanese cultural religion (Chang, 2013, 
p.416). As Passin (1962, p.42) noted, “all the major elements of Japan’s civilization owe 
their character to Chinese influence. Japan was indeed the ‘younger brother’ and 
China the ‘older brother’…For Japan, China was the ‘eternal Rome’, under whose 
inspiration she transformed herself after the 5th century from a tribal, non-literate 
society to a ‘cultured’ nation”.  
 
However, what makes Japan different from other Asian countries is that Japan never 
abandoned its own native culture. On the contrary, it contributed to the East Asian 
cultural sphere by adding modifications and making innovations. The beginning of the 
Meiji Restoration in 1868 represented Japan’s first attempt at modernization, and 
successfully led to Japan’s transformation from a feudal nation into a modern 
industrial state (e.g. Beasley, 1972; Wilson, 1992; Sim, 2001). Based on European 
experiences, structural reforms were carried out within the political system, law 
system, investment and banking system, the military and in education. In the 
meanwhile, following the defeats in the First and Second Opium Wars, there was also 
an agreement of strengthening national power through reforms within the Chinese 
government, which led to China’s Self-Strengthening Movement from 1861 to 1895 
(Inoue and Li, 1985). 
 
However, modernization resulted in different outcomes for the two countries. This 
relationship of Chinese dominance eventually changed when Japan’s increasing 
militarism and imperial ambition enabled it to gain a number of military victories and 
impose punitive economic arrangements over the weakened Chinese government. 
The end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 marked the emergence of Japan as a 
major world power, while at the same time highlighting the falling of China in the world. 
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During the period of 1894 to 1945, Japan’s long chain of invasions, occupation and 
crimes changed the cultural and political relationship between the two countries. 
Japan’s political victories included the annexation of Taiwan, acquisitions in China’s 
Shandong Province, occupation of Manchuria, and a full-scale invasion of the Chinese 
mainland, 62which became part of the Japanese colonial empire. On the other hand, 
China was also culturally viewed as an antiquated civilization without the ability to 
defend itself against western invasion. Among the Japanese, traditional admiration for 
China turned quickly to contempt. “Japan showed a much greater adaptability to the 
pressure coming from the West than China did… Japanese national pride reached the 
point of open contempt” (Passin, 1962, p.42).  
 
After World War II ended, Japan's long chain of war crimes in China in 1945 came to 
light. The Japanese government followed the U.S. and recognized the Republic of 
China (ROC) in Taiwan as China’s legitimate government. The undermined diplomatic 
relations between China and Japan did not resume until 1972. The normalization of 
Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations helped bring the PRC out of its diplomatic isolation 
and made significant rapprochement in Sino-Japanese relations. As a result, a great 
deal of effort was made by both governments to improve cultural exchange between 
the two countries. Since Deng Xiaoping announced The Open Policy, Japan has 
provided substantial economic development aid and investment to the PRC through 
concessional loan programs. In an effort to improve cultural exchange, both 
governments appropriated funds for education and cultural exchange programs and 
encouraged public communication and non-governmental exchange activities. For 
example, between 1983 and 1992, the number of Chinese overseas students in Japan 
grew at an average rate of 16.1% annually (Tanaka, 1995, p. 184). With China’s 
emerging economic power in the international economy, previous cultural relations of 
Japan as the leader has gradually shifted to a subtler role in both countries’ eyes. There 
are several challenges in Sino-Japanese cultural relations, as both countries tend to 
forge their historical narratives in ways that frame them as their historical ‘Other’. In 
Japan’s eyes, China began to appear less as a supplicant for Japanese aid and 
investment, and more as a regional rival to Japan’s own interests. In China’s eyes, there 
is a strong voice calling for both countries to make a consensus regarding those 
conflicts left during the wartime. However, they still face a number of historical and 
territorial conflicts, which are affecting their mutual relationship and damaging to 
cultural diplomacy in the Post-Cold War era. “The historical legacy has not yet been 
overcome on a government-to-government basis” (Betzler and Austin, 1997, p.579). 
 
A great deal of public concern has been aroused over the past decade due to the 
sharpest confrontations regarding historical disputes and territorial conflicts between 
Japan and China during the periods of wartime. One concern is about Japanese 
officials’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japanese leaders and war dead, 
including those convicted of war crimes in Sino-Japanese conflicts during World War 
II. It is said that Japan made an unwritten agreement with China in the 1970s that 
serving leaders would not visit the shrine.63 However, since Prime Minister Koizumi 
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first visited the shrine in 2001, Japan appeared to have broken the deal. China was 
outraged, criticizing this as a major political obstacle in the improvement of bilateral 
relations and calling for Japan to be responsible for all the consequences. After 
Koizumi, the next Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, continued to visit Yasukuni Shrine for 
the next 7 years. Although the Japanese government emphasized that Abe’s visit did 
not reflect Japanese government views, this has gained massive condemnation and 
critique from China. During the past three decades, China routinely made protests and 
refusals of bilateral engagement against the Prime Ministers’ visits to the shrine.   
 
Another obstacle is textbook controversy raised as a history issue. The controversies 
are primarily concerned with the Japanese nationalist efforts to whitewash or 
downplay the nature of Japan’s military aggression during the First and Second World 
War. The 1982 history textbook controversy in Japan first raised the issue of history as 
a serious obstacle in Sino-Japanese relations. “Over the course of this debate, the 
‘standard’ historical account— that is accepted by Chinese, Western, and many 
Japanese scholars—has been challenged by Liberal Democratic Party politicians, right-
wing scholars, and journalists in Japan. According to their account, Japan's war was 
not a war of aggression, but rather one of liberation in which Japan fought to free Asia 
from the noose of Western imperialism”. 64 More recently, after the textbook called 
New History Textbook was approved by the Ministry of Education in 2001, a number 
of students, historians and educators from both countries protested against the 
content, which tends to downplay or minimize Japan’s wartime atrocities.  
 
The most notorious example of this was the Rape of Nanking, where millions of 
Chinese civilians were killed through inhuman looting, mass rape, massacres, and 
other crimes during the Japanese invasions. In the conclusion of Barnard’s 
investigation on 88 Japanese high school textbooks’ coverage of the Rape of Nanking, 
he stated that “although the textbooks do deal with the atrocity in reasonable detail, 
there is a consistent pattern of language use that has the effect of isolating knowledge 
of the Rape of Nanking from Japan and Japanese people” (Barnard, 2001, p.519). 
Relations between Japan and China have been complicated as a result, as the denial 
of the massacre is seen as part of an overall unwillingness on Japan's part to admit and 
apologize for its aggression, or a perceived insensitivity regarding the killings.  
 
From time to time, the Japanese government would stand up and attempt to play 
down Japan’s responsibility for war crimes. On the other side, the Chinese government 
has fiercely voiced its opposition and criticized the Japanese government regarding 
the issues of history textbooks and shrine visits. “Instead of trying primarily to 
subordinate the war issue to the goal of China-Japan cooperation, Chinese leaders 
undertook a widespread program of education about the war as part of a program to 
revive patriotism” (Betzler and Austin, 1997, p.579). With China’s emerging economic 
power in the global economy, previous cultural relations with Japan as the leader have 
gradually shifted into another subtle status where China is viewed as a rival to 
challenge Japan’s regional dominance. Although Sino-Japanese relations consisted of 
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attempts at economic and political engagement mixed with stages of transformed 
tension and confrontation in the Post-Cold War period, historical disputes and 
confrontations still remain the central obstacle within Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
To conclude, throughout ancient times and continuing to the contemporary era, Sino-
Japanese cultural relations have experienced unexpected turns, with ups and downs. 
In the eyes of Japan, China has been viewed as a ‘big brother’ to admire, a ‘loser’ to 
western civilization and then, more recently, a powerful rival. Despite the close cultural 
relations and cultural similarity under the East-Asian cultural sphere, historical 
disputes created within wartime still remain the central obstacle nowadays within 
Sino-Japanese cultural relations.  
 
4.2.2 An overview of PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan 
 
The normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations is not only historically 
significant regarding the rapprochement of Sino-Japanese relations, but also in 
enhancing the depth and width of cultural diplomacy between the two countries. 
Arguably, there was no better time in the history of Sino–Japanese cultural relations 
than in the 1980s (Akio, 2017, p.12). Deng Xiaoping kept promoting the Open-door 
Policy to encourage economic development and cultural exchange. He stated that “it 
is the right decision to apply the Open-door Policy at the economic level, at the same 
time we also need to develop cultural exchange towards other countries in the long 
term” (Deng, 1994, p.233). In 1978, Deng visited Japan for 8 days, during which he 
visited a number of modern factories and took a ride on the bullet train. “It was exactly 
at this time that the Japan Film Week Festival was held in seven major cities in China” 
(Akio, 2017, p12). Echoing Deng’s Open-door Policy, both governments supported 
massive programs of cultural exchange and joint cultural institutions and organizations. 
“Following the ‘panda boom’ in the Japanese society in the 1970s, a positive image of 
China was boosted by the ‘Silk Road boom’, which arose from a popular NHK 
documentary series” (Peng, 2017, p.33). In 1984, the Twenty-First Century Committee 
for Sino-Japanese Friendship organized a 15-day visit to China for 3000 young Japanese 
people, with the aim of mutual understandings for the future between the youths of 
both countries. A number of initiatives such as the establishment of the Beijing Centre 
for Japanese studies and academic liaisons between universities were made during 
the 1980s (Betzler and Austin, 1997, p.579). 
 
In response to an invitation extended by the government of Japan, the third generation 
of Chinese leadership, Jiang Zemin, made an official visit to Japan as a state guest in 
November 1998. During the visit, an intense exchange of views between Jiang and 
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi regarding the international situation, regional 
issues and the overall Sino-Japanese relationship were discussed. 65 Jiang’s visit was 
intended to be a milestone in the process of healing suspicions between the countries. 
“Tokyo also hoped that expanding cooperation and friendly ties would top the agenda 
when Chinese President Jiang Zemin arrived on the first state visit by a Chinese head 
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of state”. 66 However, the result of the visit seemed to inflame and antagonise, rather 
than solve the misunderstandings. For example, during Jiang’s visit to Japan, he 
intended to gain two concessions from Mr. Obuchi: a clear-cut written apology to the 
Chinese people for Japan’s actions during World War II, similar to the apology Japan 
gave South Korea a month earlier, and a pledge regarding relations with Taiwan, similar 
to the statement given by American President Bill Clinton to China during his visit 
earlier in the same year. However, instead of offering an oral apology for the war, Japan 
rebuffed Jiang on both counts.67 
  
Cultural exchange played an essential role in developing the mutual understandings 
and had a direct effect on Sino- Japanese cultural relations within Jiang’s presidency. 
There were 14,524 Japanese students studying in China in 1994, which was more than 
any other group of overseas students (Zhao, 2007, p.82). By 1994, 40,000 Chinese 
students had been to Japan for further studies, (Betzler and Austin, 1997, p.583) and 
this figure had tripled by the end of 2004 (Zhao, 2007, p.82). A number of cultural 
exchange activities were held between both countries during this period. In 
September 1999, in cooperation with Japan, the Chinese Cultural Ministry hosted 
cultural exhibitions named Touring Japan 99. In the same year, the Japanese Embassy 
in China hosted activities to mark it as the Year of Sino-Japanese Friendship and 
Culture. 68 More importantly, it is from this period that Japan started impressing the 
Chinese public with its exceptional cultural products, such as anime and manga. As a 
result of this, a whole generation of Chinese children grew up watching Japanese 
animation and reading Japanese comic books.  
 
Hu Jintao’s presidency commenced during the first decade of the 21st century; it is also 
when soft power theory started to become prominent amongst the Chinese 
government and Chinese academia. In Hu’s presidency, China’s all areas of cultural 
exchange with Japan experienced a constant boom. Taking researcher exchange as an 
example, from 1999 to 2004, the number of Chinese researchers in Japan increased 
from 4,411 to 6,537, and the number of Japanese researchers in China nearly doubled, 
increasing from 7,436 to 14,438. By the end of 2003 China had 936 Japanese language-
learning institutes and nearly 390,000 people studying Japanese (Zhao, 2007, p.55). 
Meanwhile, the themes and contents of cultural exchange have broadened 
dramatically. The themes and contents ranged from the arts, such as music, dance, 
drama, film, painting, museum, archaeology, photography, folk custom, and literature, 
to fields such as education, publishing, broadcasting, television, sports, science and 
technology, religion, and architecture. In 2008, Hu Jintao arrived in Tokyo, kicking off a 
five-day "warm spring" trip to Japan. The trip aimed at boosting the strategic and 
mutually beneficial relationship between the two nations. In a written statement 
issued at the airport, Hu said that 2008 marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of 
the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the China-Japan relations are 
facing new opportunities for further development.69 The Japanese government also 
described Hu’s engagement with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda as fruitful.70 
Both Beijing and Tokyo have been very cautious to eschew any risk that would damage 
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the development of Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
2012 marks the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations; it is 
the Sino-Japanese People’s Friendship Year; it is also the year when Xi Jinping and 
Shinzo Abe both emerged as political leaders. By looking at the reports of Xi’s main 
statements and speeches from 2012 to 2017, it can be seen that historical issues have 
been a central idea regarding Sino-Japanese relations during his first couple of years. 
Due to domestic pressures and the deterioration of Senkaku/Diaoyu island between 
2010 and 2012, Xi held a strong attitude towards the need for Japan’s government to 
acknowledge and properly handle several important historical issues. In 2014, both Xi 
and Abe met for the first time in two-and-a-half years at the APEC Summit, where they 
sought solutions to repair ties frayed by territorial and historical disputes. However, 
the result of this meeting in repairing the Sino-Japanese relationship is barely 
satisfactory. An awkward scene was captured when Xi, with an unsmiling and a stiff 
facial expression, reluctantly shook hands with Abe; it was also reported that he did 
not speak to Abe when they first met.71 Xi stated clearly China’s position regarding 
historical issues again by emphasizing: “the rights and wrongs of recent serious 
difficulties appearing in Sino-Japanese relations are very clear and obvious” and 
“calling for Japan to apply the commitments they have made within previous 
governments”. 72 Unsurprisingly, cultural exchanges between the two countries have 
also been negatively affected under this antagonistic atmosphere between both 
governments and the people of both countries. Cultural exchange events between 
local governments, and non-governmental exchanges between China and Japan have 
been cancelled. Even the event for the 40th anniversary of the normalization of 
diplomatic relations and friendship was delayed for a few weeks and eventually 
cancelled.73  
The tension was first alleviated at the China-Japan Friendship Meeting in 2015. During 
this period, the Japanese Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, Toshihiro 
Nikai, led 3000 people on a visit to China for a "Japan-China Tourism Cultural Exchange 
Tour”. This visit was viewed as a symbol of achieving detente in Sino-Japanese relations 
since Xi took the power. The effort of cultural diplomacy has achieved remarkable 
success in the recovery of Sino-Japanese relations during this period. Since then, China 
and Japan have sent each other several friendly signals aimed at improving Sino-
Japanese relations. 2017 marked the 45th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-
Japanese relations. In September 2017, Abe made a surprise appearance at the 
Chinese Embassy in Tokyo which was hosting an event marking China’s National Day, 
which was the first time in 15 years that a Japanese prime minister had attended such 
an event.74  In return, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi immediately met with Yutaka 
Yokoi, the Japanese ambassador to China in Beijing, and told Yokoi that China expects 
more good news from Japan.75 In Nov 2017, on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Abe met Xi again and it was 
described as a “fresh start” to the relationship between the countries. Different from 
three years ago, both leaders smiled while shaking hands at the start of the meeting. 
In Xi’s speech, he placed particular emphasis on both countries continuing to enhance 
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the exchanges of culture, media and youth generation, therefore improving the 
development of public relations between China and Japan. Xi also said this was a 
meeting that marks a fresh start of relations between Japan and China, which has 
gained Abe’s agreement.76 This again verified that highlighting cultural diplomacy has 
become one of the key features within the fifth generation of Chinese leadership’s 
approach to dealing with their relationship with Japan.  
 
To conclude, while there are still historical factors negatively affecting cultural relations 
between China and Japan, the recent decades, especially from 1978, have witnessed 
the steady growth of cultural exchange between the two countries. Overcoming 
historical disputes has become a significant focus of the CCP’s cultural diplomacy 
towards Japan. Within Xi’s first five-years of the presidency, the effort of cultural 
diplomacy has achieved remarkable success in the recovery of deteriorated Sino-
Japanese relations, particularly in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. More recently, 
the renewed political stability in both countries has shown great potential for creating 
a better environment for the development of cultural diplomacy. 
4.3 The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward Japan—Media 
exchange   
This section analyses China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan in the realm of media 
exchange and how the Chinese Dream ideology has been manifested through the 
practice of cultural diplomacy. It argues that there has been a steady increase in media 
exchange between China and Japan since the 21st century, featured with real stories 
based on the lifestyles of everyday people. Furthermore, it argues that there is a high 
correspondence between the Chinese Dream and media exchange, most readily to be 
found in documentaries. Attempts at rebranding China as an economically strong and 
culturally attractive country can also be seen through a variety of cultural programs 
that echo with the appeal of ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. However, 
historical disputes remain the major obstacle in the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan. 
 
4.3.1 An overview of Sino-Japanese media exchange  
 
There has been a steady increase in media exchange between China and Japan since 
2000. When it comes to TV series, historical and martial arts dramas have always been 
the most popular, regardless of the fluctuation in Sino-Japanese political relations. The 
Bund (Shanghai) is a drama portraying a story of hatred among gangs and romance 
between a couple in the 1920s. This TV series became the first popular Chinese TV 
series on Japanese mainstream TV channels in 2008.77 Martial arts series such as The 
Legend of the Condor Heroes, Demi-Gods and Semi-Devils, and the Smiling, and Proud 
Wanderer also went viral among Japanese audiences in the 21st century. Furthermore, 
film-industry collaboration between China and Japan is also on the rise. China’s film 
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industry is growing rapidly, earning approximately 55.9 billion yuan (950 billion yen, or 
$8.9 billion) in box office revenue in 2017, which is over four times that of Japan.78 
Between 2000 and 2015, there were more than 56 films co-produced and released in 
both countries. Japan’s 2017 animated film Your Name completed a history-making 
run in China, pulling in $83.7 million. Jackie Chan's Skiptrace and Chinese mega-
blockbuster Wolf Warrior II, meanwhile, received theatrical releases in Japan.79Legend 
of the Demon Cat 2017, a fantasy mystery film based on a novel penned by Japanese 
writer Baku Yumemakura, became the biggest film collaboration (costing US$170 
million) between the two countries up until that point.80 At the same time, events such 
as the “Chinese film week in Tokyo”, “Chinese film festival in Japan”, and the “Japan 
and China film forum” have also been organized to promote the development of film 
exchange and cooperation between the two countries.  
 
The content of media exchange varies from history documentary to war movies, from 
art programs such as calligraphy, tea culture, to daily life themed programs such as 
food, travelling, and entertainment shows. It is worth noting that documentaries have 
become a particularly popular form of media exchange in the 21st century. In the last 
three decades of the 20th century, there were only three China-themed documentaries 
broadcasted in Japan (Silk Road 1980, Yellow River 1986, and The Treasure of 
Forbidden Palace 1997). However, this figure increased to 9 between 2000 and 2011, 
almost 9 times more than it was on average (Chao 2016, p.68). Among them, three 
were produced by CCTV with the cooperation of Japan’s largest public broadcasting 
organization NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). Four of them were made by 
Beijing Television and Japanese Daifu, and the rest of them were made by NHK and 
with Chinese local televisions and non-governmental organizations.  
 
Noticeably, different from purely promoting traditional Chinese culture in the last 
century, more programs and films that focused on presenting stories about the lives 
of common people have been produced.81 Four lifestyle-themed documentaries were 
produced in the first decade of the 21st century and 11 films about the daily lives of 
common people were released in Japan between 2000 and 2014 (Chao 2016, p.68). In 
particular, a trend of recording how Chinese people pursue a better life in Japan began 
to appear on the screen at the beginning of the 21st century. In the documentary, The 
Little International Student (2000), a 9 years old Chinese girl from Beijing called 
Zhangsu followed her parents to study in Japan. Through this documentary, it reflects 
the difficulties of the subject in adjusting to Japanese society and how her parents 
worked hard in order to seek a better life in Japan. After broadcasted in Fuji TV during 
prime time, the film caused a huge response in Japanese society, with 20.6% of the 
high ratings creating an annual record among the same category programs. 82  
 
Six years later, the director of The Little International Student, Zhang produced another 
documentary called Living in Tears (2006), which won the documentary" NHK Fund 
Award " after The Little International Student. 83 It tells the tough life story of a 35-
year-old Chinese man from Shanghai who lived as an illegal immigrant in Japan for 15 
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years, separated from his family and his motherland. He faced various difficulties such 
as long working hours and tough living conditions in order to support his family but 
was eventually reunited with his family after his daughter finished her studies and 
settled down in the U.S. More recently, 6 Chinese films, including Lost and found, 
Alajiangse, Pegasus, Patrolman Baoyin, The Island, and Weizezhilu were released 
during the Chinese Film Festival in Japan 2019. 84 All of these films were based on the 
lives of ordinary people in contemporary China, which reflects the context of actual 
life in contemporary Chinese society.   
 
In brief, there has been a steady increase in media exchange between China and Japan 
since the start of the 21st century. Rather than purely promoting traditional Chinese 
culture, more documentaries, TV series, and films based on common people’s 
everyday lives have appeared on screen. 
 
4.3.2 Media exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
Interestingly, audiences began to see a more positive image of an emerging China 
within Xi’s presidency, which highly correspondences with the Chinese Dream ideology. 
Such a shift can be most readily seen from recently released documentaries. During 
the Chinese New Year of 2013, People's Daily Online (Japanese) 85  and Japanese 
Channel launched a joint documentary series called The Chinese Dream of Japanese. 
Different from recording Chinese people’s lives in Japan as it was usually reported, this 
documentary recorded interviews with Japanese people who came to Beijing 
searching for a better life. The interviewees had many occupations such as student, 
artist, musician, teacher, architect, volunteer and acupuncturist.86 In contrast with the 
previous documentary The Little International Student, rather than narrating how 
Chinese people flock into Japan seeking a life with a higher living standard, this 
documentary series presented how Japanese people came to China to fulfill their 
‘Chinese Dream’. Accordingly, China is portrayed as a culturally attractive and 
economically prosperous country with plenty of job opportunities that is worthy 
Japanese of people travelling to and settling down in for a better life.     
 
More recently, to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the normalisation of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic relations, the documentary TV series China Story began to 
broadcast through Japan Fuji TV in 2017. 87 Produced by the Japanese Fuji TV, Daifu 
and China Intercontinental Communication Centre (CICC), China Story focused on the 
lives of common Japanese people living in China. It tells stories of how ordinary 
Japanese people have overcome the difficulties of living in China, what attracted them 
to live there, and how they successfully achieved their dreams. For example, the first 
episode recorded a Japanese single mum’s life in Shanghai. With the help of many 
Chinese friends, she has overcome a number of difficulties while simultaneously 
studying and raising her child, eventually becoming a successful businesswoman in 
China. These documentaries correspond with the basic goal of the Chinese Dream, 
which is to improve people’s material living standards. More importantly, they are 
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consistent with Xi’s Chinese Dream goal for Chinese citizens to have faith and 
confidence in the Chinese nation.   
 
Furthermore, the reflection of the Chinese Dream can also be seen from a book that 
was selected as one of the core textbooks in Meiji University, Japan. Released in Japan 
in 2016, the book The Chinese dream: whose dream? adopts stories of Chinese 
entrepreneurs, students, and foreign people who live in China to reflect the 
modernization of China and different people’s interpretations of their Chinese 
dreams.88 As one of the authors stated, the purpose of this book is to “reduce the 
misunderstandings of China, to let people know more about China, allow people to 
understand more about China and to like China”.89  This book clearly conveys the key 
message of the Chinese Dream, that is, China is no longer the backward China. The 
development of China has provided more opportunities for not only the Chinese 
people but also for the foreign people living in China, allowing everybody to pursue 
their career and life.  
 
Although Sino-Japanese media exchange has gradually increased since the start of the 
21st century, political factors still play a decisive role in media exchange between China 
and Japan. For example, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island territory dispute worsened 
political relations between China and Japan and directly affected the size and the 
content of media exchange. Anti-Japanese became the subject of Sino-Japanese 
relations guiding public opinion; therefore, media exchange activities involved strong 
political preference. In 2015, the SCIO held a conference regarding the exhibition of 
China's anti-Japanese war (the world's anti-fascism war 70th anniversary). It identified 
10 films, 12 TV series, 20 documentaries, 3 TV animations, 100 books selected topic, 
and 20 kinds of audio and video electronic publications as the key films and 
publications, with particular guidance and support for the government. 90 In the same 
year, China Daily also updated a list of eight Chinese classic war films against Japan in 
World War Two (WWII). In China, a number of anti-Japanese WWII films and TV series 
were made 91 and frequently broadcast to Chinese audiences. Between 2012 and 2015, 
when the two countries were at their lowest ebb, only two Japanese films were 
allowed to be shown under the regulation of imported film in China as a result. 92 
 
Only after the alleviation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island in 2015, media exchange 
between both countries began to recover. In May 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
signed an agreement to pursue joint film productions on his visit to Japan. The policy 
aims to deepen ties between the two nations through improved cultural cooperation 
to mark the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship.93 
Such state-level partnerships ease the permissions process for filming location permits, 
work visas and also the exemptions from Beijing's strict quota on film imports. As a 
result, Chinese audiences could finally see the Japanese animation classic My 
Neighbour Totoro on screen 30 years after its release. 94 However, it is unquestionable 
that the uncertainty of Sino-Japanese political relations could still strongly affect the 
implementation of media exchange between the two countries in the future. Not only 
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because cultural diplomacy relies on political stability, but more importantly, it is 
because unresolved historical disputes have always been an obstacle to China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward Japan.   
 
To conclude, more documentaries, TV series, and films based on the lifestyles of 
everyday common people have appeared on screen in media exchange between China 
and Japan. Furthermore, attempts to rebrand China back to a strong power can be 
seen through a variety of cultural programmes echoing with the goal of ‘the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. However, by looking at the realm of media 
exchange, it can be seen that historical disputes remain the main obstacle in the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan.  
4.4 The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward Japan-- Educational 
exchange 
The following section analyses how educational exchange as a means of implementing 
China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan has been developed since the 21st century and 
how it fits into the Chinese Dream narrative. It argues that echoing with ‘the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ initiative, traditional Chinese culture has been used 
as an essential resource in the implementation of educational exchange with Japan. 
Attempts at convincing young Japanese people to accept the Chinese narrative 
regarding the historical disputes became the focus of China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward Japan in the realm of educational exchange during Xi’s presidency. Political 
dissent remains the key obstacle of China’s cultural diplomacy in promoting its soft 
power toward Japan in the realm of educational exchange.   
 
4. 4.1 An overview of Sino-Japanese educational exchange  
 
The educational exchange between China and Japan plays an essential role in the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan. The Agreement of 
Cultural Exchange between the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
Japan was signed in 1979. Later on, in 1980, the Agreement of Science and Technology 
Cooperation between China and Japan was also signed by officials from both 
countries.95 These two agreements highlighted the necessity and the broad prospect 
of educational exchange and science and technology cooperation between the two 
countries, it also laid a solid foundation for the Education Ministers Meeting and Five 
Years Educational Exchange Plan.  
 
Educational exchanges of students and scholars, inter-institutional collaboration, and 
cooperation in language teaching and academic research between China and Japan 
have witnessed a remarkable expansion in the 21st century. According to a survey 
conducted by the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO)96, it was shown that 
there were up to 208,379 overseas students studying in Japan in 2015, which was an 
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increase of 13% compared to 2014. Among them, 94,100 students were from China.97 
In 2017, this figure went up to approximately 107,200, which accounted for 41% of all 
overseas students in Japan, far more than the second most, Vietnam (23%). 98 
Meanwhile, there were approximately 14,000 Japanese students in China, which has 
remained stable for many years. 99 The rapid expansion of educational exchange can 
also be seen from the Confucius Institutes in Japan. Since the first Confucius Institute 
in Japan opened its doors at Ritsumeikan University in 2005, they have quickly gained 
popularity throughout the rest of the country. 100 By the end of 2018, there were 14 
Confucius Institutes and 8 Confucius Classrooms across elementary schools, middle 
schools, and high schools in Japan, which is second to Thailand (23 in total). 101  
 
Furthermore, since 2000, both countries have organized a number of educational 
exchange events and activities such as academic conferences, forums, and meetings. 
In October 2000, Beijing University and the University of Tokyo conducted the 
"Chinese and Japanese University Chancellor Forum", which was held in Tokyo, Japan. 
This annual forum provides an important platform for higher education exchanges 
between the two countries and is also an effective way to conduct the university 
chancellor dialogue and educational exchanges between China and Japan (Zhang, 
2010, p.965). More recently, the fifth China-Japan Educational Exchange Conference 
was held in Japan in Nov of 2018. Hundreds of colleges and universities, scientific 
research institutions, and education agencies from both countries attended the 
conference.  A series of more specific forums were held, such as “the university 
headmaster forum” and “medical exchange forum”, along with discussions on the 
topics of university management experience and challenges, university innovation and 
cooperation.102 
 
The rapid expansion of educational exchange between the two countries is not just 
reflected in the numbers but also the scale and the content. Take Ritsumeikan 
Confucius Institute as an example, the Institute offers a structured Chinese language 
curriculum at all levels, from introductory to advanced. Besides regular teaching, it is 
also in collaboration with its partner, Peking University, to develop Chinese teaching 
materials for the Chinese character in cultural sphere. Besides, it also organizes 
Chinese language seminar tours to China during summer vacations and supports 
student study visits to Chinese universities through its scholarship-funded system. The 
institute also promotes Chinese language teaching at Ritsumeikan’s local youth centers 
and affiliated elementary, junior high, and senior high schools.103  In addition, the 
Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan also organizes a number of activities to motivate 
and promote Chinese language teaching. It holds a Chinese language speech contest 
once a year in order to encourage Chinese language students in their daily efforts. It 
invites leading experts from the fields of Chinese language study, Chinese language 
teaching, and linguistics to give interactive symposiums and lectures. Lectures on 
understanding China have been held once a month; art performance, Chinese classics 
lectures and other special courses have been held regularly. They have also worked on 
research projects about Chinese food culture through a comparative study, historical 
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research, and an accumulation of food culture survey data.104 In 2015, to celebrate the 
10 years anniversary of the Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan, the Beijing University 
Students Art Troupe carried out a 9-day art tour of activities at Ritsumeikan University, 
Aichi University, and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. 105 
 
In brief, by looking at international student exchange, Confucius Institutes and a series 
of educational exchange initiatives and events, it can be seen that educational 
exchange between China and Japan has expanded remarkably since the start of the 
21st century. 
 
4.4.2 Educational exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
A recent policy instruction on how to strengthen patriotic education in the Chinese 
educational system was published by the Chinese Ministry of Education in 2016. It 
highlights the important role of patriotic education in achieving the Chinese Dream 
and indicates the general direction and priorities of China’s cultural diplomacy during 
Xi’s presidency. For the planning of Confucius Institutes and Chinese language teaching, 
it stated that “China should actively carry out Chinese teaching and Chinese cultural 
exchange activities, heighten the portion of Chinese culture and contemporary China 
in all kinds of Chinese teaching material content, carry out more brand projects such 
as the ‘Chinese Bridge’ summer camp in China, ‘Chinese Bridge’ Chinese competition, 
and the ‘Confucius Institute Day’. Therefore, to effectively play the role of Confucius 
Institutes in promoting and strengthening China’s soft power”. 106  
 
As argued before, since its arrival to Japan in ancient times, the philosophy of 
Confucius has gained massive acceptance and has had a lasting impact. Chinese 
influence can also be seen within several aspects of Japanese culture, such as art, food, 
tea culture, and traditional medicine and so on. In terms of the content, it is not 
difficult to observe that traditional Chinese culture has become an essential resource 
in the implementation of educational exchange toward Japan, particularly based on 
the historical fact that both countries share many cultural similarities under the East-
Asian cultural sphere. The first Traditional Chinese Medicine Confucius Institute 
(TCMCI) is a good example of this. Opened at Hyogo University of Medicine in 2012, 
107  TCMCI has a regular system of university education, such courses as Medical 
Chinese, Introduction to Oriental Medicine, Therapeutics of Han Medicine, Formulae 
of Han Medicine, Clinical Therapeutics of Han Medicine and Introduction to Taiji Quan. 
Research projects that focus on attempting to explain traditional Chinese Medicine 
with modern science are available to students. Such projects include analysis and 
curative effects, the mechanism of pain treatment and so on.108 Compared to western 
countries, it is probably much easier to adopt traditional Chinese culture as a recourse 
of cultural diplomacy toward Japan. Such highlighting of traditional Chinese culture in 
the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy corresponds with the Chinese 
Dream: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is not simply related to the 
development of people’s material living standard, but more importantly connected to 
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the prospering of Chinese culture, it is not to rise China from nothing, but to regain its 
glory both economically and culturally.  
 
It is also worth noting that attempts at convincing Japanese students to accept the 
Chinese narrative regarding historical disputes became the focus of China’s 
educational exchanges with Japan within Xi’s presidency. In 2017, the fourth China-
Japan Education Exchange Conference was held in Tokyo, which raised the voice for 
mutual communication and cooperation on education exchange between the two 
countries. 109  Topics such as bilateral relations, historical disputes and post-war 
reconciliation were often discussed at those forums and conferences. Such first-hand 
experiences are expected to give students an opportunity to reconsider the 
relationship between the two countries based on more than just common media 
narratives, which are overwhelmingly negative.110 As Chinese ambassador to Japan 
Cheng said, “If students visiting Japan, through their own eyes, ears, and body, feel 
and understand how each Japanese truly thinks of the past history, it will be very useful 
for them to learn the history better.”111  In August 2018, Li made the remarks in a 
congratulatory message to an exchange conference attended by more than 1,000 
Chinese and Japanese university students at Peking University in Beijing to 
commemorate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship. Japan and China should develop a friendly and stable relationship, he 
said, adding the two sides should continue promoting exchanges between the young 
people and build more bridges of communication to enhance bilateral friendship. 
Noting that the youth represent the future, Li said the Chinese government would 
always support mutual visits and exchanges between the young people of the two 
countries.112 
 
Traditional Chinese culture has been used as an essential resource in the 
implementation of educational exchange toward Japan and had the intention of 
changing young Japanese people’s perceptions of historical disputes. However, it is 
worth pointing out that strong political interference has become a major obstacle to 
educational exchange in promoting soft power toward Japan. As it was argued, “It 
(China) tends to use utilitarian soft power resources in a coercive and rigid way, 
imposing policies, laws and regulations on its foreign partners and pushing its agenda 
and outcomes through propaganda and control mechanisms” (Lo and Pan, 2014, p.1). 
For example, due to strong political influence from the government, the robust 
expansion of Confucius Institutes encountered resistance and had negative effects in 
Japan. In 2009, Shigesato Toshiyuki, former director of the Osaka Sangyo 
University affairs board, made a statement suggesting that the Confucius Institute is a 
spy agency established to gather cultural intelligence. He pointed out that, "although 
the Confucius Institute is not an invasion by the Chinese government, it can be seen 
as a 'soft landing' for China's expansionism." 113 As the Japanese newspaper Sankei 
Shimbun reported, Shigesato Toshiyuki sued his former employer because he was 
made to leave his position and the university; the trial ended in an out-of-court 
settlement. Osaka Sangyo University also declined to give any details regarding the 
 89 
former director’s dismissal. 114 The Sankei Shimbun also pointed out that the reason 
why Confucius Institutes are welcomed by Japanese universities is because Japan is 
facing what is called the “2018 problem” — a decline of university students caused by 
the lack of 18-year-olds in the population. 115 
 
To conclude, echoing with ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ initiative, 
traditional Chinese culture has become an essential resource in the expansion of 
educational exchange toward Japan. Attempts of convincing Japanese students to 
accept the Chinese narrative regarding historical disputes became the focus in China’s 
pursuit of soft power through educational exchange within Xi’s presidency. Political 
dissent remains the key obstacle of China’s cultural diplomacy in promoting its soft 
power toward Japan in the realm of educational exchange. 
 
4.5. The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward Japan -- Cultural 
exchange 
The following paragraphs explore the recent development of China’s cultural exchange 
activities toward Japan and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream. It argues that 
Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, featuring friendship cities and delegate visits, has 
expanded despite the negative uncertainties of political dissent on the governmental-
level. In the realm of cultural exchange, echoing with the Chinese Dream, traditional 
cultural affinity has been highlighted throughout various cultural exchange practices 
in order to cultivate an economically and culturally prosperous China toward Japan. 
 
4.5.1. An overview of Sino-Japanese cultural exchange 
 
China has been conducting various cultural exchange activities with Japan to cultivate 
a favorable image. The tradition of establishing Friendship Cities/Sister Cities as a 
means of China’s cultural diplomacy was actually started with Japan. In May 1973, 
Kobe (Japan) and Tianjin (China) became the first pair of Friendship Cities, followed six 
months later by Yokohama (Japan) with Shanghai (China). From 1973 to 1978, the only 
6 pairs of Friendship Cities between China and abroad were established with Japan 
under a Chinese government initiative. However, by May of 2018, 248 Friendship Cities 
had been established between China and Japan (Cheng, 2012, p.111). The 
establishment of friendship cities not only allows the exchange of technology, trade, 
investment capital and labor, but more importantly, it allows local governments to 
make full use of cultural exchange activities to promote local culture and expand 
cultural influence.  
 
For example, since Tianjin and Kobe became the first pair of Friendship Cities in 1973, 
Kobe has provided substantial support to Tianjin regarding port management and 
pollution control. Kobe has also sent experts to Tianjin to help develop its medical and 
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transport infrastructure, sewage management, and city planning (Vyas, 2017, p123). 
In the 21st century, the cultural exchange activities between those two cities have 
become more frequent: both cities invited each other to hold cultural exchange 
activities such as art performances, exhibitions, film weeks, and exchange TV series 
and advertising videos. In addition, the two cities explored extensive cooperation 
through academic reports, professional seminars, and the exchanges of visitors. With 
the financial support of Kobe local government, the Tianjin Art Troupe has been 
regularly performed in Kobe. The Tianjin government also organizes students and 
artists to Japan to participate in Kobe Art exhibition every two years. A strong link was 
established between schools, hospitals, television networks, and universities from 
both sides (Cheng, 2012, p.113). Similarly, 2018 was the 45th anniversary of the 
Friendship City relationship between Yokohama and Shanghai. 116 Various events and 
activities have been conducted to improve the economic and cultural exchange 
between the two cities. Since 1998, delegation visits every five-years have become 
routine to commemorate the anniversary of the Friendship City relationship. Art 
exhibitions and art performances have also been carried out at the same time to 
propel the economic cooperation and cultural understanding between those two cities.  
 
However, it would be a mistake to view the expansion of the friendship cities between 
China and Japan as either peaceful or inevitable. There are still uncertain factors within 
friendship cities that have been negatively affecting China’s cultural diplomacy toward 
Japan. For instance, at the beginning of the 21st century, some Japanese right-wing 
groups organized anti-Chinese protests against the Chinese narrative of the Nanking 
massacre in Osaka. The Osaka government refused the request to cancel this protest 
from Shanghai’s government, which has subsequently cast a shadow on the 
relationship between the Osaka and Shanghai governments. As a consequence, the 
dispatching program for advanced students on technology and agriculture was 
suspended in 2003 after 22 years. All of the exchange programs between Osaka and 
Shanghai were reduced to 7 in the same year. Since 2007, both governments were only 
able to maintain 2 exchange activities per year at the official governmental level (Gong, 
2007, p.22).  Similarly, in 2003, newly elected Yokohama Mayor Hiroshi Nakada made 
a decision to cut the budget for exchanges between Yokohama and Shanghai. Two 
years later, due to the textbook revision issue and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a few large-scaled anti-Japanese protests occurred in big 
cities in China, including Shanghai. The Yokohama government sent a protest letter to 
the Shanghai government and denounced it at a press conference. As a result, the 
volume of exchange programs in 2005 and 2006 was only half of what it was 1996 
(Gong, 2007, p.22).      
 
Cultural exchange plays an indispensable role in the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan, particularly within Xi’s presidency. Take delegate visits as an 
example. As it was noted in the previous section, the visit of 3000 Japanese citizens, 
also called the "Japan-China tourism cultural exchange tour” in 2015, was seen as a 
significant turning point in the Sino-Japanese relationship since Xi came to power. The 
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delegation included Japanese politicians, central and local government officials, 
Japanese representatives from different organizations and associations, and ordinary 
tourists. 117  This cultural exchange tour was believed to have achieved significant 
improvements in Sino-Japanese relations, it also led to a more vigorous environment 
for Sino-Japanese cultural exchange. Furthermore, in 2003, in order to commemorate 
the 30th anniversary of Friendship city, Shanghai Archives Bureau and the government 
in Yokohama jointly organized a photography exhibition in Japan called Using photos 
to recall – The 30 years of development of Yokohama and Shanghai. 118 Ten years later, 
even when Sino-Japanese relations were at the worst point in years, due to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island territorial dispute, the photography exhibition was still carried 
out as planned. As Japanese archive researcher Ituwimi said, although Sino-Japanese 
relations are not very good at the moment, we still want people to know more stories 
about people in Shanghai and Yokohama and their contribution to Sino-Japanese 
relations. 119  
 
In brief, despite the negative uncertainties of political dissent on a governmental-level, 
Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, with a particular focus on friendship cities and 
delegate visits, plays an indispensable role in the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan.  
 
4.5.2 Cultural exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
Echoing with the Chinese Dream, traditional cultural affinity became the highlight in 
the practice of cultural exchange toward Japan for generating a friendly and favourable 
image of China. As the Chinese ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua, noted at the 
opening ceremony of the “2016 Chinese Festival” in Japan: “China and Japan are close 
neighbours that are only separated by a strip of water, there has been a long history 
of friendly exchanges between the two countries, and cultural identity and traditional 
values of the people from both countries are highly integrated.”120 At the 2017 Chinese 
Festival, he stated that: “the Chinese Festival not only provides wonderful 
performances that deepen Japanese people’s understanding of  China, it also allows 
people from both countries to appreciate the shared traditional cultural ties, which 
were inherited by the two countries over more than two thousand years. Hopefully it 
could be a good opportunity to strengthen face-to-face exchanges and promote 
friendly feelings between the two countries”. 121 
 
A wide range of Chinese cultural elements and symbols, such as Chinese food and tea 
culture, Chinese artworks and handicrafts, Chinese folk music, folk dance, and local 
instruments, were presented through a series of cultural exchange activities and 
events toward Japan. These cultural exchanges echoed with the Chinese Dream 
paradigm of the growing confidence in Chinese culture. In the 2018 Chinese Festival, 
more than a hundred points were set up at the exhibition, including Chinese cuisines, 
Chinese products, cultural heritage and landscapes.122 Activities and events were set 
up surrounding popular cultural themes from both countries, such as a ramen 
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challenge, table tennis competition, karaoke contests, and an electronic design contest. 
123  Such focus draws on the cultural affinity between the societies of the two countries 
highlights China’s cultural exchange toward Japan.  
 
More importantly, corresponding with the growing cultural confidence of the Chinese 
Dream, more and more Chinese cultural elements are being introduced to Japan. As 
mentioned before, China’s home-grown cartoons paled in comparison to the many 
Japanese anime series on television and in comic books, which led to a number of 
Chinese people being influenced by Japanese animation and manga culture since the 
1990s. However, a new wave of Chinese animation, which is driven by the country’s 
technology and internet giants, has begun to show up in Japan. More recently, the 
"Chinese animation trip to Japan -- from ink" was the first large-scale Chinese 
animation exhibition in Japan, where more than 130 cartoon works were presented to 
Japanese audiences. 124 The works include not only classic Chinese cartoons made in 
the last century, but also modern Chinese animation created by the new generation of 
Chinese cartoonist. 125 Accordingly, a more developed modern China, which 
corresponds closely with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, has also been 
presented to Japan through a variety of cultural exchange practices. As Cheng 
addressed, “China is also a fast-changing country with development and prosperity, 
Chinese traditional culture and the modern China both enjoy its charms, hopefully it 
will present Japanese people with a dimensional, authentic, and comprehensive image 
of China”. 126 
 
To conclude, echoing with the Chinese Dream, traditional cultural affinity has been 
used as the key resource for generating a friendly and favourable image of China in the 
practice of cultural exchange toward Japan. A more developed modern China, which 
corresponds closely with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, has also been 
presented to the Japanese audiences through a variety of cultural exchange practices.  
4.6 The Chinese Dream, cultural diplomacy and soft power 
The last section of this chapter concludes by reiterating the key features of China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward the case study country Japan with its unique cultural 
relations, and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream ideology. Overall, it argues 
that there is a high level of correspondence between China’s contemporary cultural 
diplomacy in Japan, and the foundational ideas of the Chinese Dream paradigm. 
However, historical disputes and political dissent remain the fundamental impediment 
and provides an obstacle to China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan in the pursuit of 
soft power. 
 
The Sino-Japanese relations are of central importance to East Asia; the future not only 
of the two countries, but also of the Asia Pacific region and potentially the rest of the 
world depend on this relationship. As Akira Iriye (1990, p.635) stated: “In discussing a 
pair of countries like China and Japan, the cultural dimension seems particularly 
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pertinent not only because of their historical cultural (religious, literary, artistic) ties, 
but also of the modern experiences involving their encounter which have so often 
been notable because of lack of understanding, condescension, brutality, prejudice.” 
By looking at the historical character of Sino-Japanese relations since ancient times 
and comparing these with the current political atmosphere, it argues that the cultural 
relationship between the two countries has experienced constant unexpected turns 
with ups and downs. In the eyes of Japan, China has been viewed as a ‘big brother’ to 
admire, a ‘loser’ to western civilization and then a powerful rival. Historical disputes, 
along with distinctive perceptions and narratives from both Japan and China, 
remained the central obstacles within Sino-Japanese relations. In China’s eyes, there 
is a strong voice of calling for both countries to make a consensus regarding those 
conflicts left during the wartime. Although the scale and number of cultural exchanges 
between China and Japan have increased dramatically since the normalization of 
diplomatic relations, they still face a number of historical and territorial conflicts, 
which affect their mutual relationship and damage the development of cultural 
diplomacy in the Post-Cold War era.  
 
While there are still historical factors negatively affecting cultural relations between 
the two countries, recent decades, especially since 1978, have witnessed the steady 
development of cultural exchange between China and Japan. Within Xi’s first five-years 
of the presidency, the efforts to improve cultural diplomacy have achieved remarkable 
success in the recovery of deteriorated Sino-Japanese relations due to the Senkaku 
/Diaoyu island dispute. After exploring the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward Japan through media, educational exchange, and other cultural exchange 
activities in the 21st century, it argues that cultural exchange has witnessed remarkable 
expansion, and substantial resources have been invested to promote a favourable 
image of China to the Japanese people. More recently, the renewed political stability 
in both countries has shown great potential for creating a better environment for 
cooperation through enhanced cultural diplomacy. 
 
There is no doubt that the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy in the 21st 
century has made considerable improvements in cultural relations between China and 
Japan. However, it is difficult and still too early to answer the question of whether the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy could have a positive impact on China’s 
soft power or not. According to Nye (2008, p.1), soft power rests on three resources: 
"its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives 
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as 
legitimate and having moral authority).” Furthermore, soft power also rests on the 
ability of framing and persuading agenda to influence the preference of targets. In 
terms of persuasion, it is significant to consider it as a two-way process of 
communication that involves much interpreted information for different selected 
targets rather than a single-tracked information interaction. Observing soft power in a 
way that focuses more on the perception of the audience plays an essential role in 
understanding the mechanism of soft power.  
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According to a recent research report by the PEW Research Centre on Japanese views 
of China, the index measuring unfavorable views of China held by Japanese people 
increased from 71 to 86 within the decade from 2006 to 2016. In 2016, only 11% of 
the Japanese population expressed a favourable opinion of China, while 14% of the 
Chinese say they have a positive view of Japan. 81% of the interviewees used the word 
“arrogant” to describe China and 70% of the interviewees think China is 
nationalistic.127 According to the 2017 Japan-China Public Opinion Survey conducted 
by Genron NPO128, 44.9% of the Japanese viewed Sino-Japanese relations as “bad”, 
while 64.2% of the Chinese public held this view. Most people in both countries feel 
that there “has not been any special change and there will not be a change”.  Despite 
the close cultural relationship and cultural similarities under the East-Asian cultural 
sphere, historical issues still remain the central obstacle within Sino-Japanese relations 
and continue to negatively affect the development of cultural relations between the 
two countries. History and territory impeded the improvement of perceptions about 
the other side and emotions began to deteriorate in a serious way. For a long time, the 
development of these unsolved historical issues brought up strong feelings of 
nationalism in both countries. There are still hidden dangers leading to nationalism 
and revisionism on both sides. 
 
In China’s perception of Japan, Japan has never made appropriate apologies that China 
has found satisfactory or acceptable regarding historical War Time issues. Japan’s lack 
of repentance or failure to learn from the past remains the main concern within Sino-
Japanese cultural relations. As Liu argued, “what China asks of the Japanese side is 
that it should not whitewash its history of aggression and eulogize those who died in 
the war of aggression. Japan should admit the crimes of its militarist aggression against 
China, appropriately address the problems left over from WWII, draw lessons from the 
history and stick to a road of peaceful development”.129 The prevalence of references 
to history and the Japanese aggression toward China remains a defining feature of 
Chinese rhetoric on Japan. Similar to China’s perception of Japan, there is also a very 
high prevalence of threatening rhetoric when it comes to Japan’s perception of China. 
There is also a critique among the public that the media tends to report on China in a 
sensational and negative fashion, which has contributed to the deterioration in Sino-
Japanese relations (Akio, 2017, p.45). Unsurprisingly, as argued in previous paragraphs, 
Japan tends to downplay historical issues by revising history textbooks and so on 
because they wish to move beyond the past. Both China and Japan criticize each other 
for lacking transparency, creating uncertainty and raising concerns in the region about 
the direction they intend to take. As a result, both countries repeatedly present each 
other as posing a direct danger due to their aggressive disposition, territorial 
ambitions, attempts to change the international order, or their reckless behaviour. 130 
 
Take the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue as an example. Nationalist activism on both sides 
of the East China Sea has intensified the tension within Sino-Japanese relations. Japan 
and China have both claimed this island as their own territory, either based on 
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contemporary control since the 19th century or historical tributary administration since 
the 14th century. On China’s side, regular attempts of approaching the island have been 
made by Chinese non-governmental nationals since 1970, against strong interference 
and warning from the Japanese Coast Guard. These fierce and dangerous actions are 
highly praised as a spirit of patriotism on Chinese social media, particularly after 
Japan’s agenda of nationalizing the island in 2012.131 To some extent, the Chinese 
government has “allowed anti-Japanese feelings to become an important element of 
Chinese nationalism” (D’Hooghe, 2015, p.199). On Japan’s side, the protests and 
inflamed sentiments did not stop the process of nationalising the island. Some local 
officials called on the government to push ahead with plans to deploy a unit of the 
Japanese military and patrol in greater force to assert its control of the island. 132 Eight-
in-ten Japanese (80%) and about six-in-ten Chinese (59%) are concerned that 
territorial disputes between China and its neighbours could lead to a military 
conflict.133 
 
Another problem of whether the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy could 
have a positive impact on China’s soft power or not is due to the broad nature of soft 
power itself. Although Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges have witnessed remarkable 
expansion, due to the intangible features associated with the concept of soft power, it 
is imprudent to claim that China’s soft power toward Japan has been enhanced as 
there are so many factors in affecting the dynamic of soft power. For example, living 
abroad is an important and transformative experience where most students will gain 
some measure of intercultural understanding. However, does this mean it can 
automatically be translated into soft-power gains? The result remains unknown. In 
other words, it is still too early to say whether the efforts of cultural diplomacy toward 
Japan have been transformed into China’s soft power. 
 
Although China’s Gross Domestic Products (GDP) has surpassed Japan to become the 
second-largest economy in the world in 2010, through looking at the implementation 
of cultural diplomacy there are still some distinct figures indicating the weakness of 
China’s soft power to Japan. Take publishing for example, according to statistics from 
the UNESCO Index Translationum, the number of books translated from Chinese to 
Japanese has been growing year on year since 2005. However, it is insignificant if we 
compare with the statistic of books translated from Japanese to Chinese, 3129, which 
is more than 6 times the opposite(487) since 2005.134  Furthermore, according to 
Portland’s 2017 research on soft power world rankings, Japan’s position of 6th in the 
rankings is much higher than China’s, which was only 25th.135 In this case, it can be seen 
that there is still a huge gap between China and Japan. Therefore, there is still a long 
way to go for China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan in enhancing its soft power. In 
the near future, the close relationship between Japan and the U.S. will not allow Tokyo 
to fundamentally change its political position and reverse policies toward China. 
However, by encouraging more cultural exchanges that facilitate mutual 
understandings, both China and Japan can play a greater role in creating a peaceful 
region. 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of 
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Peace and Friendship. Rather than simply seeing cultural diplomacy as a salient tool of 
soft, it may be more important to use it as a communications platform to reduces the 
misunderstanding and distrust between the people of both countries, allowing for 
peaceful solutions regarding territorial conflicts and historical disputes to be found.    
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has outlined the historic context from which contemporary 
practices have emerged and assessed correspondence between these practices and 
the Chinese Dream paradigm. Overall, it argues that there is a high level of 
correspondence between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy in Japan and the 
foundational ideas of the Chinese Dream paradigm. Practice and paradigm both 
demonstrate a broad commitment to more confident leadership and the projection of 
Chinese leadership within international politics. This analysis of China’s cultural 
diplomacy practices in Japan suggests that in the realm of media there have been 
significant attempts to rebrand China as an economically strong and culturally 
attractive country. This rebranding was attempted by projecting visions of Chinese 
citizens’ and corporations’ successes, albeit in a manner that commonly acknowledges 
the presence of social and political tension, into the Japanese sphere. In the realm of 
education, attempts at convincing young Japanese people to accept the Chinese 
narrative of historical disputes became the focus in China’s pursuit of soft power, with 
strong political interference being the main obstacle in promoting its soft power 
toward Japan. In the realm of cultural exchange, there have been various activities 
aiming to cultivate a favourable and friendly image of China toward Japan, despite the 
negative uncertainties of political dissent on a governmental level. Issues such as 
historical disputes and political dissent remain the fundamental impediment and 
challenge of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan in the pursuit of soft power. 
Chapter 5: China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia 
Introduction 
Modern Sino-Russian cultural relations are becoming an important factor in ensuring 
peace, security and stability both regionally, in Eurasia, and globally. Since Xi took 
power in 2012, the Sino-Russian relationship has entered a new period with 
overarching guidance of the Chinese Dream. Beginning with an overview of Sino-
Russian cultural relations, this chapter explores the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia in the realms of media exchange, educational exchange and 
cultural exchange, and its correspondence with the overarching guiding ideology the 
Chinese Dream. 
 
The first section looks at existing studies concerned with China-Russia soft power and 
cultural diplomacy. The second section provides a clarification of Sino-Russian cultural 
ties within a cultural context and the contemporary development of PRC’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia, in particular within Xi’s presidency. The next three sections 
analyse the manifestations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia and its 
correspondence with the Chinese Dream in the realms of media exchange, educational 
exchange and cultural exchange. The last section concludes the chapter by clarifying 
the dynamic of China’s cultural diplomacy and the Chinese Dream in promoting China’s 
soft power with Russia. 
 
Rather than making judgements over the result of China’s soft power or comparing it 
with Russia’s approach, this chapter takes a different track to explore China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia and the correspondence with Xi’s Chinese Dream narratives. 
It argues that, unlike with Japan, China’s cultural relations with Russia do not share a 
long history of cultural similarities in religion, philosophy, language, social values and 
art. Sino-Russian cultural relations only became closely linked through the shared 
political values of Marxism and Communism raised in the 20th century, with activities 
being primarily conducted by both governments. Within Xi’s presidency, China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward Russia in the Chinese Dream period has turned into an 
increasingly active environment. 
 
In the realm of media, despite the limited number of media exchanges corresponding 
with the Chinese Dream, a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global 
player is clearly embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives, 
demonstrating China’s recent economic development and political reform. More 
importantly, the adoption of traditional Chinese culture echoes closely with the 
concept of rejuvenation by demonstrating growing cultural self-confidence. In the 
realm of educational exchange, the Chinese Dream rhetoric of benefiting other 
countries corresponds with China’s direct financial support for Russian students and 
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joint universities. Traditional Chinese elements are often used as the key cultural 
resources for creating a favourable image of an unthreatening neighbour with a grand 
cultural heritage. In the realm of cultural exchange, it argues that cultural exchanges 
with Russia in the Chinese Dream period have increased steadily, with a particular 
interest in tourism exchange. Traditional Chinese culture has been seen as the symbol 
of Chinese identity and a key resource in generating Chinese influence through the 
implementation of cultural exchange toward Russian audiences. More importantly, 
corresponding with the Chinese Dream, the historical communist connection was used 
as the key resource in order to generate a positive and friendly image of China through 
cultural exchange. 
 
To conclude, China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia via media, education and 
cultural exchanges corresponds with the Chinese Dream rhetoric. By pointing out the 
limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia in the framework of Nye’s soft 
power theory, it argues whether it contributes to China’s soft power toward Russia still 
remains unknown.  
 
5.1 China-Russia Cultural Diplomacy: State of the art of existing 
literature 
This section looks at existing studies of Sino-Russian soft power and cultural diplomacy. 
It argues that existing research tends to either compare or assess the influence of China 
and Russia when it comes to soft power, and there is a low level of clarification within 
existing literature regarding the analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia. 
Rather than making judgements over the result of China’s soft power or comparing it 
with Russia’s approach, this chapter is interested in mapping the correspondence 
between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy toward Japan and the articulations 
of the Chinese Dream. The three-dimensional theoretical framework allows a more 
holistic account to be generated compared to a more focused case study stated above.  
 
 
The relationship between China and Russia is vital for regional development and global 
stability, particularly within the 21st century. The Putin–Xi dynamic, and Sino-Russian 
partnership, suggest a world where common interests, mutual trust, and shared 
purpose are more than just slogans (Lo, 2019, p.1). The relationship is becoming more 
complex, with lingering mistrust and fears from both sides. As Paul Stronski and Nicole 
Ng (2018, p.2) pointed out, “as China envisions a more active role in regional and 
global affairs, its long-term ambitions with respect to Russia are not clear.” On the 
other hand, some argued that Russia’s turn to the East is merely toward diplomacy 
and economy, rather than the turn of culture or identity based on attraction and 
emotional preference (Zhao, 2016, p.1). Fundamentally, they are two different 
countries, two different nations, with distinctive cultures and civilizations, and cannot 
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always share the same interests (Li, 1996, p.5).    
 
This branching point precisely reflected the importance of the soft power research on 
Sino-Russian relations. Given the distinctive cultural difference between the two 
neighbouring countries, it is worth asking whether soft power has ever been involved 
in this process. If yes, how has soft power been transferred and wielded between both 
countries? Do they share the same approach to soft power when dealing with each 
other? How has the pursuit of soft power been manifested in practice within both 
countries? How do we track the subtle transformation of soft power and the main 
purpose of it?   
 
Existing studies on Sino-Russian relations paid considerable attention to either 
compare or assess the influence of China and Russia when it comes to soft power (Nye, 
2013; Shambaugh,2013; Rawnsley, 2015). In Nye’s article, he pointed out that the 
mistake that China and Russia have both made in enhancing soft power is the 
misconception that the government has the main role in soft power, rather than civil 
society (Nye, 2013). Jeanne Wilson (2015) also shared Nye’s point of view, arguing that 
both China and Russia consider the soft power methods of the West to present 
nothing less than an existential threat. She compared and evaluated the similarities 
and differences in Russian and Chinese soft power strategy, highlighting that both 
countries share a legacy of communism, which notably influenced their national 
identities and their approaches to soft power (Wilson, 2015). Gary Rawnsley (2015) 
discussed the difference between China and Russia in pursuit of soft power by focusing 
on the field of broadcasting. In general, compared to the political trust and economic 
cooperation between the two countries, deficient attention has paid to the cultural 
exchange in Sino-Russian relations still seems deficient (Smirnova, 2016; Gasma, 2017; 
Xu,2018). 
 
Noticeably, little attention has been paid specifically to China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward Russia in the contemporary context, particularly within the soft power 
framework.  Valeev and Alikberova’s work presented a detailed analysis and evaluation 
of Sino-Russian cultural exchange policies, education programmes and events, the 
main results, trends, and prospects of Russian-Chinese relations in the field of culture 
between the 1990s to the 2000s (Valeev and Alikberova,2011). Xu scrutinized China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward Russia in the fields of media, art, education, sports, and 
tourism under the framework of “A Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” and 
made some suggestions regarding the limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy 
(Xu,2018).  
 
Furthermore, some recent research into China’s cultural diplomacy towards Russia 
focuses on specific fields such as film cooperation, joint education, student exchange 
and tourism. Smirnova explored the extensive development models in education 
cooperation between China and Russia and argued that despite the restrictions, 
bilateral cooperation in science and education appears to be an increasingly ambitious 
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objective aiming to build up the national innovative capacity of the two countries 
(Smirnova, 2016). Lao explored the role of cultural diplomacy in the Sino-Russian 
relationships by looking at cultural initiatives, educational cooperation, and a series of 
cultural diplomacy policies (Lao, 2012). Some research also investigated the current 
status and the popularity of Chinese films and TV series in Russia through surveys and 
interviews (Yang, 2017; Song, 2018).  
 
The sections below extend the existing literature on China’s cultural diplomacy toward 
Russia, through the application of a three-dimensional framework, which allows a 
more holistic account to be generated compared to the more focused studies noted 
above. In addition, rather than making judgements over the foundations of China’s 
soft power or the comparative strength relative to Russia’s soft power, this chapter is 
interested particularly in mapping the correspondence between China’s contemporary 
practices in Russia on the one hand, and articulations of the Chinese Dream and 
practices in other case study countries on the other. In doing so, this chapter will 
systematically analyse how and what China aims to prioritize in the pursuit of soft 
power toward Russia by looking at the realms of media, education and cultural 
exchange, and how this corresponds with the Chinese Dream rhetoric within Xi’s 
presidency.  
 
 
5.2 The background of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia 
 
The following section provides a foundation from which the connection between 
historical ties and China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy can be explored. The broad 
evolution of Sino-cultural relations and practices of China’s cultural diplomacy toward 
Russia from ancient times to Xi’s first five years is covered. It argues that fundamentally, 
there has been an enduring cultural difference in many aspects of the Sino-Russian 
relationship, such as religion, language, race, custom, social values and art. Sino-
Russian cultural relations only became closely connected through the shared political 
values of Marxism and Communism raised in the 20th century. Within Xi’s presidency, 
cultural diplomacy in the Chinese Dream period has been emerging into an increasingly 
active environment. 
 
  5.2.1 Cultural relations between China and Russia 
 
The traditional beginning of Russian history is the establishment of Kievan Rus, which 
ultimately disintegrated as a state due to the Mongol invasions between 1223 and 
1240 (Soucek, 2000; Li, 1998; Halperins, 1985). Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis 
Khan, established the Golden Horde which became the northwestern sector of the 
Mongol Empire from the 1240s to 1502. On the other side of the Eurasian continent, 
Kublai Khan was officially proclaimed emperor of the Yuan dynasty in 1271. This was 
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the first foreign dynasty to rule China and lasted until 1368 (Hsiao, 1978, p.36). The 
earliest cultural exchanges between China and Russia were conducted under the 
Mongolian empire between the mid-13th century and the mid-14th century. In the book 
The History of Yuan, it was recorded that there were a number of Russian soldiers 
collated in Beijing. There were also Chinese craftsmen and artists who followed the 
Mongol armies to Russia.136  
 
In the 16th century, China and Russia officially started formal contact through visiting 
envoys. In 1689, both governments signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk to redefine the 
border: Stanovoys and the Argun River, which remained stable until the 1840s (Frank, 
p.265). As the first milestone in the development of Sino-Russian relations, the 
agreement not only settled the political and geographic issues but also deeply 
influenced the trade and cultural exchange between the two countries. In Chinese 
ambassador Tulisen’s book Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the 
Tourgouth Tartars (1712-1715), the geography and the native culture in Russia were 
described in detail (Tulisen and Staunton, 1821). As the first detailed description of 
Russia, this book largely enhanced China’s understanding of Russia in terms of 
geography, culture, politics and economy. By the 18th century, Russia had grown to 
become the Russian Empire, stretching from Poland to Far-East Asia. The Russian 
government attached great importance to the development of cultural exchange with 
China by sending students to study in China and actively supporting the research of 
China. At the same time, the Qing government set up the Russian School in China, 
which started to accept the Russian orthodox missionaries and students to learn 
Chinese and Manchurian languages and develop Chinese experts in Russian. One 
outstanding person who made significant contributions to Sino-Russian cultural 
relations is Sinologist Nikita Yakovlevich Bichurin. Known as the founder of Chinese 
studies in Russia, Bichurin translated a number of ancient and medieval Chinese 
manuscripts and published several books about Chinese history, geography, law, and 
ethnography between the 1800 and 1840s (Popova and Miasnikov, 2002).  
 
However, unlike Japan, which shares a number of cultural similarities in religion, 
philosophy, language, art, and food under the East-Asian Cultural sphere, Russia’s 
culture distinguishes itself from neither the west nor the east. Despite some early 
cultural exchanges between the two countries, there have been enduring cultural 
differences in many areas, such as religion, language, race, custom, social values, and 
art, which are deeply rooted in Sino-Russian relations. More concretely, Russia and 
China only became closely connected through the political values of Marxism and 
Communism in the 20th century. As the CCP’s first leader, Mao stated that “the salvoes 
of the October revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism”, and cultural exchange at the 
governmental level expanded remarkably though Russian and Chinese communist 
parties. 137  
 
Considerable Russian literature became the inspiration for China’s anti-Japanese 
Imperialism and anti-fascism. In this regard, between 1921 and 1927, more than 30 
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pieces of Lenin’s work were translated and published. 138  The widespread slogan 
named after a book called ‘To Moscow’ also demonstrates that the attraction of 
Russia’s political culture has made significant contributions in boosting China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia (Mattkov, 1959). Some leaders of the CCP, including the 
second-generation leader Deng Xiaoping, have studied or visited in Moscow. Cultural 
exchange was also conducted by intellectual elites and science experts supporting 
China’s Technology and nuclear weapon. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, 
Mao pursed the Leaning to One Side diplomatic policy, which led China to ally with the 
Soviet Union and Communist bloc in opposing the imperialist and capitalist camp led 
by the United States. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union became the main focus of 
China's cultural diplomacy.  
 
Since the early 1950s, Russia’s political values, literature, music, art, dance, drama, and 
movies have become particularly popular. Russian became the priority foreign 
language studied throughout the country, even in the distant southern provinces 
(Smirnova,2016, p.8). Soviet experts offered technical assistance to complete China’s 
socialism construction, which has further promoted cultural exchanges between the 
two countries. 139 However, the Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966) cut off communication 
between the two countries. Accordingly, cultural exchange was frozen for decades 
until the normalization of diplomatic relations in the late 1980s. 
 
In brief, unlike with Japan, who shares cultural similarities in religion, philosophy, 
language, social values, and art with China under the East-Asian Cultural sphere, the 
Chinese and Russian societies do not share a traditional cultural affinity. Sino-Russian 
cultural relations only became closely linked through the shared political values of 
Marxism and Communism raised in the 20th century, with relations primarily 
conducted by both governments for political purposes.     
 
 
5.2.2 Overview of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia in the Post-Cold War era  
 
 
After a series of intergovernmental agreements on cultural exchange and education 
cooperation were signed in the 1990s, it became possible for both countries to 
implement cultural diplomacy projects such as annual cultural festivals, educational 
exchanges, literature, musical arts, and events and activities in the field of sports. In 
1992, both countries signed a cultural cooperation agreement, which opened the door 
for bilateral cooperation and exchange in culture and art, media and film, broadcast 
and publishing, and education and science. 140 In 1993, the first Chinese Studies Centre 
was set up in Moscow’s State Mining University, soon followed by St Petersburg State 
University and the Far East National University. In 1995, the two countries signed an 
agreement acknowledging each other’s colleges’ and universities’ education diplomas, 
degree certificates, and graduation certificates. 141 
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Since then, cultural and educational exchanges, as the foundation of the development 
of Sino-Russian relations, have experienced significant growth in terms of volume and 
the variety. In 1992, the China National Song and Dance Troupe had several 
performances in St Petersburg and Moscow. In 1994, musicians and dancers from the 
Russian National Dance Theater, Russian Jazz Orchestra, and Russian Army Chorus Art 
groups visited China for performances (Huang, 2015). The year 1999 was widely 
celebrated by people from both countries for the 50th anniversary of the founding of 
the PRC and the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is 
also the year of the 200th anniversary of the birth of A.S. Pushkin, when a series of 
work of Russian writers and poets was published. A number of symphony concerts 
including Russian and Chinese musicians, performances of the Central Ballet Troupe of 
China, a circus troupe and Song and Dance Ensemble of the miners also took place in 
Russia. (Valeev and Alikberova, 2015)  
Beginning with the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, the volume and variety of 
cultural and educational exchange continued to expand during the first decade of the 
21st century. In commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-
Russian diplomatic relations, the year 2004 was chosen as the “Chinese and Russian 
Youth Friendship Year” according to a consensus reached by Hu Jintao and Vladimir 
Putin. 142  Various forms of activities, such as tourism forums, science forums, 
delegation visits and other cultural activities in literature art and sports, were 
implemented to expand bilateral exchanges between the young generations. In 2006 
and 2007, China held the first large-scale cultural exchange project with cooperation 
from the Russian government: The Year of the Russian Federation in China and the 
Year of China in Russia in 2006 – 2007. The political and cultural significance of these 
events is confirmed by the personal participation of Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin in 
the opening ceremony of the “Year of Russia in China”.143  
 
Under the initiative of both presidents, 2009 was the Year of the Russian Language in 
China while the Year of the Chinese Language in Russia was in 2010.144 More than 260 
events were conducted in 14 provinces, 4 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities and 
26 cities in China during the Year of the Russian language, including thematic and 
scientific conferences, seminars and workshops, university and school festivals, 
competitions and Olympiads on the Russian language and Russian culture (Valeev and 
Alikberova, 2015). As Li Yingnan, the director of the Russian Studies Centre in the 
Beijing Foreign Studies University stated, "the Russian year is not simply engaged with 
language teaching, but also within a wide range of the humanitarian sphere in the two 
countries, and the main purpose is to deepen Chinese youth’s understanding of 
Russian culture and contemporary Russia”145 
 
There has also been a dramatic expansion in the amount of educational exchange 
between China and Russia since the 21st century. The significant cultural diplomacy 
initiative was the opening of the Russian centers in China and the establishment of 
Confucius Institutes in Russia. An agreement upon educational cooperation signed by 
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both sides in 2006 highlighted that both governments would strongly support and 
promote Sino-Russian educational exchange and language teaching. 146 Since 2000, 
more than ten Russian Studies Centers have been set up in China’s top-ranking 
universities, such as Beijing Foreign Language University, Shanghai Foreign Language 
University, Heilongjiang University, and East China Normal University. The first 
Confucius Institute in Russia was opened in Moscow in 2008, there is now a total of 17 
Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classrooms in Russia. 147 
 
Within Xi’s first five-year presidency, China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia saw 
continuous development, with a particular focus on education and young generations. 
In 2013, Xi stated in his speech at Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
that, “the youth is the future of the country, the future of the world, it is also the future 
of the friendship between China and Russia”. Later on in 2013, during his New Year 
Congratulatory message, Xi stated that: “I believe that the China-Russia Youth Friendly 
Exchanges Year program in 2014 and 2015 will further deepen the understanding and 
friendship between the young people of the two countries, and the concepts of 
passing on bilateral friendship from generation to generation and achieving common 
revitalization will be more deeply rooted in people's heart It will make new 
contributions to the continuing in-depth development of comprehensive strategic 
partnership between China and Russia”.148  As a result, the first Sino-Russian university 
MSU-BIT University was opened in Shenzhen, China, in 2014. Both countries signed a 
memorandum of understanding on establishing the university at a signing ceremony 
witnessed by Xi and Putin.149 In 2017, it was agreed to set up Weinan Moscow Institute 
of Arts (WNU) in Weinan with the cooperation of Moscow National Normal University 
and Weinan Normal University after Li Keqiang’s regular meeting with Medvedev in 
Nov 2016. More recently, Xi again called on the two countries' youths to enhance 
communication and mutual learning to promote friendship between young 
generations during a visit with Vladimir Putin to the All-Russian Children's Centre.150 
 
In general, cultural and educational exchanges, as the foundation of the development 
of Sino-Russian relations, have embraced experienced growth in terms of the volume 
and variety since the 1990s. Within Xi’s presidency, cultural diplomacy in the Chinese 
Dream period has been emerging into an increasingly active environment.  
 
5.3 The manifestation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia—
Media exchange  
This section analyses how China’s use of media in implementing cultural diplomacy 
toward Russia has developed since the start of the 21st century and how it fits into the 
Chinese Dream narrative. It argues that considerable attention has been paid to 
enhance media exchange between China and Russia by both governments, particularly 
within Xi’s presidency. Different from the case of Japan, there is a very low level of 
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practice in media corresponding with the Chinese Dream. However, a strong message 
of presenting China as a genuine global player is clearly embedded within certain 
media exchange activities and initiatives by demonstrating China’s success in economic 
development and political reform. More importantly, the adoption of traditional 
Chinese culture echoes closely with the concept of rejuvenation by demonstrating the 
growing self-confidence in culture.  
   
 5.3.1 An overview of Sino-Russian media exchange  
 
In recent years, the Sino-Russian media exchange has drawn attention from both 
governments during Xi’s presidency. During Xi’s visit to Moscow in 2013, Xi and Putin 
reached a consensus of holding a Chinese/Russian film festival every year instead of 
every two years (under the regulation of China’s State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film and Television and the Ministry of Culture of Russian 
Federation). 151 In 2015, the years 2016 and 2017 were named China and Russia Media 
Exchange Year[s]. During the closing ceremony of the 2017 China-Russia Media 
Exchange Year program in Beijing, Chinese Premier Li noted: “today’s closing ceremony 
is not an ending but a new starting point, which is expected to open a new chapter for 
media cooperation and people-to-people exchanges between two countries and push 
enduring bilateral friendship to pass from generation to generation”. 152 
 
In general, Sino-Russian media exchange and cooperation have increased, both in 
terms of the volume and their size. Within the two China-Russia Media Exchange Years, 
more than 250 media exchange events and cooperative projects were carried out 
between the two countries. 153 In Oct 2016, both countries started filming a 3 year-
long documentary series called This is China (Это китай), which was designed to 
promote China’s international image and Chinese culture among Russian audiences. 
In 2017, China’s largest English-language website, China Daily, signed a cooperation 
agreement with SPB TV in Russia during the second China-Russia New Media Forum. 
Han Lei, editor-in-chief of the China Daily website stated that “through taking 
advantage of the SPB TV platform, we hope that more good Chinese stories can be 
known and favoured by Russian people”.154 Furthermore, Chinese films and TV series 
also became more accessible for Internet users in Russia. In Russia’s most commonly 
used web search engine Yandex, there are a number of Chinese TV series that can be 
found by searching for китайский сериал (Chinese TV series). Some recent TV series 
popular among Chinese audiences such as "New Shanghai Bond", “Nirvana in Fire” 
"The Empress of China", “Ode to joy’, “Prince of Lanling”, and “Female Prime Minister” 
are also available for Russian Internet users. By the end of December 2017, there were 
more than 3700 Chinese films on Russia’s largest movie website (www.kinopoisk.ru) 
including dramas, documentaries and short videos.155  
 
Noticeably, the news and information content platform called China-Russia headlines 
released in both countries in 2017, hit 4 million downloads in 2018. 156 It is the first 
bilingual mobile platform that has been set up by both countries’ mainstream media: 
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China International Radio and Russia Sputnik News. In the app, there are several 
categories including news, politics, cultural cooperation, and entertainment. It can also 
be easily switched between Chinese and Russian languages, and there is even has an 
in-app Chinese Russian translation dictionary. In June 2018, China-Russia headlines 
launched the “Who are Putin’s fans?” online activity, which aimed to create a positive 
public opinion of Putin's visit to China. According to the report, there were more than 
10 million participants engaged in the activities and there were 100,000 effective 
questionnaires completed. 157 
  
In terms of book translation and publishing, it is worth noticing the agreement of 
"Classical, modern and contemporary literary translation publishing project between 
China and Russia". This agreement was signed by China’s State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film and Television, and the Russian Federal Agency for Press and 
Mass Communication in 2013 to promote literary exchange between the two 
countries.158 According to the agreement, both sides aim to translate and publish at 
least 50 different pieces of each other’s literature by the end of 2019. In 2015, both 
countries decided to expand the agreement to 100 pieces of literature, including the 
theory of literature and art, history, and philosophy books. 159   
 
In brief, considerable attention has been paid to enhance media exchange between 
China and Russia by both governments. As a result, Sino-Russian media exchange and 
cooperation in the fields of film, TV, and the Internet have increased in terms of both 
volume and size.   
 
 5.3.2 Media exchange and the Chinese Dream  
 
 
In 2014, at a domestic foreign affair meeting regarding neighbourhood relationships, 
Xi stressed that “we should introduce our domestic and foreign policies well, tell 
Chinese stories well, spread Chinese voices well, connect the Chinese Dream with the 
regional development prospect and the wish of living a better life of people from 
neighbouring countries, and let the idea of Community of Common Destiny take root 
in the surrounding countries.” 160  As argued before, the Chinese Dream is about 
improving the living standards of common Chinese people, and the rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation involved with self-acknowledgement and self-confidence. However, 
what message does China intend to send to Russian audiences through media in order 
to pursue soft power? How is the Chinese Dream reflected in the practice of media 
exchange with Russia? 
 
In general, media exchange with Russia rarely corresponds with the Chinese Dream’s 
main subject of improving common people’s living standards. Unlike in Japan, very few 
documentaries or films that relate to Chinese common people’s lives have been made 
to reflect the rapid economic development of China and people’s daily lifestyle toward 
Russian audiences. Similarly, correspondence with the Chinese Dream scarcely occurs 
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within books and publishing. According to updating statistics from the UNESCO Index 
Tranlationum database, only 38 books have been translated from Chinese to Russian 
in the past decade. By looking at the content of the records, the majority of these 
translated books focused on topics from traditional Chinese philosophy and medicine, 
including Daoism, Taiji, Confucianism, Buddhism and acupuncture. 161  Likewise, 
among the 10 Chinese books that were translated and published in Russia for the 
“2014 Sino-Russian Classical, modern and contemporary literary translation publishing 
project” event, only one book (Tear is Gold) reflects Chinese people’s common life and 
the social reforms in the late 20th century. In 2017’s event, only the book Massage was 
about Chinese common people’s daily lives in the 21st century. 162  
 
However, a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global player is clearly 
embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives by demonstrating 
China’s recent economic development and political reform. First of all, it is worthwhile 
to explore a recent documentary called Amazing China. Amazing China is a 
documentary series that particularly represents Xi’s Chinese Dream ambition toward 
the world. Since it was first translated in Russian and broadcasted by China Global 
Television Network (CGTV) in Oct 2017, it has hit 129,000 total views on CGTN 
Russian’s official YouTube channel. 163  
 
Consisting of 6 episodes, Amazing China records China's remarkable economic 
development and achievements since the 18th CCP Congress and combines it with Xi’s 
Chinese Dream. Produced by CCTV and the state-owned China Film Group, the six-part 
documentary Amazing China articulates a message of how China would like to be 
perceived within the new Chinese Dream era by all the audiences inside of China and 
abroad. It presents a story of how China has become a prosperous country under the 
governance of the CCP through the introduction of China’s recent grand projects, 
technological innovation, poverty improvement, environmental protection, people’s 
livelihood and international affairs engagement, particularly in the 21st century during 
Xi’s presidency. From mobile payments to shared bikes, from the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-
Macao Bridge to the Fuxing fast train, as it noted, “today's China is moving to the 
centre of the world's stage, and it has never been so close to the achievement of the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”164. By translating this documentary into 
Russian and broadcasting it on TV and online, this is precisely the message that the 
Chinese government intends to deliver to Russian audiences through media exchange.   
 
It is also worth mentioning the book entitled Xi Jinping: The Chinese Dream. Released 
in May 2015, just before Xi’s visit to Moscow for the 70th anniversary of the world's 
anti-fascist war memorial event, this book became the first monograph of Xi Jinping in 
Russian. CCTV organized an interview with the author Yuri Tavrovsky to introduce his 
interpretation of Xi’s Chinese Dream, People’s Daily (Overseas) made a special report 
about this book, and the book was also translated into Chinese and published by the 
Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. 165 Surrounding the "the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" theme line, this book details Xi’s personal 
 108 
experience of growing up and his family background. It also explores the cultural 
background of the proposal of Xi’s Chinese Dream and the prospect of Sino-Russian 
relations. In general, this book speaks highly of Xi’s reforms on new ideas, policies and 
initiatives such as the Chinese Dream, the B&R Initiative and First-lady diplomacy with 
a strong political complexion. By demonstrating the success of China’s economic 
development and political reform, this book portrays a strong and powerful image of 
the fifth generation of Chinese leadership’s creation of a favourable impression in the 
eyes of Russian people.    
 
It is also worth exploring another documentary named This is China, which is one of 
the key projects organized under the framework of the Year of Media Exchanges 
between China and Russia in 2016 by the Publicity Department of the Communist 
Party of China and the State Council Information Office.166 Produced by the Beijing 
Zhongshi Yayun company, China Radio International (Russian) and Russian Today 
television, three seasons of This is China aimed at promoting China's international 
image and Chinese culture. In 2017, This is China I was first broadcasted on CCTV, CGTV 
and Russian Today in Chinese, Russian and English. 167 During the launching ceremony, 
Chinese ambassador to Russia Li Hui stated that “ the Year of Media Exchange between 
China and Russia is a strategic decision made by the supreme leaders of the two 
countries based on the whole picture of the development of Sino-Russian relations, 
and it is continuously leading the further development of people-to-people exchange 
and cooperation between the two countries”. 168 By splitting the series into traditional 
and contemporary sections, This is China season I focuses on telling extraordinary 
Chinese stories that happened on the “old silk road” and the “new silk road”. It explains 
China’s contribution of the ancient silk road to the world and the potential influence 
of the contemporary Belt & Road Initiative on global society. It introduces China’s fast-
growing technology and “Made in China” stories, which reflect the dramatic 
development and remarkable progress that China has made in previous decades. On 
the other hand, it also displays the essence of traditional Chinese cultural elements 
such as Chinese opera, Chinese Kungfu, and Chinese carving to generate attraction 
toward Russian audiences.  
 
In July 2017, the Beijing Zhongshi Yayun company signed another agreement with the 
Russian Today company regarding cooperation in shooting This is China season II. 169As 
reported, season II would continue to focus on the presentation of traditional Chinese 
culture and the recent social development of China.170 In June 2018, the film crew 
started shooting in Beijing to explore the crafting process of making China’s diplomatic 
gifts, the sophisticated Chinese traditional handicraft production. 171  The giving of 
diplomatic gifts has a long history, with the gifts that are presented usually seen as a 
symbol of peace and the cultural image of the country. 
 
By looking at This is China, it can be seen that traditional Chinese culture and Chinese 
history have been adopted as the main resources in the implementation of media 
exchange with Russia. The combination of the ancient cultural resources and the 
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recent social reforms portrays China as a genuine global player within its increasing 
influence, not only economically and politically, but also culturally. More concretely, 
by presenting stories such as the ancient silk road, it corresponds with the concept of 
‘rejuvenation’: China is not being raised from nothing, it has a grand cultural heritage 
and splendid history from the past, with this cultural influence contributing to global 
civilization. In other words, the adoption of traditional Chinese culture echoes closely 
with the concept of rejuvenation by demonstrating a growing cultural self-confidence.  
 
To conclude, there is a very low level of practice in media exchange with Russia that 
corresponds with the Chinese Dream’s main subject of improving common people’s 
living standards. However, a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global 
player is clearly embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives 
through the demonstration of China’s recent economic development and political 
reform. More importantly, the adoption of traditional Chinese culture echoes closely 
with the concept of rejuvenation by demonstrating the growing cultural self-
confidence. 
 
 5.4 The manifestations of China’s Cultural diplomacy toward Russia--
Educational exchange 
 
This section explores the implementation of educational exchange between China and 
Russia and its relationship with the overarching political ideology of the Chinese Dream. 
It argues that within Xi’s first term of presidency, educational exchange with Russia 
had a particular interest in youth exchange and joint universities. The Chinese Dream 
rhetoric of benefiting other countries corresponds with the direct financial support for 
Russian students and joint universities. Traditional Chinese elements are often used as 
the key cultural resources for creating a favourable image of an unthreatening 
neighbour with a grand cultural heritage. 
 
5.4.1 An overview of Sino-Russian educational exchange  
 
The educational exchange between China and Russia is in line with China’s pursuit of 
soft power and plays an important role in China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia. As 
argued before, there has been a dramatic expansion of educational exchange between 
China and Russia led by the governments. The most significant cultural diplomacy 
initiative was the opening of the Russian Centres in China and the establishment of 
Confucius Institutes in Russia. “Since 2000, more than ten Russian Study Centres have 
been set up in China’s top-ranking universities such as Beijing Foreign Language 
University, Renmin University of China, Shanghai Foreign Language University, 
Heilongjiang University, and East China Normal University. The first Confucius Institute 
was opened in Moscow in 2008 and so far, there are 17 Confucius Institutes and 5 
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Confucius Classrooms in Russia”. 172  
 
Within Xi’s first term of presidency, education exchange with Russia focused primarily 
on the youth. In Xi’s 2013 speech at the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations he stated that, “the youth is the future of the country, the future of the world, 
it is also the future of the friendship between China and Russia”. He also stated that 
“in order to develop good relations between China and Russia, we need to face the 
future, cultivate the friendship between the young generations. Young people need to 
know about each other’s country's history and the present, learn each other’s 
language, and communicate with mind and soul”.173 During the visit, Xi and Putin 
jointly announced that both countries would hold Youth Friendly Exchange Years in 
2014 and 2015. 174  Numerous educational exchange activities such as language 
contest events, student art exchange exhibitions and performances, student 
exchanges and visits, youth summer camps, and youth entrepreneur exchange forums 
between the two countries have been carried out under the Youth Friendly Exchange 
Year framework across the country. More recently, during a visit to the All-Russian 
Children's Centre, Xi again called on the two countries' youths to enhance 
communication and mutual learning, in order to promote friendship between young 
generations.175  
 
Furthermore, opening joint universities has become a new trend in Sino-Russian 
education exchange within Xi’s presidency. The first Sino-Russian university MSU-BIT 
University was opened in Shenzhen, China in 2014 under the framework of a 
partnership between Lomonosov Moscow State University and Beijing Institute of 
Technology. Both countries signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing 
the university at a signing ceremony witnessed by Xi and Putin.176 As the Chinese 
Education counsellor to Russia noted, “this project should be a sign of the whole 
education exchanges between China and Russia…This is a cooperation with particular 
depth, which will lead education between China and Russia to reach a deeper 
understanding, so that both the education exchanges and cultural exchanges can move 
into a new step”.  177  
 
Approved by the Ministry of Education for its formal establishment in October 2016, 
the University is the first Sino-Foreign Cooperative University in China, which 
introduces the superior educational resources of the Russian Federation. The tenet is 
to promote culture, education, and science and technology cooperation between 
China and Russia. More concretely, as stated on their website, it is dedicating the need 
of developing a Sino-Russian strategic partnership. 178  MSU-BIT University has set up 
four bachelor’s degrees (Russian language and literature; Applied Mathematics and 
Computer Science; Chemistry, Physics and Mechanics of Materials; and Contemporary 
Russian Language and Culture) and three master’s degrees (Nanobiotechnology, 
Fundamental and Systemic Ecology). 179 In 2017, it recruited a total of 144 students, 
including 8 foreign students. It is worth pointing out that rather than following 
geographic preference, the location is not limited to the north-eastern part of China 
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but shifted to economically advanced regions. “A large Russian community has 
emerged in the developed southern provinces, which will eventually facilitate the 
recruitment of students and academic professionals in joint educational institutions”. 
180 
 
In 2017, after Li Keqiang’s regular meeting with Medvedev in Nov 2016, Weinan 
Moscow Institute of Arts (WNU) was agreed to be set up in Weinan with the 
cooperation of Moscow National Normal University and Weinan Normal University. 
Since it opened in 2017, three undergraduate programs in music, art and preschool 
education have been set up.181 49 full-time Chinese academic staff and 12 Russian staff 
were recruited, and 300 students were enrolled in the first academic year. 182 
Graduated bachelor students will also be offered more opportunities for master and 
Ph.D. studies at Moscow National Normal University. Likewise, rather than having 
geographic limitations or focusing on developed cities such as Beijing or Shanghai in 
China, joint universities like Weinan Moscow Institute of Arts could potentially benefit 
students and academic staff from less developed tier 4 or tier 5 cities by providing 
more opportunities to study or work in Russia to achieve a deeper educational 
exchange.   
 
According to official Chinese news, the total number of educational exchange students 
and visitors between China and Russia has reached more than 70,000, and both 
countries aim to increase this number to 100,000 by 2020. 183  The number of 
Mandarin learners in Russia has grown greatly in the past 10 years, from 17,000 in 
2007 to 56,000 in 2017, according to a survey of a regional research centre of 
linguistics in Russia. 184  In 2018, it was reported that the Chinese language would be 
chosen as one of the language subjects for national entrance exams. “The Russian 
Education Supervision Bureau was aiming to include Mandarin in the final exam for 
ninth-graders by 2018, and for 11th-graders in their college entrance exam by 2020”.185 
The establishment of joint universities and growing numbers of educational exchange 
activities have the potential to become the niche for deepening Sino-Russian 
educational exchanges and therefore of promoting China’s soft power toward the 
young Russian generation. 
 
In brief, educational exchange with Russia pays particular attention to youth exchange 
and joint universities. The establishment of joint universities and research centres has 
the potential to become the niche for deepening Sino-Russian educational exchange 
and therefore promoting China’s soft power toward Russian youth. 
 
 
5.4.2 Educational exchange and the Chinese Dream  
 
Given the particular attention that has been paid to the young Russian generation and 
the potential of educational exchange in promoting China’s soft power, it is worth 
considering how Xi’s Chinese Dream is reflected in the implementation of educational 
 112 
exchange toward Russia. It is also worth understanding what message China intends 
to deliver to Russia through educational exchange. Considering these two points will, 
therefore, allow for the exploration of the dynamic between the Chinese Dream and 
the practice of educational exchange toward Russia.  
 
First of all, attempts at creating an image of an economically powerful neighbor and 
the benefits this can provide can be traced to the Chinese government’s substantial 
increase in investment for supporting Russian students in educational exchange. 
Financial support for educational exchange consists of scholarships from cooperative 
projects between universities, joint universities, Confucius Institutes, research centres 
and government funds for Russian entrepreneurship and academic exchange. In a 
survey of Russian students in Chinese universities and sociology statistics analysis in 
2016, when asked about Russian students’ motivation to study in Chinese universities, 
the highest motivation (36.5%) was due to Chinese scholarship. This is an increase 
from 19.8% in 2006 where this recommendation ranked second among another 4 
reasons, such as friend or family recommendation (highest motivation with 24.7%), 
university reputation and location.186  
 
Take Confucius Institutes in 2019 as an example. Scholarship enrolment in institutes 
from 18 Chinese universities will provide 430 scholarships for one-year visiting 
international students, 290 for students who intend to do a bachelor’s degree in 
Chinese studies, and 105 for master students.187 Among them, 2 Russian Confucius 
Institutes’ linked universities: China Dalian Foreign Language University and Harbin 
Normal University. These universities have 60 scholarships for one-year visiting 
students, 40 scholarships for bachelor’s candidates and 35 for master candidates in 
Chinese studies, which could possibly provide more approachable access and 
convenience for those Russian students back at home. The scholarship provides a full 
coverage of tuition fees, accommodation fees, living allowance, and comprehensive 
medical insurance. This direct financial support to Russian students fundamentally 
corresponds with the Chinese Dream as Xi noted in his speech in Moscow, “the 
achievement of the Chinese Dream does not only benefit the Chinese people, but also 
benefits people from all over the world”.188  
 
Secondly, as in the case of Japan, traditional Chinese culture is used as the key resource 
echoing the advancement of China’s cultural confidence in the implementation of 
educational exchange toward Russia within the Chinese Dream period. A number of 
‘Chinese Dream’ themed student exchanges were held by Chinese universities and 
Confucius Institutes both in China and Russia189 to demonstrate Chinese confidence in 
its own culture, which echoes with the cultural rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream. 
For instance, sponsored by the head office of CI Hanban, the Chinese Bridge 
Competition is a large-scale international Chinese Proficiency contest and is well-
known in terms of cultural and educational exchanges worldwide. The contents of the 
competition include Chinese language proficiency, knowledge about China, Chinese 
cultural talents and comprehensive learning abilities.190  
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Elements of Chinese culture such as the Chinese language, Chinese history, Chinese 
calligraphy, Chinese painting, Chinese opera, Chinese tea ceremony, Chinese Wushu, 
Tai Chi, Chinese paper cutting, and Chinese folk music, are often used as the key 
cultural resources for highlighting Chinese cultural identity that corresponds with the 
Chinese Dream, therefore creating a favourable image of a country with a grand 
culture in the eyes of Russian students. More recently, it is reported that Chinese 
calligraphy and Chinese idioms will be added to the new edition of Russian students’ 
Chinese textbooks.191 Furthermore, it is often combined with the attempts of creating 
an image of an economically powerful neighbouring country of benefit. In the 2018 
"Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students, a 19 
years old Russian student stated in his speech that: “China and Russia are friendly 
neighbours. The bilateral economic and trade exchanges are increasingly close. The 
courier service in China is so fast, which always makes me euphoric. I would like to 
introduce China's fast courier service to Russia one day, as well as more good quality 
Chinese products”.192 This speech made him stand out in the final round and was 
eventually crowned the champion with high praise coming from the judges.   
 
However, unlike underscoring historical disputes in the case of Japan, the Chinese 
Dream that China would like to cultivate through educational exchange with Russia is 
that China is not just a powerful global player, but, more importantly, an unthreatening 
country whose peace-loving trait is deeply rooted in its culture. In Xi’s speech at 
Moscow National Institute of International Relations in 2013, he stated that “the 
Chinese nation cherishes peace. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful 
development, be committed to promoting the development of open, cooperative and 
win-win development… achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the 
greatest dream of the Chinese in modern times, which we have called the Chinese 
Dream…The development of China provides the world more opportunities rather than 
threats”. 193  The message that China is delivering to Russian audiences through 
education exchange is the portrayal of China as a powerful global player and a friendly 
neighbour.  
 
To conclude, China’s educational exchange toward Russia during Xi’s presidency 
features the cooperation with joint-universities and particular attention is placed on 
young generations. The Chinese Dream rhetoric of benefiting other countries 
corresponds with the direct financial support for Russian students and joint 
universities. Traditional Chinese elements are often used as the key cultural resources 
for creating a favourable image of an unthreatening neighbour with a grand cultural 
heritage. 
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5.5 The manifestations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia--
Cultural exchanges   
This section explores the recent development of China’s cultural exchange activities 
toward Russia and its correspondence with the Chinese Dream ideology by looking at 
the Culture Festival and the Tourism Exchange Year. It argues that cultural exchange in 
the Chinese Dream period has grown into an increasingly active environment, with a 
particular interest in tourism exchange. More importantly, corresponding to the 
Chinese Dream, the historical communist connection became another resource in 
China’s pursuit of soft power for generating a positive image of a friendly neighbouring 
country through cultural exchange toward Russia. 
 
5.5.1 The implementation of cultural exchanges between China and Russia: Culture 
Festival and Tourism Year  
 
The tradition of holding a China and Russia Culture Festival was started in the 1990s. 
Since China and Russia held National Years in 2006 and 2007, it has become a 
governmental routine for China and Russia to take it in turn to host the Culture Festival. 
So far, the Culture Festival has been held six times in each country with numerous 
cultural activities and events. Initiated by the Russian and Chinese Ministries of Culture, 
the festival aims to boost creative cooperation and cultural exchange between people 
of the two countries. It is one of the largest and most influential cultural exchange 
initiatives between the two countries.  
 
Art performance and exhibitions have always played a key role in the Culture Festival. 
In terms of the content of China’s Culture Festival in Russia, obviously traditional 
Chinese elements such as Wushu, Opera, Chinese folk music, folk dance, handicrafts, 
and acrobatics are the most popular and often presented through a variety of concerts, 
theatrical performances, shows, and exhibitions. In the 2010 Chinese Festival, China 
sent more than one hundred artists to Russia to attend the shows, performances and 
exhibitions. 194 Furthermore, it should also be noted that another activity called the 
"China-Russia Stage Art Dialogue” forum has been added to the Culture Festival since 
2011. As a result, the Festival was no longer limited to art performance or exhibition, 
it now provides an important direct platform for people-to-people cultural exchange 
and communication in the field of cultural exchange between China and Russia.  
 
Within Xi’s presidency, cultural diplomacy in the Chinese Dream period has grown into 
an increasingly active environment, which has resulted in a steady increase in cultural 
exchanges over the past decade. In 2012, the Chinese Culture Festival in Russia was 
held in 16 cities across 10 states and consisted of four programmes: performances, 
local “culture week” events, art exhibitions, and forums. There were 50 performances 
involving some 500 participants. 195 Art performances such as Chinese operas, 
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symphony, and art exhibitions were presented to Russian audiences. In addition, 
modern Chinese dance was also presented for the first time in Russia. Meanwhile, 
Chinese and Russian experts on theatre, ballet dance, and culture management also 
discussed cultural exchange projects regarding further cooperation in the field of art, 
music, sports and so on.196  
 
In 2013, Xi Jinping and Putin both attended the opening ceremony of the Tourism Year 
in Russia. Xi stated: "China and Russia are good neighbours, good partners and good 
friends. Good neighbourliness is the treasure of the nation”, and “hope that both 
countries could see Tourism Year as an opportunity to develop tourism cooperation 
into the new highlight of strategic cooperation between China and Russia”.197 As a 
result, nearly 400 cultural exchange events (236 organized by China and 160 by Russia) 
were carried out over the year. Between January and September 2013, the total 
number of tourist visits between China and Russia hit 2.37 million. Chinese tourists 
were the second most common in Russia, whilst Russian tourists were the third most 
common in China. 198 
 
The exchange events included a series of visiting tours, programme broadcastings, 
music performances. During 2013, China invited 155 Russian journalists and reporters 
on the "Beautiful China" visiting tour. During the tour, they visited 15 provinces 
(municipalities and autonomous regions) to conduct interviews and reports. Seaside 
resorts, spas, ecotourism destinations and other forms of tourism products that reflect 
Chinese daily life and the development of China's rapid modern urbanization 
achievements were introduced throughout the tour. 199  Representatives from 120 
Russian large and medium-sized tourism enterprises visited China to explore and 
discuss the Chinese tourism market, potential tourism resources, tourist routes and 
tourism cooperation. In addition, the fifth China-Russia youth sports meeting was held 
in Shanghai, with nearly 300 Russian and Chinese teenagers taking part in the event. 
Meanwhile, the "Hello China" tourism promotional videos were also being broadcast 
through radio, television, aero planes and other network media. 200 
 
In brief, cultural diplomacy in the Chinese Dream period has grown into an increasingly 
active environment and has resulted in a steady increase in cultural exchange over the 
past decade. Within Xi’s presidency, careful consideration has been put into Sino-
Russian tourism as a form of cultural exchange. 
 
5.5.2 China’s cultural diplomacy in cultural exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
The following paragraphs explore the correspondence of Sino-Russian cultural 
exchange activities with Xi’s Chinese Dream. It points out that promoting traditional 
Chinese culture continued to be the focus of Sino-Russian cultural exchange in the 
Chinese Dream era, echoing the growing cultural confidence of the rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation. More importantly, through cultural exchanges with Russia, and 
corresponding with the Chinese Dream, affinity with political values became another 
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resource in China’s pursuit of soft power for generating a positive image of a friendly 
neighbour. 
 
As Xi noted in one of his speeches in Russia, “the Chinese nation and the Russian 
nation both have a long history, ancient civilization, and splendid culture, they are both 
great nations. Our two great nations should be closer and friendlier, must be friends 
from generation to generation, and never be enemies. The Chinese Dream, the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is highly intertwined with Russia's goal of 
development”.201 By looking at the activities and the contents of Culture Festivals, it is 
not difficult to observe that promoting traditional Chinese culture continued to have 
been the focus of Sino-Russian cultural exchange in the Chinese Dream era. This 
promotion of traditional Chinese cultures echoes the growing confidence in culture 
and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that closely fits into China’s broad strategy 
for the pursuit of soft power.  
 
In the 2018 China Culture Festival, the Chinese Peking opera “Monkey King” was first 
performed at St. Petersburg Music Hall. As China Foreign Performance Company’s 
project manager Gao noted, “Opera is one of the art forms that can reflect the charm 
of Chinese traditional culture most. ‘Monkey King’ contains the rich background 
knowledge of Chinese culture, presents the comprehensive art of Peking Opera, and 
shapes the vivid image of each actor. It is beneficial to the promotion of the 
‘personification’ of Chinese culture, to ‘go out’ and form a long-lasting influence.”202 
Naturally, traditional Chinese culture has been seen as the symbol of Chinese identity 
and a key resource in generating Chinese influence through the implementation of 
cultural exchange toward Russian audiences.  
 
More importantly, the shared history of communism became a resource of China’s 
pursuit of soft power in correspondence with the Chinese Dream. As Wilson pointed 
out: “Both countries share a joint legacy of adherence to a Communist experience 
which significantly informs their behaviour and sense of national identity” (2015, 
p287). Since the launch of the first Tourism Year in 2013, the “Red Tour”, with its 
traditional focus on visiting historical socialist or communist landmarks, has become 
more and more popular between the two countries. In 2015, 22 tourism agencies from 
China and Russia agreed to conduct red tours during a tourism exchange program held 
in Hunan Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong. 203 A series of new policies have 
been made to facilitate and promote the Red Tour: more direct flight routes have been 
opened, more Red Tour tourism routes have been designed and developed in both 
countries, the tourism visa application process has also been simplified, promotions 
such as photography and painting exhibitions have also been held. 204  
 
China's red tourist landmarks, where its early communist activities began, are drawing 
a large number of Russian tourists, particularly those in Hunan Province, which 
currently has 140 such landmarks. “Hunan received 35,025 Russian tourists in 2016, 
up 31.66 percent year on year. The number of Russian tourists to Hunan grew 13.06 
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percent year on year to 14,523 in the first half of 2016.” 205 For Chinese tourists, such 
tours play a role in carefully crafting this ‘historical memory’ through this promotion 
of a positive, nationalistic ideology, which is encouraging and uplifting, and aims to 
instill a sense of hope and patriotism (Bowcher and Liang, 2014). However, for the case 
of cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange with Russia, such shared communist 
memories are used as the cultural resource for generating a positive image of an 
intimate neighbour.  
 
To conclude, promoting traditional Chinese culture continued to be the focus of Sino-
Russian cultural exchange in the Chinese Dream era, which echoes with the growing 
cultural confidence of China’s rejuvenation. More importantly, corresponding to the 
Chinese Dream, the historical communist connection became another resource in 
China’s pursuit of soft power for generating a positive image of a friendly neighbour 
toward Russia. 
 
5.6 The Chinese Dream, cultural diplomacy and soft power 
 
The last section concludes the chapter by clarifying the dynamic of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the Chinese Dream in promoting China’s soft power toward Russia. It 
argues that the implementation of cultural diplomacy toward Russia is intended to 
promote China’s soft power toward Russian people. Fundamentally, it is intended to 
facilitate the achievement of the Chinese Dream. Due to the lack of understanding and 
the cultural differences between the two countries, it remains to be seen whether the 
political elite’s long-cherished dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation can be 
achieved by promoting soft power toward Russia through the implementation of 
cultural diplomacy. 
 
In a meeting with Putin in Brazil, Xi highlighted that “cultural cooperation between 
China and Russia should shift from general friendly exchanges to the enhancement of 
both countries’ soft power, such as by opening joint schools and promoting the 
development of the cultural industry.” 206 Considerable attention has been paid to the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy in the pursuit of soft power toward 
Russia, particularly within Xi’s presidency. As a result, China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward Russia has embraced steady growth in terms of the size, volume, and variety 
during Xi’s presidency.   
 
In the realm of media, the volume and scope of Sino-Russian media exchange and 
cooperation have grown significantly during Xi’s presidency, particularly in the fields 
of film, TV, and the Internet. The attention paid by both governments to media 
exchange is reflected through a series of events, activities and programs implemented 
by both countries, such as the China and Russia Media Exchange Years, documentary 
series like This is China and Amazing China, the news application China-Russia 
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headlines, the translating project Classical, publishing translations of modern and 
contemporary literature in Chinese and Russian, and the plethora of available cultural 
products on the Internet. Despite a small amount of media exchange corresponding 
with the Chinese Dream, a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global 
player is clearly embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives by 
showing China’s recent economic development and political reform. More importantly, 
the adoption of traditional Chinese culture echoes closely with the concept of 
rejuvenation of demonstrating the growing cultural self-confidence. 
 
However, certain problems lie in the implementation of media exchange for promoting 
China’s soft power within the Chinese Dream guidance. First of all, the focus of media 
exchange insufficiently reflects the recent changes in contemporary Chinese society 
and the real lives of Chinese people, which is a fundamental part of the Chinese Dream 
narrative of improving common people’s living standards. For example, martial arts 
films seem to have been the dominant Chinese film type among Russian audiences. 
Among the 35 best Chinese films rated on Russia’s largest movie website 
(www.kinopoisk.ru) in 2017, 19 of them were based on the theme of Chinese martial 
arts or Kungfu. 25 of them were based on ancient or modern Chinese history (Song, 
2018). It indicates that apart from Chinese martial arts, the popularity of other types 
of Chinese films or TV series in Russia tends to be very low. Likewise, few TV series that 
are closely related to the context of contemporary China are available for Russian 
audiences, even on the official Chinese TV channel CGTN(Russian). 207  The majority of 
available Chinese TV series online are traditional Chinese costume dramas and fantasy 
dramas such as “Nirvana in Fire” "The Empress of China", “Prince of Lanling”, and 
“Female Prime Minister”. These TV series do not reflect the recent changes in 
contemporary Chinese society and the real lives of Chinese people within the Chinese 
Dream context.  Furthermore, it is also worth pointing out that contrary to claims by 
the Chinese media, documentaries such as This is China and Amazing China were not 
broadcasted on mainstream TV channels in Russia such as Channel One, Russia-1 and 
NTV. Despite the claim that This is China hit a total of 100 million views between its 
release in March 2017 and January 2018, online viewing had a fairly poor performance. 
By following the search link to CGTN (Russian) YouTube channel when typing in Это 
китай (This is China) on Yandex, we can find a striking contrast compared to the TV 
report: the six episodes on average had less than 2,000 views, despite being published 
over a year ago. The most viewed episode with more than 5,000 views was about the 
Chinese martial art Wushu. 208 
 
In the realm of educational exchange, particular attention has been paid to youth 
exchange and joint universities during Xi’s presidency. Numerous educational 
exchange activities such as language contests, student art exchange exhibitions and 
performances, student exchanges and visits, youth summer camps, and youth 
entrepreneur exchange forums between the two countries have been carried out 
under the framework of the Youth Friendly Exchange Year across the country. The 
establishment of joint universities such as MSU-BIT University and Weinan Moscow 
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Institute of Arts could also potentially become the niche for deepening Sino-Russian 
educational exchange and therefore promoting China’s soft power toward Russia’s 
younger generation. The Chinese Dream rhetoric of benefiting other countries 
corresponds with China’s direct financial support for Russian students and joint 
universities. Traditional Chinese elements are often used as the key cultural resources 
for creating a favourable image of an unthreatening neighbour with a grand cultural 
heritage. 
However, since English has evolved as a global language in teaching and academic 
communication, neither Russian nor Chinese are the first choice for their second 
language in either country. A much larger amount of academic teaching, research, 
exchange, and collaboration was conducted in English or with English-speaking 
countries such as the US (Hayhoe, 2009). Joint education projects are often challenged 
with the issue of language and communication. “Because of the objective difficulty of 
both Russian and Chinese, it is extremely hard for the majority of people to learn these 
languages for professional purposes” (Smirnova, 2017). Furthermore, when asked 
about Russian students’ motivation to study in Chinese universities in 2016, the 
highest motivation was because of Chinese scholarship (36.5%). Ironically, the 
motivation for joining a university based on reputation had dropped to 12.3%, 
compared to 14.8% ten years ago (A and K and Ren, 2017). 209  According to Nye, soft 
power is attraction and persuasion rather than payment or coercion (Nye, 2004), 
therefore whether wielding hard power through financial support could generate soft 
power in the eyes of Russia remains unknown. 
In the realm of cultural exchange, promoting traditional Chinese culture continued to 
be the focus of Sino-Russian cultural exchange in the Chinese Dream era, echoing 
growing cultural confidence in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the pursuit of 
soft power. Traditional elements of Chinese culture were often used as the key 
resource in cultural exchange activities and events aimed at featuring Chinese cultural 
identity and the Chinese Dream ideology. Furthermore, the Red Tour tourism, based 
on the historical communist connection between the two countries, became another 
resource of China’s cultural diplomacy that corresponds with the overarching Chinese 
Dream ideology. For the case of cultural diplomacy toward Russia, such shared 
communist memories are used as the resource of cultural diplomacy that generates a 
positive image of an intimate neighbouring country.  
However, it should be noted that cultural resources like high-class culture or political 
connection only target specific groups of people. If the original intention of the 
Chinese Dream was to improve the lives of common people and benefit Russian 
common people, if China’s cultural diplomacy is meant to target the public majority of 
Russia, the utilization of such cultural resources in the implementation of cultural 
diplomacy seems to be insufficient for the pursuit of soft power. Noticeably, it has 
indicated that there is insufficient understanding of China’s contemporary culture and 
social situation in Russia, especially among the public. In Dec 2018, the China-Russia 
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Headline and Russian company Ipanel conducted the “Sino-Russian Relations Public 
Opinion Survey”. The survey’s results showed that there is an evident asymmetrical 
phenomenon in terms of communication between people from the two countries.210 
Not many Russian people are aware or familiar with the enormous changes in China’s 
foreign policies, political values, social situations, and people’s lifestyles in the 21st 
century. “When it comes to Chinese culture, Russian people immediately think of 
Chinese Kung Fu and Jackie Chan, Chinese tea and silk and so on, most of the Russian 
people don't really know Chinese culture” (Yang, 2017, p.187).  
As Nye argued, culture, political values and foreign policy are the three pillars of soft 
power (Nye, 2004). Although China and Russia share mutual political interests and 
might find more similarities in political values due to the shared communist history, 
the lack of understanding and cultural differences could possibly bring about suspicion 
and threats. “Unlike the heyday of the Sino–Soviet alliance, the two countries do not 
seek to spread a coherent alternative ideological blueprint. Nor do they share a 
cultural heritage”. 211  “Russians are, despite their proud and independent culture, 
mainly European – Russian art, culture, literature, and religion are solidly within the 
European family, respected and admired for their contributions to Europe as a 
whole.”212 Also, given the growing imbalance of economic development, whether the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation could be able to generate real attraction or 
persuasion through the implementation of cultural diplomacy remains unclear. When 
the relationship is riddled with competition and distrust, it remains to be known 
whether “Beijing can continue to manage Russian sensitivities given the continuing 
rapid growth of Chinese influence in Central Asia” (Li and Pho, 2019, p.26). As the 
author Yuri Tavrovsky noted: “China's rising international influence intrigued China’s 
neighbouring country Russia to know more about China. It is necessary to introduce Xi 
Jinping to Russian people, to let them better understand what has been happening in 
China, and more clearly perceive the direction of the development of China and the 
world”. 213 Since there is a lack of understanding and cultural differences between the 
two countries, it remains to be seen whether the political elite’s long-cherished dream 
of rejuvenating the Chinese nation can be achieved by promoting soft power toward 
Russia through the implementation of cultural diplomacy. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia via media, education and 
cultural exchange highly corresponds with the Chinese Dream rhetoric. In the realm of 
media, despite the limited number of media exchange corresponding with the Chinese 
Dream, a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global player is clearly 
embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives, demonstrating 
China’s recent economic development and political reform. The adoption of traditional 
Chinese culture echoes closely with the concept of rejuvenation by demonstrating 
growing cultural self-confidence. In the realm of educational exchange, the Chinese 
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Dream rhetoric of benefiting other countries corresponds with China’s direct financial 
support for Russian students and joint universities. Traditional Chinese elements are 
often used as the key cultural resources for creating a favourable image of an 
unthreatening neighbour with a grand cultural heritage. In the realm of cultural 
exchange, it argues that cultural exchanges with Russia in the Chinese Dream period 
have increased steadily, with a particular interest in tourism exchange. Traditional 
Chinese culture has been seen as the symbol of Chinese identity and a key resource in 
generating Chinese influence through the implementation of cultural exchange toward 
Russian audiences. More importantly, corresponding with the Chinese Dream, the 
historical communist connection was used as the key resource in order to generate a 
positive and friendly image of China through cultural exchange. By pointing out the 
limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Russia in the framework of Nye’s soft 
power theory, it argues whether it contributes to China’s soft power toward Russia still 
remains unknown. 
Chapter 6: China’s cultural diplomacy toward the United 
States 
Introduction 
Arguably, the development of Sino-American relations is significant for world 
prosperity and global security in the 21st century. China is one of the oldest civilizations, 
with more than five thousand years of history, while the United States is the youngest 
hegemon, with less than three hundred years of history. Beginning with an overview 
of Sino-American cultural relations, this chapter explores China’s cultural diplomacy 
toward the United States. The overview will cover media, education, and cultural 
exchanges, as well as its correspondence with the overarching guiding ideology of the 
Chinese Dream.  
 
The first section looks into the art of the existing study of China-United States soft 
power and cultural diplomacy. The second section explores their cultural relations and 
the contemporary development of the PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward the United 
States, in particular within Xi’s presidency. The next three sections analyse the 
manifestations of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the U.S. and its correspondence 
with the Chinese Dream. The last section concludes the chapter by pointing out the 
limits of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the U.S. in the context of soft power theory. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing an updated systematic 
analysis of China’s implementation of cultural diplomacy within the Chinese Dream 
period to enhance its soft power toward the United States.  
 
In the realm of media, there have been significant attempts to rebrand China as a 
powerful and responsible global player, with a growing confidence in both hard and 
soft power. In education, traditional Chinese culture is often used as the key resource 
for echoing the advancement of China’s cultural confidence and is featured in a 
number of ‘Chinese Dream’ themed exchange activities, albeit providing little 
resistance to the challenges from the United States. However, cultural exchanges with 
the United States are presented through a complicated narrative of modern economic 
success and traditional cultural heritage. Overall, this analysis of China’s cultural 
diplomacy practices in the U.S. suggests that there is a high level of correspondence 
between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy and the Chinese Dream paradigm 
in promoting a favourable image toward the U.S., featuring with new trends and 
distinctive characteristics in the realm of media, education and cultural exchange. 
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6.1 Sino-American cultural diplomacy: State of the art of existing 
literature 
 
This section looks into existing studies of China- U.S. soft power and cultural diplomacy. 
It argues that little work has provided a systematic analysis of China’s implementation 
of cultural diplomacy toward the U.S., in particular under the framework of soft power 
within Xi’s Chinese Dream era. By looking at the implementation of cultural diplomacy 
within the Chinese Dream context, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by 
providing a more updated and systematic analysis of China’s effort to enhance its soft 
power toward the United States.    
 
After Nye’s first mention of soft power in the context of the U.S. in the 1990s, the 
majority of literature focused on American soft power and cultural/public diplomacy 
toward China in the 20th century. However, since the start of the 21st century, China’s 
soft power has drawn increased attention from scholars, researchers, and thinktank 
institutes (Callahan, 2008; Steinfeld, 2010). Existing literature regarding the study of 
China’s soft power has paid much attention to the question of whether China’s soft 
power ambition would create a challenge to the U.S. or not. Many scholars anticipate 
competition between China and the United States over their competing soft power 
(Wang, 2008, p.267). Nye himself noted that China's soft power still has a long way to 
go compared to the United States, pointing out the lack of non-governmental 
organizations and the attractiveness of cultural industries and universities (Nye, 2005). 
In the CSIS report on Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States, it 
concluded that China has leveraged soft power in developing regions such as Africa, 
South America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It suggested that China has not 
sought to replace or supplant the United States in its role of security provider, 
therefore viewing Chinese successes or failures in the developing world through a 
zero-sum framework is not an effective way for the United States to shape its policy 
(CSIS, 2009).  
 
Existing studies also go beyond the literature on China’s broad use of soft power 
toward the U.S. and focus on specific case studies of Chinese cultural diplomacy 
toward the U.S., such as Confucius Institutes, art exchanges and Chinese films in 
America. For example, in a NAS report on Confucius Institutes and soft power in 
American higher education, it was argued that Confucius Institutes tend to present 
China in a positive light and focus on anodyne aspects of Chinese culture to develop a 
generation of American students with selective knowledge of a major country 
(Peterson, 2017, p10). Hartig also argues that, “CIs largely remain state-centric which 
limits its influence to shape China’s image and project its soft power” (Hartig, 2014, 
p.331). Some researchers have pointed out that Hollywood films seem to speak louder 
about Chinese soft power than China’s own films or China-led productions (Peng, 
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2017). However, little work has provided a systematic analysis of China’s 
implementation of cultural diplomacy toward the U.S., in particular under the 
framework of soft power within Xi’s Chinese Dream era.  
 
This chapter aims to explore China’s implementation of cultural diplomacy toward the 
United States by looking at media, education and cultural exchanges, as well as its 
correspondence with the Chinese Dream in China’s pursuit of soft power. It contributes 
to the existing literature by providing an updated and holistic analysis of China’s efforts 
to enhance its soft power toward the United States through cultural diplomacy within 
Xi’s presidency. More importantly, rather than simply observing China’s overall use of 
soft power, summarizing the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy toward 
the United States allows us to see the similarities and differences between China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward three different case study countries. Therefore, it allows us 
to understand more deeply the new trends of China’s pursuit of soft power within the 
Chinese Dream era.  
6.2 The background of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the United 
States 
 
The following section explores China-United States’ cultural relations throughout the 
period from the early 19th century to the end of the pacific war. In addition, it will give 
an overview of the contemporary PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward the U.S. from 1949 
to present Chinese leadership. It argues that the United States had played a leading 
role in Sino-American cultural exchange from the early 18th century to the end of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, featuring an imbalance of American cultural export. Since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1978, China’s 
cultural exchange activities with the United States have increased remarkably. 
However, China’s cultural diplomacy toward the United States is likely to encounter 
serious challenges due to U.S. President Trump’s foreign policy in restricting the 
cooperation of cultural exchange between the two countries.     
 
6.2.1. Cultural relations between China and the United States 
 
The history of Sino-American cultural relations can be traced back to when the United 
States first gained independence. Since 1783 there have been American businessmen, 
sailors and adventurers, coming to China for trade and exploration. In 1830, the first 
American missionary, Elijah Coleman Bridgman, arrived in Guangzhou. Since then, 
American missionaries have played an important role in China-United States cultural 
exchange. Along with Christianity, American missionaries also brought modern science 
and technology, medical systems, educational institutions, and charity services to 
China. Schools and institutes were set up for Chinese students, and programs were set 
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up to fund Chinese students in American schools and universities. Between Bridgman’s 
arrival in 1830 and the last missionary, John Leighton Stuart, leaving in 1949, 
thousands of American missionaries came to China as an essential medium for cultural 
exchange between the two countries. Their engagement in education, medical 
systems, and publishing directly contributed to the early cultural exchange between 
China and the United States (Ping, 2018, p.1-p.209). 
 
Arguably the most famous and influential cultural exchange program was the Boxer 
Indemnity scholarship214, set up to allow Chinese students to study in America in 1909. 
As a result, universities teaching in both Chinese and English were set up in China with 
the support of the Qing government and American missionaries. The curriculum varied, 
including topics such as English, mathematics, biology, geography, chemistry, 
astronomy and western medicine. Furthermore, a group of Chinese students were 
funded to study in American schools and universities, with top universities like Harvard 
and Yale began offering scholarships to Chinese students (Malone,1926, p.64). 
Therefore, a number of young Chinese intellectuals received western education were 
educated both in China and America within the two decades since 1909 (Meng, 1931; 
Li, 2018). Some outstanding students who went back to China after studying, including 
Nobel laureate Yang Zhenning and Hu Shih, a key contributor to Chinese liberalism and 
language reform, have played a significant role in serving the socialist construction of 
the P.R.C. in the fields of industry, agriculture, education, and politics.215 
 
Furthermore, books and publishing were also focal points of Sino-American cultural 
exchange. The spread of Newspapers such as The Chinese Repository, Wan Kwoh Kung 
Pao, and The Canton News provided large amounts of information about Chinese 
current affairs, reforms and foreign policies, as well as American religions, politics, 
science and technology. During the Second Sino-Japanese war, the newspaper 
Millard's Review (1917-1922), founded by American resident Millard, actively 
participated in appealing for international support for China against the Japanese 
invasion (Zhang, 2001). Numerous books and journals in natural science, social science, 
and western medicine were translated into Chinese to educate the new generation of 
Chinese intellectuals and broaden Chinese people’s outlook.  
 
In 1941, the establishment of the U.S. Division of Culture Relation’s branch in Beijing 
marked a new period of Sino-American cultural exchanges throughout the pacific 
wartime. American textbooks, films, and scientific research instruments were donated 
to the Chinese by different American institutes, organizations, and societies under the 
approval of the State Council. A number of American journalists and reporters visited 
China and recorded a large amount of valuable first-hand materials of the Second Sino-
Japanese War (Liu, 1988, p.2). In 1943, China’s National Capital Library approved the 
request from Washington to allow the Library of Congress to make microfilm copies of 
2720 books, which were shipped to the U.S. in 1941 due to the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (Zhang, 2001, p.11). Between 1942 and 1945, several groups of American experts 
were dispatched to China to offer assistance in such areas as education, 
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telecommunication, agriculture, engineering, and public welfare (Xu, 2001, p.459).  
 
It is worth pointing out that Sino-American cultural exchange before the Second Sino-
Japanese War was more focused on a one-way cultural export, which was led by the 
United States. It is during the war period that Sino-American cultural exchange 
gradually became a two-way communication under the governance of the Kuomintang 
government. In 1943, the Kuomintang government sent 10 professors from National 
University and another 74 well-known Chinese scholars to visit and lecture in the 
United States. Two years later, 200 technicians were sponsored by the government to 
get technical trainings in different fields. However, due to China’s internal political 
instability and foreign military interference in the war, American’s cultural diplomacy 
toward China was far more active and powerful than China’s toward the United States. 
Sino-American cultural relations featured an imbalance, with the United States playing 
a leading role in cultural exports. 
 
To conclude, the United States played a leading role in Sino-American cultural 
exchange from the early 19th century to the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
Both the Qing and Kuomintang governments made efforts to support cultural 
diplomacy activities in order to promote cultural exchange between the two countries. 
However, Sino-American cultural relations featured an imbalance, with the United 
States in the lead in terms of cultural exports. 
   
6.2.2. An overview of the PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward the United State 
 
After Kuomintang’s defeat in the 1949 Chinese civil war, cultural exchange once again 
stagnated for nearly 30 years between the two countries due to the derecognition of 
the United States of the CCP’s legitimacy in China. In 1972, American President Richard 
Nixon's visit to the P.R.C was seen as a momentous diplomatic approach in the 
recovery of China-United States relations after years of diplomatic isolation. 
Accordingly, the cultural exchange between the two countries became increasingly 
more common. Between 1972 and 1979, approximately 10,000 Chinese citizens in 
academia went to study in the United States (Fei, 1989, p.23). In 1972, the Chinese 
People's Association for Friendship with the United States was established in Los 
Angeles. In 1978, the U.S. Information Agency and the Ministry of Education of P.R.C 
also signed the memorandum of understanding the exchange of students and scholars 
(National Research Council, 1986, pp.233-235). Academic exchange, particularly 
scientific exchange between the two countries, has largely boosted the process of 
establishing Sino-American diplomatic relations once again.   
 
The diplomatic relationship that had terminated 30 years prior had been retied and 
reopened the way for a great expansion in cultural exchange. A number of 
businessmen, artists, students, experts, and scholars were involved in various cultural 
exchange activities. Institutes, organizations, and joint programmes were set up and 
rapidly expanded, particularly in China. Between 1978 and 1985, the Chinese 
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government sent about 10,000 students to study in the United States (Zhang, 2001, 
p.231). In 1989, there were approximately 70 American studies institutes in China 
(Zhang, 2001, p.231). After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protest, the deterioration of 
Sino-American relations once again resulted in the implementation of China’s cultural 
diplomacy slowing down. Cultural exchange between the two countries resumed 6 
months later after numerous bilateral negotiations.  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a significant change has taken place within the 
Sino-American relationship, leading to China achieving remarkable economic growth 
and moving its eyes toward the pursuit of soft power. Government-led cultural 
exchange activities with the United States have begun to gradually increase. In 2000, 
China's State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Culture successfully held 
the "2000 Chinese culture’s American trip" event; In 2005, the "Chinese Culture 
Festival" was first launched in the United States; In December 2008, China's Ministry 
of Culture and the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities jointly held the first 
“China-United States cultural forum”, which acts as a platform for cultural and 
academic dialogue between the two countries; In 2010, the "Chinese Culture Week" 
opening ceremony was held in California State University, Long Beach (CSULB).216  
 
Furthermore, China has also learnt from America’s advanced management mechanism 
and operation mode to promote its cultural system of reform. Cooperation between 
the two countries has been strengthened to continue promoting Chinese culture 
products "going out". Well-known American companies such as Disney, DreamWorks, 
and Universal Entertainment have started to cooperate with their Chinese 
counterparts (Yang,2019, p.71). Chinese enterprises also acted more actively in the 
film entertainment industry and media communication. The TianChuang company 
acquired the majority stake of the White House Theatre in 2009; the Wanda group 
merged AMC Entertainment, which has allowed Chinese films to screen within the top 
cinemas in the United States. (Yang,2019, p.77).      
 
In 2013, Xi proposed establishing a ‘new type of great power relations’ on his visit to 
the United States. Since then, China has been proactively striving to establish ‘a 
favourable international environment for China’s national rejuvenation’ (Yan, 2014, 
p.154). Within his presidency, China’s cultural exchange with the U.S. continues to 
expand in the fields of media, education, science, technology, and sports. In 2015, 
China’s Ministry of Education launched the ‘Bai Qian Wan’ student exchange program: 
from 2016 to 2020, China would invite 100 American young elites, and 1000 
outstanding American college students to study in China; 1000 Chinese Ph.D. students 
would be supported in doing their research in the U.S.217 In 2016, the Sino-American 
High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange218 formed a plan with a series 
of detailed cultural exchange activities and initiatives in education, technology, culture, 
healthcare, youth, sports, and women’s issues. 219  To date, 2019, there were 105 
Confucius Institutes and 501 Confucius Classes in the United States, which is far more 
than in other countries.220  
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However, there have been dramatic ups and downs between the two countries since 
Donald Trump’s administration started in 2017. In the first year of Trump’s presidency, 
Sino-American relations experienced a stable period, despite the attitude toward 
China that Trump indicated in his election speeches. Accordingly, China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward the United States has achieved productive results. In September 
2017, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong and the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
co-chaired the first China U.S. Social and Cultural Dialogue, which was launched by 
Trump and Xi 5 months ago at Mar-a-Lago. 221 According to the plan made through this 
dialogue, both sides would continue to deepen the cooperation within seven areas – 
education, social development, science and technology, health, arts and culture, and 
environment and conservation. In November 2017, Trump and his wife officially visited 
Beijing and received a warm welcome from Xi and his wife Peng.222   
 
A turning point started from the proposal of the U.S. national security strategy report 
in Dec 2017, followed by the U.S. National Defense strategy report at the beginning of 
2018. In both reports, China was defined as America's strategic rival, from whom the 
United States will face primary challenges in the future.223 On March 24, 2018, the 
memorandum “Section 301" marked the beginning of the China-United States trade 
war. 224 In 2018, the United States imposed a 10% tariff on $200bn worth of Chinese 
products, including fish, handbags, clothing and footwear.225More importantly, it also 
included cultural products such as Chinese art and antiques, along with paintings, 
drawings, and pastels. In brief, China’s cultural diplomacy will probably suffer an 
unprecedented impact due to the China-U.S. trade war. The foundation of a long-term 
healthy and stable development of Sino-American relations for cultural exchange is 
likely to encounter unprecedented challenges in the next few years.     
6.3 The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward the United States—
Media exchange 
This section explores the manifestation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the United 
States in the realm of media exchange. It argues that the past ten years has seen a 
dramatic expansion of Chinese media to enhance its communications and develop its 
influence in the United States, particularly in the fields of television, film and the 
internet. It argues that the growing confidence in the Chinese Dream has been clearly 
delivered to American audiences: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation not only in its 
hard power, but also in soft power. Moreover, China has been making an effort in order 
to change American perceptions of China through media, in particular within Xi’s 
Chinese Dream era: China is not just a powerful player in the world economy, it is also 
a responsible player who cannot challenge U.S. hegemony on the global stage. 
 
 
6.3.1 An overview of China’s cultural diplomacy in media exchange 
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Media exchange has become a key element of China’s cultural diplomacy in the 21st 
century. Unsurprisingly, the United States is the primary market for the reach of 
China’s media. The past ten years have seen a dramatic expansion of Chinese media 
to enhance its communications and develop its influence in the United States, 
particularly in the fields of television, film, and the Internet.  
 
Founded in 2009, the China Network Corporation (CNC) plays an important role in 
China’s attempt to show an international vision with a Chinese perspective. In the 
same year, China Daily also launched a Boston edition and is available in eight other 
markets in the United States, including New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. 
(Dale, Cohen and Smith, 2012, p.6). China Daily also publishes the China Watch, a 
weekly supplement distributed through the Washington Post, The New York Times, 
and The Wall Street Journal in the United States (Creemers, 2015, p.301). In 2011, 
Xinhua News Agency also moved into new, high-profile headquarters in New York. 
(Creemers, 2015, p.301). In 2016, CGTN America began broadcasting in the United 
States, replacing the former English language CCTV America. It provides breaking news, 
award-winning in-depth reporting and analysis in English – and from a Chinese 
perspective – to viewers in the United States, China, and more than 100 countries and 
regions around the world. Its online live TV and radio are also available 24/7 through 
phone, pc and TV. 226  
 
In the past decade, China’s film industry has entered into an unprecedented "golden 
age", with a predominant success in the domestic market. According to Deloitte’s 
China film industry report, “by 2020, China's box office is expected to reach RMB200 
billion and will exceed North America as the world's largest market in box office 
revenue and audience numbers” (Deloitte Global, 2017, p.2). Since 2016, the top-
grossing Chinese films all earned more than $500 million: The Mermaid (2016, $507m), 
Wolf Warrior 2 (2017, $849m), Operation Red Sea (2018, $545m), and The Wandering 
Earth (2019, $660m).227 
 
For decades, American film production companies have dominated the global film 
market with numerous successful Hollywood blockbusters, earning 35 percent of their 
revenue from foreign markets. Hollywood has done an exceptional job of spreading 
American culture and values around the globe. China has also taken its first steps 
toward entering into the American film market, particularly with Kung Fu films, which 
have become a major genre of transnational co-production. Chinese martial arts 
movies have experienced success in the U.S. from the beginning of the 21st century, 
most notably is Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon which remains the highest-earning 
foreign-language film ($128 million). Hero (2002) and Fearless (2006) – both of which 
starred Jet Li – each grossed tens of millions of dollars and remain the 3rd and 7th 
highest-grossing foreign-language films in the U.S. (China Power, 2019). In 2000, China 
released just 91 films. That number jumped to 798 in 2017, more than the 740 features 
released in North America (China Power, 2019). Culturally, all these movies use 
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Chinese martial arts as their biggest selling point, featuring dazzling, skillful fighting 
scenes. They also highlight traditional Chinese cultural values, like brotherhood, family 
ties, personal perseverance, and loyalty. The fundamental strategy that these films 
employ is to draw on traditional Chinese culture and historical resources while 
incorporating Hollywood techniques (Su, 2014). 
 
Chinese enterprises have also become more active in the film entertainment industry 
and media communication, which has enhanced the connection between Sino-
American media exchange. For example, since its acquisition of AMC Entertainment 
Holdings Inc. (AMC), Wanda Group, a Chinese real estate and entertainment giant, has 
become the largest cinema chain operator in the world. More importantly, this 
acquisition has also allowed Chinese films to be screened within the top cinemas in 
the United States. (Yang, 2019, p.71). Wanda also acquired US-based production 
company Legendary Entertainment in 2016 for $3.5 billion. Moreover, the number of 
co-productions has steadily risen since 2014. The Meg, a 2018 thriller that follows a 
group of scientists who encounter a giant shark, was co-produced by Warner Bros. and 
China Media Capital’s Gravity Pictures. The picture earned $527.8 million worldwide, 
making it the all-time highest-grossing co-production between the US and China 
(China Power, 2019). 
 
In brief, with China’s rising economy, the past ten years has seen a dramatic expansion 
of Chinese media, enhancing its communications and developing its influence in the 
United States, particularly in the fields of television, film and the internet.  
 
6.3.2 Media exchange and the Chinese Dream  
 
In Xi’s congratulatory letter to the opening ceremony of CGTN in 2016, he addressed 
China’s need to understand the world more and the world’s need to understand China 
more. Corresponding with the Chinese Dream, Xi emphasized that CGTV should be 
confident in Chinese culture, tell the Chinese stories well, spread the Chinese voice 
well, and let the world know a colourful China. It should represent a good image of 
China as the world's peacebuilder, global development contributor, and international 
order defender. 228 In Kai’s brief comparison between the Chinese Dream and the 
American Dream, he argued that the Chinese Dream emphasizes a collective effort 
from all Chinese people in gradually achieving China’s yearning for a “great 
rejuvenation” in the 21st century (Kai, 2015). He stated that the American Dream 
stresses the spirit of freedom and social mobility, while the Chinese Dream (although 
it incorporates individual dreams) pinpoints unity and stability (Kai, 2015). Interestingly, 
when a country with more than 5000 years of civilization meets the world’s youngest 
yet most powerful country, when the collective Chinese Dream meets the individual 
American Dream, we might wonder how China aims to be perceived by the U.S. in 
order to enhance its soft power; what kind of cultural resources have been mobilised 
through media exchange with the U.S., and how the key ideas of the Chinese Dream 
have been reflected in a series of initiatives and activities toward American audiences 
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in the fields of film, TV, and internet.  
 
Noticeably, a new trend of the Chinese film industry has shown the growing Chinese 
confidence in correspondence with the Chinese Dream. In 2017, Wolf Warrior 2 
grossed more than $874 million and broke the all-time Chinese box office record, 
followed by Operation Red Sea, which was 2018’s highest-grossing movie in China and 
ninth in the world, according to Beijing-based film research firm EntGroup (Nie, 2018). 
These two films are part of a national trend seen in the last three years of 
strengthening China’s soft power by promoting patriotic films. For example, Wolf 
Warrior 2 tells the story of a former special forces soldier who stumbles into an African 
war zone and rescues Chinese citizens from Western mercenaries. 229  Rather than 
simply highlighting traditional Chinese culture or martial arts, by demonstrating 
China’s successful operations overseas, a key message has been delivered: China is no 
longer a weak and poor country; the Chinese will act in the best interests of defending 
its citizens both at home and abroad. Although the film only made approximately $2.3 
million in North America, it is a “clear and undiluted expression of the China Dream 
that is now openly canvassed in Chinese politics.” 230  
 
More recently, it is also worth looking at the Chinese sci-fi film Wandering Earth. 
Released on Chinese Lunar New Year day in 2019, Wandering Earth became the first 
Chinese sci-fi blockbuster set in space. It tells the story of our planet, doomed by the 
expanding Sun, being moved across space to a safer place.231 Produced by the Beijing 
Jingxi Culture & Tourism Company and the state-owned China Film Group Corp, it was 
mainly filmed in the new Oriental Movie Metropolis, an $8 billion studio built by the 
Chinese Wanda Group. It had a limited release in the United States, later being bought 
by Netflix. Noticeably, the release coincides with China achieving a milestone in space: 
the landing of a probe on the far side of the moon in January 2019. Although decades 
behind Russia and the United States, China has now put astronauts in orbit and has 
ambitious plans to join — or even lead — a new age of space exploration (NewYork 
Times, Myers, 2019). Being broadcasted in America, this promotion of patriotic 
Chinese films clearly demonstrates growing confidence in the Chinese Dream by 
American audiences: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation not only in its hard power 
like military or space technology, but also in soft power through Chinese films, media, 
and other relevant cultural industries.  
 
Furthermore, although the Wandering Earth takes for granted China’s central role in 
future space exploration, it also has a vision of the international collaboration 
necessary to cope with the threats facing the planet (NewYork Times, Myers, 2019), 
which precisely corresponds with Xi’s core state-governing theory of the Chinese 
Dream and the Community of Common Destiny. On Xi’s first meeting with American 
President Barack Obama in 2013, Xi noted that the purpose of the Chinese dream is to 
achieve national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and the people's happiness. It is a 
dream about peace, development, cooperation, and win-win. It communicates with 
the beautiful dreams of people all over the world, including the American Dream. 
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232Along with the Chinese Dream, Xi also advocates for the Community of Common 
Destiny, which describes a world defined by cooperation.  
 
During Xi’s 2015 speech in Seattle, he stated that, “at present, all economies are facing 
difficulties, and our economy is also under downward pressure, but this is only a 
problem in the course of progress. We will take coordinated steps to achieve stable 
growth.” In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during this 
same visit to America, President Xi stated that China planned to set up a permanent 
United Nations peacekeeping force of 8,000 troops and provide $100 million to the 
African Union to create an immediate response unit capable of responding to 
emergencies.233 All this amounted to an effort to respond to calls from the United 
States and others in the West that, as the world’s second-largest economy, China 
needed to shoulder more responsibilities at the United Nations. 234 This is exactly how 
China has been using world media to change American’s perception of China, 
particularly within Xi’s Chinese Dream era: China is not just a powerful economic player, 
it is also a responsible player on the global stage.  
 
However, Xi’s Chinese Dream toward the United States showed little intention of 
competing with the world superpower to become the next hegemon. Despite the 
controversial debate, Xi insisted that China is still the world's largest developing 
country. In 2015, Xi delivered a speech during a welcome banquet hosted jointly by 
the Washington State government and friendly communities in the United States. In 
that speech, he pointed out that “China’s per capita GDP is only two thirds that of the 
global average and one-seventh that of the United States, ranking around people living 
under the poverty line. If measured by the World Bank standard, the number would 
be more than 200 million. Over 70 million citizens live on basic living allowances, and 
the number of people with disabilities exceeds 85 million”.235 He explained the two 
centenary goals and stated that “to anyone charged with the governance of China, 
their primary mission is to focus all the resources on improving people's living standard 
and gradually achieve common prosperity”. 236 Echoing with the Chinese Dream, he 
highlighted that the priority for the CCP is to continue developing and improving 
Chinese people’s living standards.  
 
To conclude, by looking at the manifestation of China’s cultural diplomacy in the realm 
of media, it is argued that growing confidence in the Chinese Dream has been clearly 
delivered to American audiences: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is evidenced 
not only in its hard power but also in soft power. Moreover, China has been making an 
effort to change American perceptions of China through the media, particularly within 
Xi’s Chinese Dream era: China is not just a powerful player in the world economy, it is 
also a responsible player who is not able to challenge U.S. hegemony on the global 
stage.  
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6.4 The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward the United States—
Educational exchange 
 
This section looks into the realm of educational exchange in the practice of China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward the United States and its correspondence with the Chinese 
Dream. It argues that within Xi’s presidency, China’s educational exchange with the 
United States has seen a rapid growth in the number of exchange students, educational 
exchange projects and Confucius Institutes, featuring with a particular focus on seeking 
for premier quality of joint venture university collaborations. Traditional Chinese 
culture is often used as the key resource for echoing the advancement of China’s 
cultural confidence, which is done through a number of ‘the Chinese Dream’ themed 
exchanges, similar to those done with Japan and Russia. Unlike the underlying 
historical disputes in the case of Japan or highlighting an unthreatening partnership in 
the case of Russia, China’s cultural diplomacy on educational exchange tends to be 
passive and quiet, especially when it confronts challenging voices from the United 
States. 
 
 
6.4.1 An overview of China’s cultural diplomacy in educational exchange  
 
Since the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship was first launched in 1909, education exchange 
has played an essential role in Sino-American cultural relations, as well as China’s 
cultural diplomacy toward the United States. Within Xi’s presidency, China’s 
educational exchange with the United States has seen a rapid growth in the number 
of exchange students, educational exchange projects and Confucius Institutes, and 
features with a particular focus on seeking a premier quality of joint venture university 
collaborations. 
 
Over the course of the last century, the U.S. has maintained its leading position for 
attracting international students from all over the world, while China has become its 
largest single source of international students. The number of students in each other’s 
country has both increased in the past decade, particularly with regard to Chinese 
students in America. According to Statista, between 2012 and 2018 the number of 
college and university students from China in the United States increased dramatically 
from 235,597 to 363,341. The figure for the 2017-2018 academic year is more than 4 
times that of the 2007-2008 academic year. 237 In the academic year 2012-2013, over 
14,000 American students studied in mainland China. This figure increased to 23,838 
by 2016.238 Furthermore, a series of educational projects were also carried out by both 
governments. In 2015, the China-US Young Maker Competition was launched by the 
Ministry of Education of the PRC to promote the China-United States youth 
commutation and exchange.239 In 2015, China’s Ministry of Education launched the 
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‘Bai Qian Wan’ student exchange program: from 2016 to 2020, China would invite 100 
American young elites, and 1000 outstanding American college students to study in 
China; 1000 Chinese Ph.D. students would be supported while doing their research in 
the United States.240 Between 2009 and 2016, the China-U.S. High-Level Consultation 
on People-to-People Exchange241 carried out a series of detailed cultural exchange 
activities and initiatives in education, technology, culture, healthcare, youth, sports, 
and women’s issues between the two countries.242  
 
Like their counterparts across the world, Confucius Institutes in the United States aim 
to promote Chinese language education and cross-cultural understanding through 
teaching the Chinese language and Chinese culture while carrying out a number of 
activities and programs, such as speeches, exhibitions, language competitions, 
summer camps and art performances. Since the first Confucius Institute in the United 
States was established at the University of Maryland in 2006, there have been already 
105 Confucius Institutes and 501 Confucius Classes in the United States, which is far 
more than in other countries.243 The growing number of US Institutes and Classrooms 
led the Hanban to opening The Confucius Institute U.S. Center in 2013 in Washington, 
D.C. 244  
 
Different from Russia, the joint university program between China and English-
speaking countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom started much 
earlier and have had much more experience in educational cooperation and exchanges. 
In 2006, Xi (working as the Secretary of CPC Zhejiang Province) visited Kean University 
in New Jersey and delivered a keynote speech in the Signing Ceremony of cooperation 
in establishing Wenzhou-Kean University. 245  Five years later, the University was 
established and made its goal as “striving for excellence in building an international 
university with world-class education”. 246 Within Xi’s presidency, the focus of joint 
universities was to create world-class high-quality cooperative education by delivering 
the highest quality undergraduate and graduate education, rather than focusing on 
the quantity.  
 
In 2012, NYU Shanghai was founded by New York University and East China Normal 
University with the support of the city of Shanghai and the district of Pudong. As 
China’s first Sino-US research university, it “seeks to cultivate globally-minded 
graduates through innovative teaching, world-class research, and a commitment to 
public service.”247 The faculty of renowned scholars, innovators, and educators are 
recruited from the world’s best research universities. It also offers a variety of master’s 
and Ph.D. degree programs in disciplines and fields important to contemporary society. 
English is the language of instruction on campus, though international students are 
required to study and achieve proficiency in Mandarin Chinese. The university also 
regularly provides opportunities for cross-cultural communication and cooperation 
both in the classroom and through diverse extra-curricular activities. 
 
In 2014, Duke Kunshan University welcomed its first group of students, initially offering 
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graduate degrees and semester-long programs for undergraduate students enrolled at 
Duke and other universities. In 2018, Duke Kunshan welcomed its inaugural 
undergraduate class, a four-year bachelor’s degree program that is based in the liberal 
arts and sciences departments.248 As partnership universities from both sides, Wuhan 
University and Duke University both enjoyed a world-class reputation in the 
international education system. As a premier Sino-US joint-venture university, the 
mission for Duke Kunshan University is to embrace the integration of global, national, 
and local traditions of thought and experience and promote cross-cultural 
understanding and cross-border collaborations. 249  
 
Educational exchange has been noticeably affected due to the increasingly fierce 
tension between China and the United States. It was reported that China’s trade war 
with the US drove Chinese students to the United Kingdom. EIC Education, a Chinese 
consultancy company, found that the UK has become the most sought-after 
destination for Chinese students, with 20 percent of respondents to its survey picking 
the UK as their first choice, compared with 17 per cent favouring the US.250 Even 
visiting Chinese scholars in the United States are encountering a less friendly 
environment (Yao, 2018). However, it is still too early to know what further 
consequences this prolonged China-U.S. trade war will have on educational exchange 
between the two countries. 
 
6.4.2 Educational exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
In 2015, during one of Xi’s speeches in Seattle, he stated that “the more frequent 
communication between the Chinese and American people, the more solid friendship 
we will develop, and the more prosperous, pragmatic cooperation will happen 
between the two countries.” 251  More recently, during a meeting with Harvard 
University President Larry Bacow, Xi expressed the hope that Sino-U.S. cultural and 
people-to-people exchanges could produce more positive results. He stated that: 
“China is committed to promoting the modernization of education. We will expand the 
opening up of education, strengthen exchanges and experiences sharing with 
countries around the world, and jointly promote the development of education…We 
would like to carry out more extensive exchanges and cooperation with U.S. 
educational and research institutions such as Harvard University.”252 
 
Millions of dollars have been spent on education exchange projects by the Chinese 
government in both China and the United States. Certainly, it would be naive to think 
that such a big investment merely stems from pure generosity. As Jin, a professor from 
Peking University stated: “when they (American students) return to the United States 
after the study, it will not only enhance the young generation of American people’s 
understanding about China, but also influence the understanding of the older 
generation about China, this kind of benign influence, will have a positive effect to 
mutual trust between China and the United States”.253 More concretely, educational 
exchange is an essential part of China’s cultural diplomacy that has been used as a tool 
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to cultivate a particular perception from the American people. Therefore, it is worth 
asking what particular image China intends to cultivate toward Americans in order to 
create attraction, what kind of resources have the Chinese government used in the 
practice of educational exchange, how it corresponds with the Chinese Dream, and 
what are the similarities and differences compared to Japan and Russia. 
 
Unsurprisingly, as it is in the cases of Japan and Russia, traditional Chinese culture is 
often used as the key resource resonating through the advancement of China’s cultural 
confidence in the implementation of educational exchange toward the United States. 
The Chinese language, Chinese history, Chinese calligraphy, Chinese painting, Chinese 
opera, Chinese tea ceremony, Chinese Wushu, Tai Chi, Chinese paper cutting, and 
Chinese folk music are often used as the key cultural resources that correspond with 
the Chinese Dream and highlight cultural identity, projecting a favourable image of a 
country with a grand culture on to American audiences. Specific events and activities 
have been organized by the government and organizations for not only American 
students, but also for researchers, scholars and relevant officials. For instance, in 2018 
HanBan organized a trip to China for principles that work for schools that have set up 
Chinese courses that promote Chinese language and cultural teaching in their schools, 
with a reimbursement for all costs in China. 
  
Furthermore, a number of ‘the Chinese Dream’ themed exchange activities have been 
held by Chinese universities and Confucius Institutes to correspond with the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream. For example, a documentary called "An American 
lady’s Chinese Dream" was presented at a local event organized by the Confucius 
Institute at Portland State University in 2014. It told the story of an American lady who 
decided to sell most of her assets in the United States at the age of 82 and moved to 
a small village in China to help local schools and students. Her action was highly praised 
and closely linked with the Chinese Dream as “she dedicated the rest of her life to 
achieving the Chinese Dream of making a better living standard life for common 
people”.254 
 
However, unlike underscoring historical disputes in the case of Japan, or highlighting 
an unthreatening and friendly partnership in the case of Russia, China’s cultural 
diplomacy on educational exchange tends to be passive and quiet especially when it 
confronts challenging voices from the United States. It often chooses to remain silent 
to avoid sensitive political topics while highlighting other positive factors such as 
elements of traditional culture in order to maintain a positive image of China. Take 
Confucius Institutes in the United States as an example. CIs are often accused of 
lacking intellectual freedom and transparency in developed countries, particularly in 
the United States and other western democratic countries (Hartig, 2014; Hubbert, 
2014; Hughes,2014). Sahlins described CIs as academic malware that functions as 
propaganda branches of the Chinese government, stating that the CIs are a threat to 
the principles of academic freedom and integrity at the foundation of our system of 
higher education (Sahlins, 2015; Sahlins, 2018).   
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Interestingly, little voices or practices from CIs have effectively responded to 
challenges from the United States. The University of Chicago closed its Institute in 2014 
after 100 professors signed a petition calling on the Council of the University Senate 
to vote on terminating the university’s contract with Hanban.255  Nevertheless, no 
relevant information about it has been mentioned either on the website of the 
Confucius Institute in Chicago or the Hanban website. A similar silent response was 
made when Pennsylvania State University announced its closure of CI as well. It was 
reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC responded that “Confucius 
Institutes provide support and help such as teaching materials, which is based on the 
voluntary application from the United States.  It never forces, nor may pose a threat 
to academic freedom and integrity” on Chinese media.256Nevertheless, the fact is that 
little information was reported by the Chinese mainstream media in English, such as 
through Xinhua News or the China Daily.  
 
According to Reuters, the University of North Florida has become “the latest U.S. 
college to [close its Confucius Institute] amid criticism from U.S. legislators that China 
used the institute to influence American higher education in 2018”.257 More recently, 
“the latest National Defense Authorization Act, which the U.S. passed in August of last 
year, stipulates that the Ministry of Defense shall not provide funds for Chinese 
programs of American universities that open Confucius Institutes unless the school 
submits and obtains relevant exemptions. As a result, several universities including the 
University of Rhode Island announced that they will close their Confucius 
Institutes”.258 Regarding all of these challenges, neither the Hanban nor the Chinese 
government has made any clear announcement through either Chinese or English 
media.   
 
In a survey conducted by the National Association of Scholars, none of the 12 
Confucius Institutes they examined publicly would willing to disclose its contract with 
the Hanban, its budget, or its funding arrangements (Peterson, 2017, pp.18-19). The 
Confucius Institute of the University at Albany was locked and dark when NAS visited 
(Peterson, 2017). When Chinese teachers and directors were asked what they would 
say to a student who asked about Tiananmen Square, several replied that they would 
talk about the Square’s historic architecture (Peterson, 2017, p.18). It argued that 
Confucius Institutes “have grown into a central node of US-Chinese academic 
exchanges, making it increasingly difficult for universities to withdraw from Confucius 
Institutes without jeopardizing other financial relationships” (Peterson, 2017, p.20). 
However, no official announcement has been made by the Hanban stating that there 
would be a financial cut for CIs in the United States.  
 
To conclude, traditional Chinese culture is often used as the key resource 
corresponding with growing cultural confidence in the implementation of China’s 
educational exchange toward the United States, which is similar to the practice toward 
Japan and Russia. Furthermore, a number of ‘the Chinese Dream’ themed exchange 
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activities were regularly held by Chinese universities and Confucius Institutes to 
correspond with the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream. Unlike the underscoring 
historical disputes in the case of Japan or highlighting an unthreatening and friendly 
partnership in the case of Russia, China’s cultural diplomacy and educational 
exchanges with the United States tend to be passive and quiet, especially when 
confronted by challenging voices from the United States. 
6.5 The manifestation of cultural diplomacy toward the United States—
Cultural exchange 
 
This section provides an overview of China’s cultural diplomacy in the realm of cultural 
exchange with the United States and explores its correspondence with the Chinese 
Dream in the context of soft power. It argues that substantial governmental efforts 
were made by Xi and Obama to boost the expansion of cultural exchange between the 
two countries in various fields. However, due to the rocky relationship between the two 
countries since the Trump administration’s repressive policies toward China were 
enacted, cultural exchanges between the two countries are facing an increasingly 
unfriendly environment. It argues that a more complicated narrative of China’s modern 
economic success mixed with its long history and traditional cultural heritage has been 
presented throughout the implementation of China’s cultural exchange toward the 
United States. 
 
 
6.5.1 An overview of China’s cultural diplomacy in cultural exchange  
 
As the two largest economies in the world, the number and the depth of cultural 
exchanges between China and the U.S. is second to no other country in the 21st century. 
It reaches a large variety of fields such as art, music, sports, tourism, museums and 
intangible cultural heritage, traditional handicraft, food culture, women and children, 
professional exchanges and so on. The activities vary from short-term cultural 
exchange programs to long-term training and internship programs, from summer work 
and travel programs to cultural exchange forums. Although the bulk of cultural 
exchange expansion has taken place through nongovernment organizations, private 
actors and individuals, both governments have made substantial efforts on creating 
opportunities to encourage more people to get engaged in the practice of cultural 
exchange. In one of Xi’s speeches, while visiting the U.S., Xi said that: “I pay close 
attention to cultural exchanges between China and the United States. ‘family get closer 
through communication; friends get closer through exchange’. Each province and state 
conducting cooperation and exchange should do so in various fields, such as education, 
tourism, sports, youth exchanges, and help support people and each sector of society 
to communicate more frequently”.259  
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In November 2014, during President Obama’s visit to China, the two countries reached 
a reciprocal visa policy, which extends tourist business class visas from one year to ten 
years, and student and exchange visas from one year to five years. This agreement 
massively facilitated the complicated visa procedures and made it more affordable for 
a larger group of people, especially Chinese citizens. Both countries’ citizens who 
regularly travel back and forth benefit from the longer validity by not having to apply 
and pay the application fee every year. Businesses in both countries, particularly those 
involved with the tourism industry, benefit from increased travel, investment, and 
business development opportunities between the two countries. Longer visa validity 
allows students and exchange visitors to return to their home countries during school 
and work holidays more easily. 260 Since 2014, tourist, student, and visitor visas have 
no longer been an obstacle to cultural exchange between the two countries. 
 
A year later, Presidents Xi and Obama announced an agreement for each country to 
participate in a year of tourism cooperation. On the opening ceremony, Xi stated that: 
“China and the United States both have a splendid culture, beautiful scenery, the 
people both have a strong desire to deepen understanding and enhance friendship. I 
hope Tourism Year will offer an opportunity to expand personnel exchanges, 
strengthen cultural communication and cultivate a more solid public opinion and social 
basis for the development of a China-United States relationship”. 261  Under the 
framework of China-U.S. Tourism Year" in 2016, more than 80 events were completed 
during the year. These include the February opening ceremony in Beijing;  the ‘1,000 
American Tourists Travelling to the Great Wall’ event; the China-U.S. Tourism 
Leadership Summit; "Beautiful China: Maritime Silk Road" themed tourism promotion 
activities; and the closing event held in Washington, D.C. 262  Chinese tourists 
contributed $30.1 billion to the United States in 2015, positioning China as the United 
States’ top spending market abroad in terms of travel and tourism exports. According 
to the October 2016 National Travel and Tourism Office Forecast for International 
Travelers, more than 5 million Chinese travelers are expected to visit the United States 
by 2021 – which would make Chinese tourists the top overseas visitation market 
(Craighead, 2016).  
 
However, due to the rocky relationship between the two countries since the Trump 
administration’s repressive policies toward China were enacted, cultural exchanges 
between the two countries are facing an increasingly unfriendly environment. For 
example, it is reported that travel from China to the U.S. fell by 5.7% to 2.9 million 
visitors in 2018, according to the National Travel and Tourism Office, which collects 
data from U.S. Customs forms.263 On  China’s National Day in 2018, usually known as 
the golden holiday week, there was a dramatic 42% decrease in flight bookings from 
China to the US according to travel fare search engine Skyscanner (McCarthy, 2019). It 
was the first time since 2003 that Chinese travel to the U.S. dropped from the prior 
year. However, as with other practices of cultural diplomacy, it is still too early to know 
the full impact that this will have on cultural exchange between the two countries. 
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6.5.2 Cultural exchange and the Chinese Dream 
 
Neither government denies the importance of cultural exchange in developing a 
healthy and stable relationship between China and the United States. At the opening 
ceremony of a Sino-American cultural exchange event in 2017, Chinese Vice Premier 
Liu Yandong noted that: “In the face of ongoing changes, strengthening people-to-
people exchanges was vital to the sound and stable development of bilateral relations. 
It was now incumbent on both sides to implement the consensus reached by President 
Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, raising people-to-people exchanges and 
cooperation to a new level, to lay a firm social foundation for the development of 
bilateral relations”.264 The U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson also said that the close US-
China people-to-people exchanges in recent years had been fruitful and expressed that 
the United States was willing to expand exchanges and cooperation with China in 
various social and cultural areas that are significant to US-China ties. 265 
 
However, several questions are raised, such as what is the new trend of China’s cultural 
exchange with the United States within Xi’s presidency? What kind of cultural resource 
has been adopted in the implantation of cultural exchange toward the U.S.? How does 
it correspond with the contemporary overarching ideational guidance of the Chinese 
Dream? It argues that ever since cultural exchange between China and the U.S. has 
become more in-depth across several fields, China’s cultural diplomacy toward the U.S. 
went far beyond merely promoting particular elements of traditional Chinese culture, 
in order to cater to American audiences’ taste. A more complicated narrative of China’s 
modern economic success is mixed with its long history and traditional cultural 
heritage in correspondence with the Chinese Dream and presented to American 
people throughout the implementation of China’s cultural exchange toward the United 
States. 
 
Unsurprisingly, traditional Chinese culture has always been mobilised as a key cultural 
resource in the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the U.S., 
particularly those elements which have already generated attraction among American 
people. Films involving Chinese cultural elements such as Kung-Fu, Tai-Chi and other 
Chinese martial arts, which featured renowned celebrities such as Bruce Lee and 
Jackie Chan, used to be the key selling points of Chinese cultural products aimed 
toward American audiences (Li, 2001). However, nowadays such elements are often 
presented in a way that mixes with narratives of contemporary China in 
correspondence with the Chinese Dream. For example, in September 2017, China's 
State General Administration of Sports and the International Wushu Federation 
launched an event called "Harmony, Health, and Sharing" for promoting Chinese 
martial arts, with the popular Chinese martial arts star Jet Li being invited as a chief 
guest.266 This went beyond the pure presentation of the art itself, it also presented 
American people with the healthy lifestyle of contemporary Chinese society: since 
Chinese people’s living standards have improved considerably, nowadays people are 
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looking for a better, healthier, and happier lifestyle. 
 
Over the past few years, a variety of cultural exchange activities such as art 
performances, exhibitions, and competitions have presented a wide range of Chinese 
artworks, including paintings, handicrafts, ceramics, archaeological artefacts, craft 
objects, and calligraphy to the American people. Although the content still focuses 
primarily on traditional Chinese cultural heritage, the way these traditional Chinese 
elements are presented is no longer limited to traditional Chinese cultural symbols. A 
deeper understanding of Chinese culture intertwined with China’s modernization 
success can be found throughout China’s practice of cultural exchange with the United 
States. For instance, as one of the key projects of the First China-US Social and People-
to-People Dialogue in 2017, the “Innovation Chinese Culture Festival” launched a 
series of activities and events in New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. 267 Events such as 
the Modern Sky Music Festival, the Chinese Film Tour, and the Chinese Contemporary 
Art Exhibition demonstrated the recent achievement of the development of the 
Chinese culture and art, which offered American people a new approach to 
understanding the rapidly developing contemporary China. Such events and activities 
often portray the profound Chinese history and culture together with China’s 
contemporary new image.  
 
To conclude, a more complicated narrative of China’s modern economic success is 
mixed with its long history and traditional cultural heritage in correspondence with 
the Chinese Dream and presented to American people throughout the 
implementation of China’s cultural exchange toward the United States. 
6.6 The Chinese Dream, cultural diplomacy and soft power 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1978, 
China’s cultural exchange activities with the United States have increased remarkably. 
Despite the fact that cultural exchange between the two countries remaining relatively 
active since Xi’s presidency, China’s cultural diplomacy toward the United States is 
likely to encounter serious challenges due to Trump’s repressive foreign policy toward 
China.  
 
The past ten years have seen a dramatic expansion of Chinese media to enhance its 
communications and develop its influence in the United States, particularly in the 
fields of television, film and the internet. By looking at the manifestation of China’s 
cultural diplomacy in the media, we can see that growing confidence in the Chinese 
Dream has been clearly delivered to American audiences: the rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation not only in its hard power, but also in its soft power. Furthermore, 
China has been making an effort to change American perceptions of China through 
media, particularly within Xi’s Chinese Dream era: China is not just a powerful player 
in the world economy, it is also a responsible player who cannot challenge U.S. 
hegemony on the global stage. 
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However, it should be noted that certain problems lie in China’s implementation of 
media exchange for cultural diplomacy. For example, despite Wolf Warrior 2 grossing 
millions of dollars in revenue, most of it was generated domestically. The director of 
Wandering Earth Guo pointed out that, “there is at least a 10 to 15 year gap in film 
visual effect technology between China and the United States, it might be 25 to 30 
years when it comes to film production”268. When considering the top-20 grossing 
Chinese features since 2005, less than 1 percent of their total revenue came from 
overseas. Over the same period, American blockbusters earned 35 percent of their 
revenue from foreign markets. This trend is especially significant when considering 
that many of the highest-grossing movies in the world are either produced or co-
produced by American studios.269  Obstacles to China’s cultural diplomacy through 
media exchange also came from the recipient’s side. In September 2016, 18 members 
of the US Congress, including the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, 
penned a letter to the US Government Accountability Office highlighting their 
“growing concerns about China’s efforts to censor topics and exert propaganda 
controls on American media.” Members of the U.S. House of Representatives also 
urged the government to take action against Chinese investments in Hollywood. A 
variety of factors failed to reflect an optimistic environment for China’s cultural 
diplomacy to generate attraction through media exchange.     
 
Within Xi’s presidency, China’s educational exchange with the United States 
experienced rapid growth in the number of exchange students, educational exchange 
projects and Confucius Institutes, and had a particular focus on seeking premier 
quality China-U.S. joint universities. Traditional Chinese culture is often used as the key 
resource corresponding with the growing cultural confidence through a number of 
‘the Chinese Dream’ themed exchange activities to correspond with the Chinese 
Dream, which is similar to Japan and Russia. However, unlike underscoring historical 
disputes in the case of Japan or highlighting an unthreatening and friendly partnership 
in the case of Russia, China’s use of educational exchange for cultural diplomacy tends 
to be passive and quiet, as little defense has been mounted when facing challenges 
from the United States. Furthermore, substantial governmental efforts have been 
made by Xi and Obama to boost the expansion of cultural exchange between the two 
countries in various fields. It argues that a more complicated narrative of modern 
China’s economic success mixed with its long history and traditional cultural heritage 
in correspondence with the Chinese Dream has been presented to American people 
throughout the implementation of China’s cultural exchange toward the United States.  
 
Despite all of these efforts for cultural diplomacy, China is still suffering a severe deficit 
of soft power compared to the United States. According to Portland’s global ranking of 
soft power (2018), China’s soft power was listed 27th among 30 sample countries, 
while the United States was 4th. Davide Shambaugh (2013) also pointed out that, 
although the Chinese government and Chinese companies are actively engaged in a 
large and growing number of cultural activities abroad, these activities have had little 
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influence on global cultural trends. Fundamentally, the U.S. government currently 
views China as a major competitor who has the intention of shaping a world 
antithetical to U.S. values and interests (The White House, 2017). China has undergone 
many reforms in areas such as anti-corruption and developed progressively since Xi 
took power. However, China’s authoritarian regime, which has been consolidated by 
Xi through extending the presidency period from 10 years to an unlimited period, is 
often perceived as less attractive to America’s liberal democratic political system, even 
“as a potential threat to the liberal international order” (Portland, 2018, p25). Together 
with other issues such as human rights, Taiwanese independence, the South China Sea 
disputes and China-Tibet tension, different political values and clashing national 
interests have become the key obstacles and constantly undermine the development 
of the China-United States relationship, which also makes it very difficult to generate 
attraction in the eyes of American. Within Trump’s presidency, China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward the United States is likely to encounter more serious challenges in 
its pursuit of soft power. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter argued that there was a high level of correspondence 
between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy toward the United States and the 
foundational ideas of the Chinese Dream paradigm. This correspondence promoted a 
favourable image in the eye of American people and features new trends and 
distinctive features in the realm of media, education and cultural exchange. In the 
realm of media, there have been significant attempts to rebrand China as a powerful 
and responsible global player, with a growing confidence in both hard and soft power. 
In education, traditional Chinese culture was often used as the key resource for 
echoing China’s growing cultural confidence within a number of ‘Chinese Dream’ 
themed exchange activities, albeit providing little resistance to the challenges from 
the United States. However, cultural exchanges with the United States were presented 
through a complicated narrative of modern economic success and traditional cultural 
heritage. Overall, this analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy practices in the U.S. 
suggested that there was a high level of correspondence between China’s 
contemporary cultural diplomacy and the Chinese Dream paradigm in promoting a 
favourable image toward the U.S., featured with new trends and distinctive features 
in the realm of media, education and cultural exchange. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Summary of the thesis 
 
This thesis provided an engagement with literature on soft power through a study of 
Chinese practices of cultural diplomacy. It specifically has sought to explore the 
correspondence between overarching ideological guidance of the Chinese Dream and 
practices of cultural diplomacy toward the case study countries Japan, Russia, and the 
United States. A central focus was on the extent to which contemporary practices 
reflected the recently articulated ‘Chinese Dream’, and points of similarity and 
difference in operationalization through the case study relationships. The thesis 
contributed to the literature on soft power by extending ongoing attempts to add 
analytic precision to the concept. In addition to positioning cultural diplomacy as a 
significant area of soft power politics, a three-dimensional framework was developed, 
focusing on media, educational exchange, and cultural exchange as important aspects 
of cultural diplomacy. By offering three country case studies of Chinese practices of 
cultural diplomacy, the thesis overall demonstrated that there was significant 
correspondence between practices and overarching Chinese Dream ideology, but with 
significant between-country difference.  
 
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the debates within the literature on soft power 
and cultural diplomacy and the overall theoretical/empirical contributions of the 
thesis. From Nye’s work, it situated ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ as important 
mechanisms through which cultural diplomacy builds soft power.  It argued that 
cultural diplomacy refers to a broad set of practices that overlap substantially with 
working understandings of soft power, which represents an example of states’ 
attempts to cultivate soft power. Accordingly, it introduced a three-dimensional 
analytic framework of cultural diplomacy to analyse the mechanism of soft power, 
which allowed for a holistic and structured analysis within a field where the focus of 
much literature was either under-defined or somewhat narrow. The case study 
developed a comparative review of Chinese cultural diplomacy with three significant 
global and regional powers, namely Japan, Russia, and the United States. This 
comparison specifically sought to explore the correspondence between contemporary 
practices by focusing on three pillars of China’s cultural diplomacy (education, cultural 
exchange, and media), and the 'Chinese Dream' framework that purportedly guides 
foreign policy action.  
Chapter 2 chapter traced the rise and development of China’s cultural diplomacy from 
ancient times to the beginning of the 21st century. It provided the background 
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information by exploring the mainstream classical schools of Chinese political thought 
and China’s early cultural exchanges in ancient times, as well as China’s cultural 
diplomacy since the establishment of the PRC. It argued that Chinese traditional 
philosophy and early cultural exchange activities had a substantive influence on 
guiding contemporary policy-making processes in Chinese cultural diplomacy. More 
importantly, it provided China with a vast range of cultural and historical resources 
that were often mobilized in the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy. Overall, China’s 
cultural diplomacy, featured a top-down administrative structure with various 
branches and offices undertaking different responsibilities, has been used as a key tool 
in China’s foreign policy within the CCP regime.  
 
Drawing upon historical analysis and discourse analysis, Chapter 3 identified the key 
ideology guidance of the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural diplomacy within Xi’s 
presidency. It contributed to the existing literature by providing a historical perceptive 
for the cultural background of the Chinese Dream and a clarification of the relationship 
between the Chinese Dream and cultural diplomacy within Xi’s presidency. It argued 
that by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, the Chinese Dream demonstrated that there was 
a process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening based on the understanding of 
Chinese history and Chinese culture: it aimed to not only continually build on this 
cultural legacy, but to remind the rest of the world of China’s prosperity in ancient 
times and its ambition to achieve the great rejuvenation in the modern era. 
Furthermore, it argued that an abundance of Chinese traditional cultural resources 
that convey Chinese values, norms and beliefs have been implemented into Xi’s 
cultural diplomacy in order to generate a positive image of China. Overall, the Chinese 
Dream acted as an ideational strategy orienting China’s cultural diplomacy, with the 
main purpose of cultural diplomacy being to create a stable, peaceful, and favourable 
international environment to propel the achievement of the ‘great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation’.   
 
Beginning with an overview of Sino-Japanese cultural relations, Chapter 4 explored the 
implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan through media, 
educational, and cultural exchanges, and its correspondence with the overarching 
guiding ideology the Chinese Dream. Focusing on the most updated research data, it 
contributed to the existing literature by linking China’s cultural diplomacy and the 
Chinese Dream in the context of. This analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy practices 
in Japan suggested that in the realm of media, there have been significant attempts to 
rebrand China as an economically strong and culturally attractive country through 
projecting visions of Chinese citizens’ and corporations’ successes, albeit in a manner 
that commonly acknowledges the presence of social and political tension. In the realm 
of education, attempts at convincing Japanese youth to accept the Chinese narrative 
regarding historical disputes have been made despite strong political interference 
being the main obstacle. In the realm of cultural exchange, there have been various 
activities aiming to cultivate a favourable, friendly, and strong image of China toward 
Japan, along with some uncertainties of political dissent. Overall, there was a high level 
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of correspondence between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy in Japan and the 
foundational ideas of the Chinese Dream paradigm.  
 
Beginning with an overview of Sino-Russian cultural relations, Chapter 5 explored the 
case of Russia. Rather than assessing or comparing China’s soft power with Russia’s 
approach, it contributed to the existing literature by taking a different track to identify 
the most updated implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy during the Chinese 
Dream through the lens of soft power theory. In the realm of media, it argued that 
despite the low number of media exchanges corresponding with the Chinese Dream, 
a strong message of presenting China as a genuine global player through 
demonstrating China’s recent economic development and political reform was clearly 
embedded within certain media exchange activities and initiatives. Moreover, by 
demonstrating a growing cultural self-confidence, the adoption of traditional Chinese 
culture echoed closely with the concept of rejuvenation. In the realm of educational 
exchange, traditional Chinese elements were often used as the key cultural resources 
to create a favorable image of an unthreatening neighbour with a grand cultural 
heritage. In the realm of cultural exchange, China’s exchanges with Russia aimed at 
presenting China as a positive and friendly neighbouring country through the 
mobilization of traditional Chinese culture and the memory of a shared communist 
history.  
 
Beginning with an overview of Sino-American cultural relations, the last chapter 
explored the case of the United States. It contributed to existing literature by providing 
an updated and systematic analysis of China’s efforts to enhance its soft power toward 
the United States through the implementation of cultural diplomacy within the 
Chinese Dream period. In the realm of media, it argued that substantial effort has been 
made to rebrand China as a powerful and responsible global player with a growing 
confidence in both hard and soft power. In the realm of education, traditional Chinese 
culture was often used as the key resource echoing with the advancement of China’s 
cultural confidence with a number of ‘the Chinese Dream’ themed exchange activities, 
however providing little resistance to challenges from the United States. In the realm 
of cultural exchange, a more complicated narrative of modern China’s economic 
success mixed with traditional cultural heritage has been presented throughout the 
implementation of China’s cultural exchange toward the United States. Overall, this 
analysis of China’s cultural diplomacy practices in the U.S. suggested that there was a 
high level of correspondence between China’s contemporary cultural diplomacy and 
the Chinese Dream paradigm in promoting a favorable image toward the U.S., 
featuring with new trends and distinctive features in the realms of media, education 
and cultural exchange. 
 
Broadly speaking, China’s cultural diplomacy has dramatically expanded through a 
series of media, education and cultural exchange practices since the beginning of the 
21st century. This expansion could be seen from the increasing numbers of the 
Confucius Institutes, joint universities and student exchanges, the expansion of media 
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exchange and cooperation, and the growth of cultural exchange events and activities 
within the three case study countries. Attempts at cultivating an economically strong 
image of a modern China through a series of cultural diplomacy practices revealed the 
fundamental content of the Chinese Dream to be the improvement of common 
people’s material living standards. More importantly, the adoption of the traditional 
Chinese culture demonstrated that there was a high level of correspondence between 
the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy toward the three case study countries and 
the overarching ideological guidance of the Chinese Dream. Traditional Chinese 
culture has been mobilised as the key resource for generating a favourable image of 
China throughout the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan, Russia and 
the United States in the Chinese Dream era. The mobilization of elements from 
traditional Chinese culture, such as Confucianism, Chinese traditional literature, 
Chinese traditional art and sport, and Chinese ancient history, showed that China’s 
cultural diplomacy has reflected growing cultural confidence that echoed with “the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, a process of self-acknowledgement and self-
awakening based on the understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture. On the 
other hand, by highlighting the history and cultural heritage, it corresponded with the 
“rejuvenation” of the Chinese Dream: neither modern China nor the Chinese culture 
is rising from nothing, what it pursues now is the status of where it used to be 
economically and culturally.  
 
However, instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, both the narratives of the 
Chinese Dream and the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy varied in different cases, 
depending on the target country’s culture, political values, and their unique cultural 
relationship with China. For example, in the realm of media exchange, China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Japan featured many of documentaries that reflected the changes 
of common people’s lives, which was a strong contrast compared to the low level of 
media exchange with Russia. In the realm of educational exchange, China’s cultural 
diplomacy toward Russia has featured a particular increase in joint universities while 
the focus has already been shifted to seek for a better educational quality when it 
comes to the United States. Furthermore, although cultural affinity was adopted as an 
essential element in the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy, the key focus 
varied in different cases: in the case of Japan, traditional cultural affinity under the 
East-Asian cultural sphere has been mobilised as a key point in facilitating cultural 
diplomacy activities in order to generate a favourable image of China; in the case of 
Russia, the political cultural affinity of a shared communist history became a key 
resource within Sino-Russian cultural exchanges.  
 
The narratives of the Chinese Dream also varied in different cases based on the target 
country’s distinctive cultural and diplomatic relationship with China. For example, 
there was a clear shift in presenting Japanese people pursuing a better life in China 
through a series of media resources. The focus of the Chinese Dream toward Japan 
was to present Japanese audiences with images of an economically strong and 
culturally prosperous neighbouring rival. When looking at Russia however, few media 
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resources reflected the recent changes in contemporary Chinese society and the real 
lives of Chinese people. The focus of cultural diplomacy toward Russia was to create 
an image of China as both economically strong and beneficial, but at the same time an 
unthreatening neighbouring. In the case of the U.S., the Chinese Dream was reflected 
in China’s use of cultural diplomacy to rebrand China as a powerful and responsible 
global player who does not challenge American hegemony. Interestingly, we also 
observed how China’s cultural diplomacy reacted differently in different cases when 
confronted with challenges and criticism. In the case of Japan, the attitude of the 
Chinese government regarding the historical disputes was rather assertive, as seen in 
the attempts at convincing young Japanese people to accept the Chinese ‘narratives’ 
that have been put forward in the practices of cultural diplomacy. In comparison, 
China’s cultural diplomacy tended to be passive and quiet when confronted with 
challenges from the United States.  
 
Overall, it argued that the practices of China’s cultural diplomacy toward Japan, Russia, 
and the United States broadly corresponded with Xi’s Chinese Dream. Practice and 
paradigm both demonstrated a broad commitment to more confident leadership and 
the projection of Chinese leadership within international politics. Instead of adopting 
a one-size-fits-all approach, both the Chinese Dream paradigm and the practices of 
China’s cultural diplomacy varied in different cases depending on the targeted 
country’s culture, political values, and the unique cultural and diplomatic relationship 
with China.  
Contribution to International Relations literature on soft power 
Considerable debates have taken place regarding the two elements of soft power: 
attraction and persuasion. (Mattern, 2005; Li, 2009; Gallarotti, 2011; Rothman, 2011; 
Gallarotti, 2011; Kearn, 2011). Within existing literature on soft power, we saw 
prominent calls for high levels of specificity and disaggregation (e.g. Breslin, 2011; Bar, 
2011; Gallarotti, 2011; Kearn, 2011). This thesis highlighted that ‘attraction’ 
fundamentally relies on certain cultural resources of soft power, which are inherently 
attractive, influential, and alluring in nature. Furthermore, soft power rests on the 
ability of framing and persuasion as a means by which to generate particular 
perceptions within its audiences. Given the diversity of the audiences, it is necessary 
to strategically understand the differences between specific targets before putting 
forward any message or policy. Therefore, observing ‘persuasion’ requires us to 
distinguish different targets in specific contexts, which brings out the significance of 
case study research. 
Within existing literature, considerable attention has been paid to the observation of 
soft power through the lens of public diplomacy (Wang, 2011; Hayden, 2012; 
D’Hooghe, 2015). By pointing out that there was often a distinct lack of clarification of 
cultural diplomacy within the soft power sphere, this thesis extended the existing soft 
power theory by stating that cultural diplomacy an example of states’ attempts to 
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cultivate soft power. It argued that cultural diplomacy can be deployed as a means of 
mobilizing soft power by the states. Here ‘mobilizing’ means both generating and 
wielding soft power. More specifically, generating soft power involves the integration 
of soft power resources that a country possesses and the strategy of framing an 
agenda to maximize the possibility of wielding soft power. Whereas wielding soft 
power includes the process of persuading and influencing either other states or the 
citizens of those states in order to achieve one’s foreign policy goals. On the one hand, 
cultural diplomacy can be more explicitly related to issues of security and foreign policy.  
On the other, cultural diplomacy also strives to build commonalities by interpreting 
the resources of culture, values and institutions inside the home. Therefore, it is crucial 
to consider cultural diplomacy as an example of states’ attempts to cultivate soft 
power, and by focusing on these practices we can shed light on soft power promotion 
in particular countries.  
This thesis contributed to IR literature on soft power by introducing a three-
dimensional analytic framework for analysing cultural diplomacy, with the aim of 
bridging the literature of both soft power theory and cultural diplomacy. This 
framework explored manifestations through the spheres of media, (e.g. film, book and 
publishing, internet, television, and broadcast), education (e.g. education exchange 
programmes, language institutes), and cultural exchange (e.g. culture, music, art, sport 
exchange initiatives and activities). The creation of this three-dimensional framework 
of analysis provided a key contribution to this thesis, which allowed for a holistic and 
structured analysis within a field where the focus of much literature was either under-
defined or somewhat narrow.  
Overall this thesis aimed to extend existing IR literature on soft power theory. This aim 
was accomplished by first providing a high level of specificity and disaggregation 
regarding ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ that highlighted the significance of case study 
research; secondly, by pointing out cultural diplomacy as an example of states’ 
attempts to cultivate soft power, which bridged the gap between literature on both 
soft power and cultural diplomacy; and thirdly, by offering an analytic framework for 
studying cultural diplomacy that focused on media, educational, and cultural exchange 
dimensions, which allowed for a holistic and structured analysis. 
Contribution to Chinese studies literature 
Existing literature on Chinese studies has paid considerable attention to China’s foreign 
policy and diplomatic relations with the three case studies countries, namely Japan 
(e.g. Iriye, 1990; Rose, 2000; Yahuda, 2006; Hagström,2008; Sun, 2012; Mori, 2013; 
Beeson and Li, 2014; Yang, 2015; Men, 2016, Zhao, 2016), Russia (e.g. Nolan, 1995; Lo, 
2002; Popov, 2014; Eder, 2014; Wijk, 2015) and the United States (e.g. Nye, 2005; 
Callahan, 2008; Steinfeld, 2010). More recently, existing literature on China’s soft 
power and cultural diplomacy has placed a greater focus on either comparing or 
assessing China’s soft power with those three countries. (Japan: e.g. Heng, 2010; Sun, 
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2012; Russia: e.g. Nye, 2013; Shambaugh,2013; Wilson, 2015; Rawnsley, 2015; United 
States: Nye, 2004; Callahan, 2017). Furthermore, some studies also explored China’s 
soft power by paying particular attention to certain initiatives, such as the 
development of the Confucius Institutes and the recent Belt & Road initiatives (e.g. 
Wang, 2011; Hughes, 2014; Hartig, 2014; Hartig, 2015; Lahtinen, 2015; Gil, 2017) or 
specific fields such as film cooperation, joint education, student exchange and tourism 
(e.g. Lao, 2012; Smirnova, 2016; Peng, 2017, Yang, 2017; Song, 2018). For example, 
Chao (2016) provided an overview of Sino-Japanese film and television cooperation 
from the 1980s to the beginning of the 21st century. Fan and Zhang (2017) took the 
Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan University as a case and analysed China’s public 
diplomacy in promoting diplomatic relations with Japan. Valeev and Alikberova (2011) 
presented a detailed analysis and evaluation of Sino-Russian cultural exchange policies, 
education programmes and events, the main results, trends, and prospects of Russian-
Chinese relations in the field of culture between the 1990s to 2000s.  
 
A great deal of attention has been drawn to the Chinese Dream, particularly within IR 
academia (Mohanty, 2013; Link, 2015; Liu, 2015; Zhao and Gan, 2015; Kerr, 2015; Barr, 
2015; Callahan, 2017; Ho, 2018). Some work examined how the system of Chinese 
diplomacy has changed within Xi’s Chinese Dream era since the 18th CCP’s National 
Congress by looking into Xi’s key statements and strategic ideas. (Zhao and Gao, 2015, 
p.43). Some work focused on the comparison of the Chinese Dream with other 
countries such as the United States (Callahan, 2017), Japan, Russia, and India (Zheng, 
2013).  Furthermore, some research pointed out the key barriers and limitations of the 
Chinese Dream. (Barr, 2015; Kerr, 2015; Servaes, 2016; Callahan, 2017). For example, 
Kerr (2015, p.5) argued that the Chinese state’s unwillingness to share political and 
legal authority with a civil society was the largest single barrier to achieving the goal 
of good governance on which the goal of national rejuvenation would depend. Barr 
(2015, p.7) stated that there was little prospect of bringing back traditional Chinse 
values to everyday life due to China’s people becoming part of the modern world, and 
therefore the promotion of Chinese traditional values was more to do with managing 
the manifold problems and dislocations of Chinese modernity. 
 
However, existing literature provided a low level of analysis of a historical exploration 
regarding the Chinese Dream discourse and China’s cultural diplomacy. Elements such 
as traditional Chinese culture, Chinese history, and Chinese political values have been 
largely neglected or unclarified in the existing literature surrounding China’s soft 
power and cultural diplomacy. In order to understand how ideology works in the 
Chinese social context and how it is reflected in practice, it argued that a more 
systematic clarification of the Chinese mentality based on a deep understanding of 
Chinese history and Chinese culture is necessary. More importantly, little work has 
been done to systematically examine the comparison of how the Chinese Dream 
ideology corresponds with the practice of cultural diplomacy, particularly within the 
three case study countries. Rather than simply observing it within a domestic scope, 
the analysis of the Chinese Dream in correspondence with cultural diplomacy toward 
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distinctive countries could shed light on existing research regarding this notion.  
 
This thesis contributed to Chinese Studies literature by developing a comparative 
review of Chinese cultural diplomacy with three significant global and regional powers, 
namely Japan, Russia, and the US. This comparison specifically sought to explore the 
correspondence between the ideas embedded in the 'Chinese Dream' that 
purportedly guided foreign policy action and the practices of cultural diplomacy in 
these case study countries. There was a particular focus on three pillars of China’s 
cultural diplomacy (education, cultural exchange, and media). A large number of 
resources were used in order to systematically investigate the evolving pattern in 
official discourse and how they framed the relationship between China and each 
particular country. The resources included not only official documents, speeches, 
reports, but also comprehensive readings on soft power analysis, Chinese culture and 
foreign policy studies, which included scholarly articles and books, media reports, and 
various texts both in Chinese and English. It contributed to the existing literature by 
providing an updated and holistic analysis of China’s efforts to enhance its soft power 
toward the three case study countries within Xi’s presidency. More importantly, rather 
than simply observing China’s overall use of soft power, summarizing the distinctive 
features of China’s cultural diplomacy allowed us to see the similarities and differences 
between China’s cultural diplomacy toward three different case studies countries. 
Therefore, it allowed us to deeply understand the new trends of China’s pursuit of soft 
power within the Chinese Dream era.  
In sum, this thesis aimed to extend the existing literature on Chinese Studies by 
providing a holistic analysis of the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural diplomacy in 
cross-culture and cross-country studies. This aim was accomplished by first providing 
a high level of historical exploration of the Chinese Dream and China’s cultural 
diplomacy, and secondly by developing a comparative review of the interplay between 
ideas, namely articulations of the Chinese Dream ideology, and practices of cultural 
diplomacy within three significant global and regional powers. 
The question of the impact of Chinese soft power and cultural diplomacy is raised 
within prominent contributions to the field (e.g. Ding, 2006; Zhang and Guo 2017; 
Schneider 2009). Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that there is significant 
variation in the form and content of Chinese cultural diplomacy across the studied 
partner states, and that underlying this variation there is a broad adherence to the 
key pillars of the ‘Chinese Dream’ as articulated by the current leadership. These 
findings suggest that leadership exerts significant over practices of cultural diplomacy. 
Iris Shaw (2010) suggests that, in general terms, China’s attempts to project soft 
power through cultural diplomacy has been particularly effective wherein generating 
favourable popular attitudes in countries that display higher levels of nationalism, and 
that are non-Western. 270  These findings suggest that the studied cases provide 
potentially fruitful foundations for impact from cultural diplomacy interventions. 
Specifically, all three cases are typically held to exhibit relatively strong nationalism 
amongst domestic populations, and the Japanese and Russian cases are typically 
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classified as non-Western. This thesis suggests that China is engaging in a form of 
customised cultural diplomacy, shaping interventions according to the specifics of the 
pre-existing relationship with the case study country and country-specific 
characteristics. The question of whether such customised cultural diplomacy is further 
enhancing the impact of Chinese cultural diplomacy is worthy of further study. 
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